The Sahel, a vast region south of the Sahara where desert gradually turns into savanna and tropical forest, usually draws global attention only when a military conflict escalates in the area, as it recently did in Mali.

The geographic and political core of the Sahel is traditionally understood as five countries: Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. Sudan is sometimes added to that list, but today that is more of a formality. Since 2023, Sudan has been consumed by its fourth devastating civil war and is following its own trajectory. The five core Sahel states, however, share a similar historical background and a whole set of acute modern problems.

These states are first and foremost united by their colonial legacy. The countries, which gained independence from France in the 1960s, remained within the former colonial power’s sphere of influence for decades. A major factor was the use of the African franc, which firmly locked them in their economic dependence.

Another important factor is religion. Islam dominates the region, with Muslims making up more than 90% of the population in Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, and about 65% in Burkina Faso and Chad. At the same time, large territories are de facto controlled by radical groups operating under the banners of al-Qaida or the Islamic State. The economic situation remains dire, with the Sahel consistently ranking among the poorest regions in the world. GDP per capita ranges from $1,500 in Mauritania to a very modest $550 in Niger.

GDP per capita in the Sahel ranges from $1,500 in Mauritania to a very modest $550 in Niger

Extreme poverty is accompanied by a deep crisis of statehood. With the possible exception of relatively sparsely populated Mauritania, these are classic failed states, where authorities have weak control over borders and cannot provide the population with basic services, from education and health care to justice. The situation is aggravated by high birth rates, ranging from 4.4 children per woman in Burkina Faso to 6.7 in Niger, which could double the region’s population by 2050.

All these factors predictably led to political turbulence. About 10 to 15 years ago, the fragile stability there broke down. The rise of Islamists and the inefficiency of old pro-French elites triggered a series of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, finally undermining the legitimacy of state institutions.

From France to the jihadists

In the middle of the last century, much of Africa was under French rule. Unlike Algeria, which went through a brutal war of independence, the Sahel countries parted with the colonial power relatively peacefully. That left hope for constructive ties in a new format.

France’s strategy in Africa was based on maintaining its presence through military bases, economic projects, and development programs. But no clear long-term plan was ever developed. Memories of the Algerian conflict and discontent in newly independent states made the policy highly vulnerable: almost any action by Paris could easily be interpreted as neocolonialism.

For a long time, the Sahel remained on the margins of attention, overshadowed by more prosperous African neighbors. Local governments cooperated with the French military and French companies, for example, in uranium mining in Niger or gold mining in Mali, while periodically invoking historical injustice.

Another pattern was also visible: the more successful a state became, like Senegal or the Ivory Coast, the easier it was to build dialogue with France. Others, meanwhile, often sought to justify their failures by blaming the negative influence of the former colonial power.

States often sought to justify their failures by blaming the negative influence of France, the former colonial power

The colonial past is a difficult legacy, but more than 65 years of independence now make it possible to speak of different trajectories among various African states. Some have developed dynamically, even as others have remained stuck in ineffective models of corrupt and incompetent regimes that continue to seek legitimacy by settling scores with the former colonial power. Nevertheless, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, and several other countries have workable relations with France.

A new phase for the region began in January 2013, when jihadists in Mali launched their first offensive toward the capital, Bamako. Mali’s government formally requested help from Paris, and France responded with Operation Serval. Relying on bases in Niger and Chad, French forces quickly defeated the militants and restored government control over the north of the country.

But local military success did not solve systemic problems. To consolidate the gains, Paris launched Operation Barkhane. Its goal was to help the Sahel countries provide their own security with minimal external support. Still, even at its peak, the contingent numbered only 5,500 troops — far too few to control an area the size of Europe. The strengthening of national armies played an unexpected role: they developed political ambitions.

In the end, the initiative failed. Local governments remained passive, and the French presence, which had produced positive results at first, increasingly came to seem useless and reminiscent of the recent colonial past. A deepening internal crisis led to a series of military coups: two in Mali (in 2020 and 2021), then one in Burkina Faso in 2022, and finally one in Niger in 2023. Events in Chad, where President Idriss Déby was killed in an armed clash in 2021 and power passed by default to his son, must also be added to this list. In short, nearly all of the region’s weak and corrupt (but legitimate and pro-French) governments were replaced by military juntas with revolutionary ambitions.

France’s postcolonial policy is changing before our eyes. Operation Barkhane was Paris’ last attempt to build a major regional coalition against radical Islam and in support of development programs. However, France lost 58 troops during Operations Serval and Barkhane, a toll that French society expected ought to produce visible results. Those results did not materialize. As hostile forces seized power in key countries, the mission lost its purpose. In 2025, France officially closed its bases in Senegal and Chad. Now, in the event of a new crisis, France no longer has the infrastructure in place for a rapid military response.

Even before that, Paris had reacted cautiously to regime changes. Sanctions and diplomatic pressure from regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS (also known by its French acronym CEDEAO), did not shift the new authorities’ positions. Neither did threats that lacked military backing. When Assimi Goita led a mutiny in Mali in 2020, France stopped short of forceful intervention. Paris accepted the new political reality, seeking to avoid accusations of occupation after concluding that past direct military interventions in similar cases had been a mistake.

Russia enters the fray: Security for minerals

France’s departure created an opening for Russia. Moscow offered a model of cooperation through private military companies, in which protection for the ruling regime is exchanged for access to natural resources.

Since the 1960s, the Soviet Union viewed Africa as an important theater for anti-Western operations during the Cold War. Countries in the Sahel did not play the main role in those projects, but some of them, particularly Mali and Burkina Faso, declared that they had chosen a socialist path of development and received arms supplies, economic aid, and student training programs in return.

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia struggled for years to define its inherited relationships with African countries. With the emergence of the Wagner private military company in the 2010s, a solution appeared — providing security services for African governments in exchange for access to mineral resources. Russia had already tested that approach in the Central African Republic.

Two points are worth noting. First, the regimes most in need of PMC support were the most unstable, seeking to preserve the personal power of their leaders by any means possible, from police repression to aggressive propaganda. Second, there are questions about the economic profitability of these projects, since their costs can be enormous. They are not always possible without strong political backing. However, Vladimir Putin has revealed that Russian PMCs were funded by the state. 

The regimes most in need of PMC support were the most unstable, seeking to preserve the personal power of their leaders by any means

Military juntas, disillusioned with Paris, turned to Moscow. Mali was the first to initiate the withdrawal of French troops, specifically to replace them with Wagner units. Around the same time, the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger fell into international isolation and came under sanctions from neighboring countries. They then created the Alliance of Sahel States and officially left ECOWAS. Russia, meanwhile, remained in the region after the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, with Wagner’s functions transferred to the Africa Corps, which is controlled by Russia’s Defense Ministry.

But changing partners has not brought stability. In July 2024, Mali’s army and Russian mercenaries were ambushed in the north of the country and suffered heavy losses. In November 2025, Bamako faced a blockade by radicals, and in January 2026, militants attacked the airport in Niamey, the capital of Niger. The recent killing of Mali’s defense minister offers another example.

In foreign policy, however, Moscow strengthened its position through support from these countries. In February 2025, the three Sahel states voted against a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Niger’s uranium illusion

Before the 2023 coup, Niger was France’s second-largest uranium supplier, with extraction carried out by the company Orano. Ore from Niger was transported south to the Beninese port of Cotonou, from where it was shipped by sea to France. There, uranium was enriched to the level needed for use in nuclear power plants. But Niger’s new leadership decided to revise the agreements, leading to litigation and a halt in production. In 2025, Niger signed a cooperation memorandum with Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation.

Niger’s generals may have expected Russian companies to replace Orano quickly and easily. Instead, the plan ran into a logistical dead end. The problems include not only uranium extraction and storage, but also exports. Previously, uranium was shipped through Benin, a country friendly to France. However, that border is now effectively closed. An attempted coup in Benin in December 2025, in which Russia was suspected of involvement, failed.

Unlike the departing French — or representatives from China, India, Turkey and the Gulf monarchies, which are moving in — Russia has little to offer beyond military support for the current regime. It lacks experience operating in modern Africa through development programs, despite talk of possibly launching them.

Niger’s uranium sector shows that even where Russian companies may have potential advantages, the support of a military junta does not offset practical obstacles. The region’s main telecommunications operators, for example, still belong to international groups with no Russian involvement.

Dark prospects: Islamists, bandits and dictators

The Sahel is at an impasse. Military governments are in no hurry to hold elections, fearing the loss of power. The fight against jihadists is producing no clear successes, while interethnic conflicts remain acute. There is a serious risk that if radical groups create a caliphate here, it would be a structure modeled on ISIS, recognizing no borders. It would not look like Afghanistan, where the Taliban, while imposing its order inside the country, understood that borders existed and that neighbors were ready to defend them. In that sense, the Taliban could be considered a local phenomenon.

High birthrates, meanwhile, are creating an explosive demographic mix of rising unemployment and a low average age. The situation is partly eased by growing emigration, mainly toward the EU. But even those who fail to reach Europe try to settle in the Maghreb or the Middle East. This is not a free exodus, but an extremely risky undertaking given the prevalence of criminal trafficking through parts of the Sahara where no laws apply. Young people from the Sahel are not seen as welcome guests in more developed parts of Africa, let alone in Europe. The absence of life prospects leaves them with a narrow choice among attempted emigration, radical Islam, or criminal groups.

The young people of the Sahel are left with a narrow choice among attempted emigration, radical Islam, or joining criminal groups

Destabilization around the Sahel is unfolding almost on its own. It threatens, above all, the more prosperous countries of the Gulf of Guinea. The Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, and Cameroon feel this pressure on their northern borders, and the attempted coup in Benin in December 2025 can be seen as a sign of an expanding zone of political chaos. The Sahel risks becoming a vortex of instability that is already projecting threats onto neighboring states. Without large-scale international support, which is so far absent, it will be extremely difficult for the region to overcome this crisis.

Narek Karapetyan allegedly “submitted a false declaration to the Migration and Citizenship Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, asserting that he is not a citizen of another state and thereby concealing information about the existence of foreign citizenship that would prevent him from seeking the post of a public official,” according to the agency.

An investigation was opened under Armenia’s Criminal Code over allegations that information was concealed that could have barred a person from obtaining or holding public office.

On May 19, the Armenian outlet Medianews published an extract from Russia’s Unified State Register of Legal Entities (EGRUL), which indicated that Narek Karenovich Karapetyan is a citizen of Russia.

The Insider verified the data and confirmed that, according to EGRUL, Narek Karenovich Karapetyan is listed as a co-owner of the Moscow-based company Mospromekspluatatsiya LLC with a 2.5% stake. The document states that he is a Russian citizen.

Leaked Russian databases include an individual with the same full name and taxpayer identification number listed in the EGRUL extract. His passport number is shown as the letters “AN” followed by seven digits, a format used for Armenian passports. The website of Yerevan State University, Karapetyan’s alma mater, says he was born Oct. 31, 1990, while the leaked data lists his date of birth as Nov. 1, 1990.

Narek Karapetyan is the nephew of billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, the founder of Strong Armenia, which is registered to run in the June 7 parliamentary elections as part of a bloc of the same name. Narek Karapetyan tops the bloc’s electoral list. Samvel Karapetyan himself cannot run as he holds a Russian passport. Armenian law requires parliamentary candidates to have held only Armenian citizenship for at least four years.

In a May 19 investigation, The Insider published documents indicating links between Karapetyan Sr. and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). A source familiar with the billionaire’s entourage told The Insider that Samvel Karapetyan, who built his business empire in Russia, “has never been involved in politics” and that Moscow most likely forced him to “create the Strong Armenia bloc as a counterweight to Pashinyan.”

Samvel Karapetyan is under house arrest in Armenia while being investigated on suspicion of calling for the violent seizure of power, money laundering, and other crimes.

11 scientists in 11 years

The “hypersonics case” began in 2015 with the arrest of Vladimir Lapygin, a specialist at the Central Research Institute of Machine Building (TsNIIMash). He was 75 at the time, and 79 when he was granted parole.

After his case, 10 more Russian scientists working in this field were convicted on treason charges.  

• Viktor Kudryavtsev, 74. Also a TsNIIMash employee who, according to investigators, passed classified information to Belgium’s von Karman Institute for Fluid Dynamics. 
  
  The scientist spent one year and two months in pretrial detention until being released under a travel ban due to deteriorating health. The investigation into his criminal case was suspended in the summer of 2020. Kudryavtsev died from complications following cancer treatment in 2021.
• Roman Kovalev, 56. Deputy head of the Department of Spacecraft at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT) and head of the Heat Exchange and Aerogasdynamics Center at TsNIIMash. He was arrested in June 2019.
  
  In June 2020, a court sentenced him to seven years in a maximum-security penal colony. In the spring of 2022, the scientist was released due to illness after being diagnosed with terminal cancer. He died two weeks after his release.
• Anatoly Gubanov, 63. Head of the aircraft and missile aerodynamics division at the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute. He was arrested in late 2020 and is currently serving a 12-year sentence in a maximum-security penal colony, handed down in 2023.
• Valery Golubkin, 68. An associate professor at MIPT and researcher at the Zhukovsky Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI), Gubanov’s subordinate. Searches at Golubkin’s home were conducted on the day of Gubanov’s arrest.
  
  In a letter from pretrial detention, Golubkin wrote that his arrest followed testimony from his supervisor, who had struck a deal with investigators. His lawyer said the case was based on the physicist’s publicly available reports prepared as part of a cooperation project with a European institute. In June 2023, a court sentenced him to 12 years in prison.
• Alexander Kuranov, 73. Head of the Research Enterprise of Hypersonic Systems. Kuranov was arrested in August 2021. Of all the defendants in the case, he received the shortest sentence of seven years, even though the minimum sentence for treason is 12 years. 
  
  Kuranov cooperated with the investigation and, according to T-invariant, testified against at least two of his colleagues: Alexander Maslov and Alexander Shiplyuk.
• Alexander Maslov, 75. Chief researcher at the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ITAM) in Novosibirsk.
  
  Maslov’s arrest in 2022 marked the beginning of the “Novosibirsk branch” of the “hypersonics case,” centered on research at ITAM, T-invariant notes. In May 2024, he was sentenced to 14 years in prison. Two months before the verdict, the scientist suffered a heart attack while in pretrial detention.
• Dmitry Kolker, 54. A researcher at the Institute of Laser Physics of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Novosibirsk State University. 
  
  The scientist was arrested June 30, 2022. Kolker’s relatives told The Insider he was taken from a hospital, where he had been admitted the day before. He was then transported to Moscow and placed in the Lefortovo pretrial detention center, despite being terminally ill with cancer. On July 2, it emerged that Kolker had been hospitalized, and he died the next day.
• Alexander Shiplyuk, 55, the director of ITAM, was arrested in August 2022. Prosecutors sought the maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, but a court sentenced him in September 2024 to 15 years in a penal colony.
• Valery Zvegintsev, 79, became the third ITAM researcher to be detained on suspicion of treason. 
  
  It was only after his arrest in spring 2023 that staff at the institute publicly responded to the prosecutions. An open letter supporting the scientists was posted on the institute’s website, with employees saying they were “not only afraid for the fate of our colleagues,” but also “simply do not understand how to continue doing our work.” 
  
  Zvegintsev was sentenced in May to 12.5 years in prison.
• Vladislav Galkin, 68, was an associate professor at Tomsk Polytechnic University and a co-author of Zvegintsev and Shiplyuk. His arrest became known in December 2023. He was sentenced to 12.5 years in prison on the same day as Zvegintsev.

“Easy to pressure”

Of the 11 scientists arrested in the “hypersonics case,” eight were elderly at the time of their detention, ranging in age from 63 to 79.

Valery Zvegintsev became the oldest scientist convicted of treason in the case. He was 82 when he was sentenced and is expected to remain in prison until age 93. His close colleague Anatoly Maslov is expected to remain behind bars until age 90.

Ivan Pavlov, a lawyer and founder of the Pervy Otdel (lit. “Department One”) human rights project, told T-invariant that Russia’s security services deliberately targeted elderly scientists because they were easier to pressure.

“The ‘hypersonics case’ began when Putin casually said at one event that Russia’s hypersonics are the most hypersonic in the world and that intelligence services from every country are hunting for information about them. Someone heard that and decided to monetize it, in bureaucratic terms — essentially to curry favor. And so the manhunt began. It was easy as pie. These scientists, these research institutes — they are all in plain sight. All the security services had to do was draw up a list of international projects they had participated in and reassess them. What had previously been considered normal practice began to be viewed differently in light of Putin’s new fixation. They started looking at what information the researchers had exchanged with foreigners. ... And despite the approvals obtained for open publication (and those did exist), it was not particularly difficult to prove that the scientists had sent this kind of data, meaning they had shared classified information,” Pavlov said.

Before publishing these videos, the ministry actively circulated statements by officials claiming that no one was forcing Russian students to go to the front and that military contracts were signed strictly on a voluntary basis.

The first video tells the story of Mikhail Guzanov, a student at Don State Technical University (DSTU), who, according to the MoD, “fulfilled a long-held dream of flying by becoming a UAV pilot.”

“The most exciting part is flying real ones. It’s an incredible feeling! You soar like a bird,” Guzanov says in the video.

The Insider was able to confirm that Guzanov is a 21-year-old student at DSTU’s Faculty of Ground Transport Technologies. Judging by leaked online data, at the time of his birth his parents were registered at two military bases in the town of Bataysk in the southern Rostov Region. Both bases belong to the 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade, which took part in the occupation of Mariupol in 2022. It is unknown whether Guzanov’s parents are still serving in the military, although their age would allow it: his father is 49 and his mother 45.

The second video, titled “From Game Developer to Real Combat,” features another DSTU student, 21-year-old Alexander Rybasov. The MoD says Rybasov was studying programming and decided to sign a contract after recruitment into Russia’s drone systems forces began. In the video, Rybasov says he developed an interest in first-person view (FPV) drones while playing military video games.

“There are quite a lot of advanced military-themed games in Russia, and they also have their own ‘birds’ there. I flew them too, so I already have some experience,” Rybasov says.

The Insider confirmed his identity and the fact that he studied at DSTU in the “Game and Applied Software Development” program. Rybasov’s father is also an engineer, working as head of the relay protection department at the Rostov branch of the Russian Power System Operator. His family does not appear to have any links to the “special military operation.”

The third video focuses on Nikolai Ivanov, a student at Tomsk Polytechnic University from the city of Belovo in the Kemerovo Region. The video is titled “He Was a Student, and Became a Drone Operator.”

“I just up and left one day, signed a contract, and then filled out the paperwork for academic leave remotely,” Ivanov says. According to him, he was a second-year straight-A student and decided to go to war because “the motherland needs young, quick-thinking specialists.”

All three students say in the videos that they plan to return to their studies after their contracts end while continuing military training.

As the videos were being released, the BBC reported on the first known death of a Russian student recruited into the drone systems forces in May 2026. The outlet said Valery Averin, a 23-year-old resident of Buryatia, was killed near Luhansk on April 6, just days after being sent to the front.

Averin signed a contract with the Defense Ministry in January and trained as a drone operator. His adoptive mother, Oksana Afanasyeva, said the training ended in late March. On April 2, he called her for the last time, saying he was being sent somewhere “without network coverage.” A few days later, the family was told he had been killed in a mortar attack.

Afanasyeva said Averin was not supposed to take part in assault operations. “The kid trained for three months as a UAV operator, and then they threw him into an assault, into the worst meat grinder,” she said. She also said he had previously been found unfit for military service because of health issues. At the time he signed the contract, Averin was in his final year at the Buryat Republican Technical School of Construction and Industrial Technologies.

Russia’s Defense Ministry announced the creation of the drone systems forces in 2025. Soon after, Russian universities and vocational schools launched an aggressive campaign to recruit students for contract service in the MoD’s drone units.

Most of the plates bear round marks from small-caliber bullets, but several others show damage from larger munitions. Some plates are badly warped along the edges and have torn marks, apparently from mine or blast damage. All the images painted on the body armor plates have been consecrated, according to the exhibition description.

The exhibition occupies one of the theater’s lobbies, with works displayed along the walls on special stands. The admission is free but limited to those attending stage productions at the theater. Several icons are displayed on the way to the lobby, in hallways leading to staircases.

The idea of painting the images of Russian Orthodox saints on armor plates came from the clergy at Moscow’s Danilov Monastery, according to the exhibition description.

“Young artists enthusiastically took up the idea. Students from the V.I. Surikov Moscow State Academic Art Institute and the S. Andriyaka Academy of Watercolor and Fine Arts volunteered to transfer sacred faces onto armor scorched by war,” the description says.

The names of students and teachers who contributed to creating the icons on the armor plates are not indicated; the works are anonymous.

“We received these body armor plates straight from the front, untreated, with their wounds, in blood,” said Professor Anatoly Lyubavin, rector of the Surikov Institute. “The students had to prepare the surface, prime it, let it sit for a while, and then begin work using icon-painting techniques.”

Among the locations from which the plates came are Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Myrnohrad. All of those cities were fully or almost fully destroyed during intense fighting and were occupied, fully or partially, by Russian forces.

The exhibition is part of the “Russian Style: Steel” project, which has been on display in multiple Russian cities since 2024. The icons painted on armor plates have also been brought to Donetsk. The project’s ideologist is artist and pro-government activist Anton Belikov, a vocal advocate of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine whom pro-Kremlin Russian media have described as an “Orthodox philosopher.”

In 2016, Belikov vandalized an exhibition on the war in Donbas at Moscow’s Sakharov Center, splashing paint on works by photographers Alexander Vasyukovich of Belarus and Sergei Loiko of Ukraine, winners of the Direct View competition. The images showed Ukrainian soldiers, some of whom had already been killed.

The body plate armor project’s curator is Svetlana Cheprova, a pro-war artist who has organized several exhibitions, mostly in the field of Orthodox art. She raises funds to buy equipment for Russian soldiers, criticizes the West, and voices support for Russia’s invasion in comments to the media.

In late April, the icons were displayed on Smolenskaya Square across from the Russian Foreign Ministry building. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova gave a speech at the opening ceremony. The organizers initially announced that the exhibition would run at Lenkom from May 7 to 14, but as of May 19, the works were still in place.

“Semi-nationalization”

This week, Nature Energy Solutions Ltd., a company owned by Kazakh businessman Shakhmurat Mutalip, issued $1.2 billion in bonds. The bonds have a six-month maturity, and trading is set to begin May 20. 

As The Insider reported this past January, Mutalip planned to spend roughly the same amount, $1.4 billion, to buy the controlling 40% stake in Eurasian Resources Group, an international company engaged in mining and processing minerals. The current holders of the controlling stake, Patokh Chodiev and the family of the late Alexander Mashkevich, have reportedly received a $200 million advance payment from Mutalip.In theory, proceeds from the bond sale could cover the remaining $1.2 billion. The source of the amount already paid is unknown.

In early May, the Financial Times reported that ERG’s Kazakh entities were headed for de facto partial nationalization after Roman Sklyar, Kazakhstan’s deputy prime minister at the time, joined the company’s board in March. On May 5, Sklyar was appointed head of the Presidential Executive Office. The FT, citing company sources, reported that Sklyar could also be installed as ERG’s CEO; whether he has taken the post remains unclear.

With Kazakhstan’s government already owning 40% of ERG, the outlet described the state’s effort to take control of the company as “semi-nationalization.” 

Kazakhstan’s Presidential Executive Office also has ties to Mutalip’s company that issued the bonds. According to the public register on the Astana International Financial Centre website, two new people joined the board of Nature Energy Solutions Ltd. on May 12. One of them, Baurzhan Bishenov, shares a name with the deputy head of the regional development monitoring department of the Presidential Executive Office, who assumed office in April 2025. It is unclear whether he still holds it, as the department’s page on the Kazakh president’s website is empty.

International struggle

Switzerland-based Glencore, one of the world’s largest suppliers of minerals, nonferrous metals, and energy resources, was initially expected to support Mutalip’s purchase of the ERG stake.

In March 2026, Glencore offered an $800 million prepayment for future supplies of ferrochrome, an alloy used to make stainless steel. The payment could, in theory, have helped finance Mutalip’s bid. The Financial Times noted that Glencore had long worked with ERG and had previously tried to acquire it in 2011.

The Insider asked Glencore about its role in Mutalip’s planned purchase of the ERG stake. The company initially asked for a week to provide an official response, but did not reply. Two weeks later, The Insider learned that Glencore had pulled out of the deal.

A source familiar with the matter said Glencore may have withdrawn because of reputational risks.

Glencore has another investment project in Kazakhstan: Kazzinc, a major producer of zinc, lead, copper, and precious metals. In September 2025, Glencore considered selling its 70% stake in Kazzinc, but then abruptly reversed course, saying it considered the company a “strategic asset.” Less than three weeks passed between the two developments, according to documents reviewed by The Insider.

By late November, however, it emerged that talks on the sale of Glencore’s statke in Kazzinc were still underway, but with a new buyer in play — Shakhmurat Mutalip. The deal was valued at $3.5 billion.

Shopping for assets and the Russian trail

As Kazakh investigative journalists have repeatedly noted, the origin of Mutalip’s money is murky. Mutalip began his career in construction, and at the time when his nearly $1.5 billion offer for an ERG stake became known at the start of the year, he was not listed among Kazakhstan’s ultrawealthy.

The 35-year-old businessman entered the local Forbes ranking of Kazakhstan’s 75 richest people only in May – the list’s youngest member and a new entrant, ranking 22nd.

As Mutalip is weighing purchases of Kazzinc and ERG, his construction company, Integra Construction KZ, is carrying out major projects, including railways, power plants, buildings, and water supply networks. RFE/RL’s Central Asia unit, Azattyq Asia, has cited support from “the authorities” as key to the businessman’s entrepreneurial success, but stopped short of naming specific officials.

Interest from Kazakhstan’s Presidential Executive Office in Mutalip’s prospective deal is also confirmed by the presence ofits chief on ERG’s board. A source familiar with the negotiation process told The Insider that at least “passive support” from the state body is “obvious.”

In March, after Mutalip’s plans to acquire Kazzinc and ERG became public, his Central Asia Resources Holding Ltd. purchased the gold mining company Altynalmas. Mutalip also bought the Ordabasy football club.

There is also a Russian connection in Mutalip’s biography. Sources have told The Insider that he has close ties to Russian bankers, is personally acquainted with VTB President Andrey Kostin, and was “introduced” to Russian banks by the oligarch Alisher Usmanov. More details on Mutalip’s ties to Russia are available here.

Labour’s mistakes

So what is behind this collapse? The extraordinarily low personal approval rating of Prime Minister Keir Starmer –negative 66% – certainly played a role. In an IPSOS poll, 79% of Britons said they were dissatisfied with his performance, while only 13% expressed satisfaction.

It is the lowest figure for any prime minister since such polling began in 1977. Following Labour’s rout in the local elections, commentators have even begun referring to Starmer as a “zombie prime minister”: few believe he will survive in office until the end of the year, let alone survive until the next general elections.

And yet the issue is not only – or even primarily – the personal unpopularity of a leader many in Britain see as an unprincipled opportunist with no clear convictions, as well as a poor speaker and communicator utterly lacking in charisma.

Many in Britain see Starmer as unprincipled, opportunistic, and, on top of that, a poor speaker and communicator utterly lacking in charisma

Voters are clearly disappointed with the government’s domestic – economic and social – policies. It is widely acknowledged that Labour’s impressive victory in the 2024 parliamentary elections, which gave the party an absolute majority in the House of Commons and the ability to pass whatever legislation it wished, was not driven by the appeal of its platform. The outcome was determined by voters’ revulsion toward the Conservatives, who had exhausted the public’s trust after 14 years in power. It was a classic protest vote – not for, but against. Once in office, Labour failed to use its overwhelming majority to adopt any coherent program of its own.

The central mantra of Starmer’s cabinet was a commitment to economic growth. But by now it is clear that this strategy has completely failed. Fiscal policy proved to be a colossal mistake: small and medium-sized businesses were hit with a triple blow. Taxes rose, employers’ social insurance contributions increased, and the minimum wage was raised as well. As a result, every job became far more expensive for companies – in many cases by as much as £10,000 a year.

As a result of these decisions, Starmer’s government lost the support of business owners – but not only theirs. Squeezing entrepreneurs dry means abandoning any hope of meaningful economic growth and, consequently, any rise in living standards. Paradoxically, the legacy of Starmer, who is considered a moderate centrist by Labour standards, resembles some of the party’s most notorious failures: the highest tax burden in 80 years, rapidly growing welfare spending, and labor legislation leading to business decline and job cuts. To top it all off, he failed to stop the flow of illegal immigrants – an issue that deeply irritates voters.

The working class has largely turned away from the ruling party. In many areas, working-class voters backed either Reform UK or the Green Party. A widespread view has taken hold that Labour can no longer be considered the party of workers – that it now represents little more than the interests of the unemployed and disabled living on generous benefits, as well as the idle. The government is prepared to spend colossal sums on welfare – more than £300 billion a year. At the same time, more than 9 million working-age Britons are classified as “economically inactive” – in other words, people who are not even attempting to find work.

To Starmer’s credit, he did try to cut or at least restrain the growth of welfare spending, but he achieved nothing. Left-wing MPs from the ruling party – the so-called backbenchers, who do not hold government posts – quickly forced him to make concessions. In the King’s Speech outlining the government’s legislative agenda for the near future, the anticipated welfare reform bill failed to materialize. Nor did the long-awaited draft law on tax relief for entrepreneurs, whom Labour has pushed to the brink.

Who comes after Starmer?

Labour has found itself facing a fatal dilemma: the views and sentiments of the majority of party members, including those in its parliamentary faction, do not align with the views of most of the population. The Conservative Party has found itself confronting much the same problem – though on the opposite, right-wing flank of British politics. Is it any wonder that the two parties, which for decades had alternated in power according to the swings of public opinion, have now lost their positions – perhaps forever?

The main question occupying British newspapers of every political orientation these days is: what comes after Starmer? Who could replace him, and can a change of leader save the Labour Party from political collapse – and the country from a severe crisis? Several prominent figures are being mentioned as theoretically capable of securing sufficient support both within the ruling party’s parliamentary faction and among its rank-and-file members. But two figures deserve particular attention.

First, there is former Health Secretary Wes Streeting –eloquent, quick-witted, and always self-assured. He is a modern-style politician who knows how to hold an audience, is unafraid of difficult questions, and has proven himself a master of soundbites – short, aphoristic remarks journalists love to quote. He gives the impression of being capable of formulating a coherent, rational, and above all realistic program that could help address the country’s economic problems. He is not a slave to ideology, but rather a continuation of the moderate, pragmatic course of Tony Blair and New Labour. Streeting is openly gay and could become the first LGBT person to lead a British government. But that troubles few people. What hurts him instead is the fatal mismatch between his worldview and pragmatism on the one hand and the dogmatic views of the deeply ideological backbenchers and party members on the other. To them, he is “too right-wing.” So who, then, might satisfy them as a replacement for Starmer? Manchester Mayor Andrew (Andy) Burnham.

A poll conducted by Compass among more than 1,000 party members found that 42% would choose Burnham as Starmer’s successor, while only 11% would vote for Streeting. YouGov polling shows that Burnham significantly outperforms not only his Labour rivals but also the leaders of the country’s other major political parties. Some 34% of voters view him positively, while 30% view him negatively, giving him a net approval rating of plus four. That figure may not seem especially impressive, but none of Britain’s current political figures has a positive approval rating. Compared with other leadership contenders, Burnham also performs strongly. Former Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner has an approval rating of minus 35, while Wes Streeting stands at minus 25.

Burnham is widely considered to be handling his role as Manchester’s mayor successfully. In addition, he is sufficiently telegenic, a strong public speaker, and clearly possesses a measure of charisma – unlike the wooden Starmer. But above all, the issue lies in his political convictions.

He has openly declared himself to be a socialist, collectivist, and internationalist, as well as a supporter of a system for redistributing wealth within society – taking from the rich and giving to the poor.

Burnham has declared himself a socialist, collectivist, and internationalist, as well as a supporter of wealth redistribution within society

If rank-and-file Labour members and the backbenchers had their way, Burnham would immediately replace Starmer as party leader and prime minister, advancing their ideals: sharply higher taxes on the wealthy and corporations, greater state control over the economy, large-scale nationalization, and other elements of the left-wing agenda. But under party rules, anyone seeking the leadership must be a member of the House of Commons. In January, the party’s National Executive Committee refused to allow Burnham to stand in a by-election for a vacant parliamentary seat. Now, however, Josh Simons, Labour MP for the Makerfield constituency in northwestern England, has deliberately resigned in order to give Burnham an opportunity to enter Parliament. This time, Starmer’s supporters either could not or did not wish to prevent Burnham from running, and the executive committee did not object to his candidacy. That does not mean, however, that a leadership vote is imminent. Burnham’s supporters say that his main goal is to force such a vote before the party conference scheduled for the fall.

Commentators believe that a further shift to the left in British politics is inevitable in any case. If Starmer, contrary to expectations, manages to remain in office, he will have to cater even more to the mood within the party. If he is replaced by Burnham or by any of the other prominent contenders –with the exception of the “odd man out,” Streeting – the leftward shift will be even more pronounced. But Streeting’s chances are considered slim precisely because of his ideological distance from the party base. As a result, both government policy and the ruling party’s course will move even further left, widening the gap between public opinion and the ideology of those in power. That, in turn, is likely to end in a crushing Labour defeat at the next parliamentary elections and, perhaps by the logic of the political pendulum, the rise of right-wing populists to power.

Populists in power

Daniel Finkelstein, a prominent columnist for The Times, calls on the Labour Party to reinvent itself as the party of the liberal middle class. He recalls that historically the party was a coalition of three very different factions – trade unions, urban socialist intellectuals, and the liberal middle class. Now that coalition has fallen apart, and it can no longer be restored. What happened in the local elections was merely the logical culmination of a long process of disintegration.

The Greens have become a new radically socialist party – and for the first time achieved a measure of success. Nationalistically minded voters have shifted to Reform UK under Farage. Meanwhile, middle-class liberals have been left without a political home, as the Liberal Democrats have failed to formulate any coherent program distinguishing them from the other parties.

However, Finkelstein is indulging in wishful thinking. There is indeed a demand for a strong centrist party representing the interests of the liberal intelligentsia and the middle class. But in practice Labour cannot possibly play that role. The party is entirely dependent on financial support from the trade unions; without it, it would be unable to function, and union leaders have little interest in a liberal agenda. Nor would most ordinary Labour members likely accept such a transformation.

Most importantly, the crisis affecting the ruling party, as well as the opposition Conservatives, is closely tied to the broader process of decline of Britain’s political system. A significant part of the electorate has lost not only its faith in the two traditional parties but also its confidence in the way British democracy itself functions, as well as in politicians and the central government.

A significant part of the electorate has lost not only its faith in the two traditional parties but in the way British democracy itself functions

Under these conditions, society is undergoing painful polarization. Populists, both right-wing and left-wing, are gaining strength. The country’s most popular party, Reform UK, resembles a personality cult centered on its leader, Nigel Farage, who is seriously aiming to reach the pinnacle of power in the coming years. He has nothing even remotely resembling a coherent economic or social program – and does not seem to need one. He promises to stop immigration and make England “great again,” imitating his political idols –Trump and Orbán. In other words, this is undisguised populist nationalism, appealing to xenophobic sentiments and to the growing wave of ressentiment spreading through society and amplified by social media – feelings of hostility, envy, and powerless resentment toward those whom people blame for their misfortunes. For many, those targets are immigrants and the people supposedly enabling them. On the opposite flank stands the Green Party, led by Zak Polanski, whom his opponents regard as a charlatan.

It is enough to recall his claims that, while practicing hypnotherapy, he discovered that hypnosis could be used to increase the size of women’s breasts. He shamelessly embellished his biography with falsehoods. More importantly, under his leadership the Greens have abandoned their traditional role. Environmental protection has receded far into the background, replaced by promises of crude socialist egalitarianism based on the principle of “take and redistribute,” along with calls to punish Israel for what the Greens describe as a “genocide in Gaza.” The party’s anti-Israel rhetoric and protests often verge on antisemitism – and at times cross that line outright.

In Birmingham, a party activist responded with a laughing emoji to a commemorative post honoring the victims of the October 7 terrorist attacks, after which he won election to the local council with 20.5% of the vote. Rebecca Jones, a Green Party candidate in London’s Lewisham district, praised in her social media posts one of Hamas’s most brutal terrorists, Yahya Sinwar, who is considered the chief organizer of the mass killings of Israeli civilians. She also called to “burn Zionism to the ground.” In Newcastle, another prominent Green activist, Tina Ion – who brazenly uses the pseudonym “Anne Frank” – declared that “Israel must be deleted in every sense of the word.” In Croydon, Mark Edderly warns of “Jewish conspiracies” threatening the world.

Overall, more than 30 party candidates were accused of making antisemitic remarks on social media during the election campaign. Polanski himself attracted attention by liking a post by one of his fellow party members in which the latter criticised the police for the way officers dealt with a terrorist who had attempted to kill two Jewish passers-by.

It is no coincidence that the Greens received substantial support in areas with large Muslim populations. British Muslims, dissatisfied with Starmer’s Middle East policy and his unwillingness to break with Israel, are believed to have turned away from Labour, which they had traditionally supported. Some observers see this as one of the reasons for the ruling party’s crushing defeat in the latest elections. Certain commentators now argue that political outcomes in Britain may increasingly be shaped by events in Gaza and Iran. Commentator Robert Colvile even suggested that the fierce debate once centered on Brexit has now given way to another dividing line: “the key question in British politics has been replaced with “Jews or Muslims?’”

The Greens received substantial support in areas with large Muslim populations

Colvile’s assertion may be seen as a polemical exaggeration and an oversimplification. But there is little doubt that, within Britain’s fragmented and overheated public consciousness, both antisemitism and Islamophobia have become serious factors that, at times, determine the political choices of a not insignificant share of voters.

Even so, the Greens are unlikely to be in a position to form a government after the next parliamentary elections. But by siphoning votes away from Labour, they may help bring Reform UK to power. According to BBC projections, the Greens could secure 18% of the vote, putting them ahead of both Labour (17%) and the Conservatives (17%), trailing only Farage’s party at 26%.

An important fact: the Greens have become the most popular political force among young people, winning 49% support among voters aged 18 to 24. Labour may yet come to regret its initiative to grant voting rights to 16- and 17-year-olds.

In the current climate of fierce political debate, European policy has receded into the background. But most Britons still firmly support the government’s course of continuing strong support for Ukraine. There is no doubt that the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats share this position as well – something that cannot be said of the ascendant populists. Farage once openly admired Putin as a politician. He has repeatedly argued that the West “provoked this war,” claiming that NATO’s and the EU’s “endless eastward expansion” gave Vladimir Putin grounds to justify the invasion to the Russian people.

The Greens rarely speak publicly on this issue, but official party documents contain condemnations of Russia’s actions as an “aggressive war” and of its “drive for imperial domination.” At the same time, however, the party advocates cuts in military spending.

The erosion of the political center and the sharp polarization taking place in Britain mirror processes unfolding across many Western countries. Disillusioned voters have grown tired of the liberal-democratic model that emerged after the Second World War. They are increasingly inclined to give authoritarian populists a chance – politicians who will undoubtedly attempt to weaken or even dismantle traditional democratic institutions and systems of checks and balances, subordinating the courts and media to themselves. Such a “cure” may prove far more bitter and dangerous than the disease itself.

The measures were taken under an interagency order on cooperation to identify bad-faith participants in foreign economic activity. The list of companies was prepared by the Ministry of Economy and Commerce together with other government agencies that had previously reviewed cases of sanctions circumvention.

In an official statement, the ministry said the measures are aimed at protecting the national economy from the potential impact of secondary sanctions. It added that a set of control mechanisms had been adopted in the interests of “Western partners” to prevent sanctions violations.

On April 22, the EU for the first time activated a special “anti-circumvention tool” against Kyrgyzstan to counter sanctions evasion involving Russia. The move barred the Central Asian country from importing a range of dual-use goods, such as computer numerical control (CNC) machines and radios, from Europe. Brussels said Bishkek is being systematically used to re-export such goods to Russia and that technical talks on strengthening border controls have failed to produce results. Several Kyrgyz logistics companies were also cut off from access to EU transport infrastructure.

The EU had previously sanctioned several Kyrgyz banks on suspicion of helping circumvent its restrictions. Bishkek has repeatedly called the measures unfounded, while the country’s Foreign Ministry said in 2023 that Kyrgyzstan complies with sanctions “where possible.”

In March 2026, Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiev denied a Financial Times report that the country was prepared to sue the EU over sanctions linked to re-exports. He said Bishkek was instead ready to impose its own sanctions on companies supplying Moscow with sanctioned goods, including by revoking their registration.

“During the inspection, responsible officers reviewed medical documents, obtained explanations from convicts and staff at the administration of IK-18 [Polar Owl], and examined footage from stationary surveillance cameras and body cameras. The recordings were preserved for review to the prosecutors and employees of Russia’s Investigative Committee. No video recordings were concealed or deleted.

…On the special prosecutor’s instructions, medical workers from Branch No. 9 of Medical Unit No. 11 of the Federal Penitentiary Service conducted a medical examination of the convict, during which no bodily injuries were found on the surface of his body.”

Miftakhov confirmed that a medical examination had been ordered for him, but it was carried out two weeks after the alleged torture. “By that time there were no traces left,” he explained.

The support group said the Investigative Committee’s office in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District is still conducting a preliminary inquiry into a complaint filed by Miftakhov’s lawyer.

On May 4, The Insider published Miftakhov’s account of the torture he said he had been subjected to on April 21, shortly after arriving at the IK-18 prison colony, also known as  Polar Owl, in the settlement of Kharp. The Polar Owl facility is notably down the road from IK-3 Polar Wolf, the prison where opposition politician Alexei Navalny was murdered with a deadly toxin in February 2024.

According to Miftakhov, he was tortured with electric shocks, beaten on the heels with a wooden hammer, and threatened with rape. Miftakhov named the Federal Penitentiary Service officers who he said took part in the abuse.

The Insider identified two employees whom Miftakhov mentioned in his account: Mikhail Sobolev from Tyumen and Pavel Kiselev from the Sverdlovsk Region. According to Miftakhov, Sobolev personally took part in the beatings, rape threats and torture, while Kiselev was present in the room where the political prisoner was tortured with electric shocks.

In response to a request from The Insider, the ministry said Danish authorities had not suspended contracts with the company “either now or previously.”

“The Danish authorities have not paused the work, either now or previously. Cooperation with the company on establishing production in Denmark through Fire Point’s Danish subsidiary is continuing. The Danish authorities are in ongoing contact with the Ukrainian authorities and are following the case closely,” the ministry representative stated.

The Ukrainian missile and drone manufacturer announced plans to build a plant in Denmark this past March. The facility will produce not only fuel but also missile bodies and engine components. The former production line is scheduled to be commissioned in 2026, while the latter will follow next year.

A source in Denmark’s Defense Ministry also expressed doubts that such a project could be frozen, noting that “the state has invested so much, both in terms of funding and support.”

Fire Point’s CEO earlier told the Financial Times that Copenhagen had suspended the contract to build the facility. He said the decision was prompted by media reports publishing transcripts of conversations involving Mindich, who is under investigation in Ukraine over alleged procurement fraud at Energoatom, the operator of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.

Media outlets have described Mindich as one of Fire Point’s potential beneficiaries – an allegation the businessman denied. Among the conversations published in late April was an exchange between Mindich and former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov dated July 8, 2025, in which Mindich discussed selling a stake in a company – which indirect evidence suggests could be Fire Point – to unnamed investors.

Fire Point co-owner Denys Shtylerman said at an investigative commission hearing in May that Mindich had sought to acquire 50% of the missile and drone manufacturer. According to Shtylerman, the talks lasted more than a year, until August 2025, but were unsuccessful.

With additional reporting by Morgane Fert Malka.

The information campaign against Pashinyan is being coordinated by the recently created Presidential Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation, which replaced the cultural ties directorate headed by Dmitry Kozak, who was removed after a failed attempt to influence last year’s elections in Moldova. The new directorate is led by Vadim Titov, a former nuclear industry official at the state atomic energy corporation Rosatom and an ally of Sergei Kiriyenko, the first deputy chief of Russia’s presidential administration (whom The Insider covered in its previous investigation). Titov’s start in the post was not especially successful: ahead of elections in Hungary, he flew to Budapest with his aide, Yegor Kvyatkovsky, also a Rosatom official, but the campaign ended in a crushing defeat for Viktor Orban. Now, however, Titov has a new chance to prove himself.

The direct handlers for Armenia from the Russian presidential administration are Valery Chernyshov, head of the USSP department for developing interregional and sociocultural ties, and his deputy, Dmitry Avanesov. Both come from the security services. After serving at a Russian military base in Abkhazia, in 2013 Chernyshov was invited to join military intelligence. He taught the basics of sabotage work at advanced training courses for GRU officers in the village of Zagoryansky in the Shchyolkovo District, at Military Unit 36360. In the presidential administration, he first oversaw Georgia before being reassigned to Armenia.

His deputy, Avanesov, graduated from the Peter the Great Military Academy of the Strategic Missile Forces and holds the rank of colonel. In 2012, he completed advanced training at the FSB’s Moscow Institute of New Information Technologies in a program focused on “systems for assessing, analyzing, and forecasting the state of national security.” Both men have repeatedly visited Yerevan, where they met with local Kremlin allies. In the Russian government, the Armenia portfolio is handled by Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk, who on a near weekly basis warns Yerevan of major economic problems if it continues moving closer to the EU and the U.S.

At the Foreign Ministry, the Armenian elections are handled by Mikhail Kalugin, head of the Fourth Department for CIS Countries. He began his diplomatic career as a press attache in Lithuania when the mission was headed by Yury Zubakov, a former deputy director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. In 2006, Lithuanian intelligence services suspected Kalugin of working for Russian intelligence, and he was recalled to Moscow.

In 2016, Kalugin worked as an economic counselor at the Russian Embassy in Washington, and his name appeared in media reports related to Moscow’s interference in the U.S. election. After those reports, he left the United States and was appointed head of a division in the Foreign Ministry’s foreign policy planning department. In July last year, he became head of the Fourth Department for CIS Countries.

The most active groups in Armenia include the Gorchakov Fund, which promotes pro-Kremlin narratives; the National Research Institute for the Development of Communications, headed by Vladislav Gasumyanov, a career officer of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service; the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank linked to foreign intelligence; and a large number of pseudo-political analysts, experts, councils, and organizations that receive funding from the Kremlin.

Long-familiar figures, including senators Konstantin Kosachev and Konstantin Zatulin, are in the front ranks of the propaganda campaign against Pashinyan. Zatulin heads the international Russian-Armenian Lazarev Club, which boasts among its members the billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, owner of the commercial real estate giant Tashir Group.

Rossotrudnichestvo, the federal agency responsible for Russian cultural outreach, is leading Moscow’s “soft power” efforts from the Russian Embassy. Its Russian House in Yerevan organizes seminars, lectures, roundtables, and summer camps where participants are shown films about the “revival of Nazism in Ukraine.” The programs mainly target young people, promoting the message that Armenia’s future is with Russia.

The Russian House in Yerevan mainly target young people, promoting the message that Armenia’s future is with Russia

The Russian House in Yerevan is headed by Vadim Fefilov, a former war correspondent with NTV. After Putin’s takeover of the network in 2000, Fefilov moved with the main group of journalists to TVS, which at the time was financed by the oligarch Boris Berezovsky. He later returned to NTV and in 2018 became an adviser to the channel’s CEO.

Igor Chaika, the son of former Prosecutor General Yury Chaika, was recently appointed head of Rossotrudnichestvo, a move that may also be linked to preparations for Russia’s direct interference in Armenia. The younger Chaika is widely known for his role in corruption scandals in the waste management business, but recently his profile has undergone a bit of a makeover.

Funding for the pro-Kremlin opposition during the Kremlin’s interference efforts in Moldova’s recent elections passed through Chaika. In 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department placed him under sanctions, and the European Union later followed suit. Rossotrudnichestvo’s previous head, Yevgeny Primakov Jr., also known as “Sandro,” repeatedly said it was time to end “balalaika diplomacy” and stop spending money on meaningless events abroad. However, the Kremlin apparently had a different view: Sandro was removed, and Chaika was appointed in his place.

The resident and his friends in Armenia

June 3 is expected to be a busy day at the Russian Embassy in Yerevan, where colleagues will congratulate trade representative Alexei Myshlyavkin on his 65th birthday before an evening banquet replete with the customary toasts to Russia, Putin, and Russian military success. Few diplomats, however, know that Myshlyavkin is not a trade representative, but the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service’s resident in Armenia. His name does not appear on the Russian Embassy’s website in Yerevan, but it is listed on the diplomatic roster.

Through his extensive network of agents, Myshlyavkin knows about every move made by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, a former opposition journalist who became prime minister after the 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” earning him special status as the main target of almost all Russian intelligence operations in the country. In Moscow, Pashinyan was given the operational codename “Boroda” (lit. “Beard”), and Russian intelligence began actively collecting material to compromise him.

Pashinyan, a former opposition journalist, became prime minister after the 2018 “Velvet Revolution” and has since served as the main target of Russia’s intelligence operations in Armenia

After graduating from the SVR Academy, the future resident Myshlyavkin was assigned to the foreign intelligence headquarters in the Moscow district of Yasenevo, where he served in the directorate that trained illegals for espionage in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The Myshlyavkin family lived in a building on Vilnius Street that was put up in 2002 by order of the SVR. The building’s “spy” connection became known due to the fact that an order by then-Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov was posted in the public domain. In 2017, the Myshlyavkins moved to the village of Kommunarka — near SVR headquarters — and three years later they were allowed to privatize their departmental apartment. In November 2020, Myshlyavkin arrived in Yerevan and took charge of the field office.

At the banquet, Myshlyavkin will be joined by his deputy, Sergei Katin, who began his military service as an engineer in the Federal Protective Service’s government communications directorate before entering the SVR Academy.

After graduation, Katin was assigned to the private company MVTs Znanie, which provides supplementary education services. There, he received a fictitious salary of 400 rubles a month [$5.50]. In 2007, Katin was officially listed in Foreign Intelligence Service Military Unit 33949, as shown by a leaked loan application. Since 2022 he has been spying on Armenia.

Katin’s new wife, Yevgenia, is chief financial officer at the U.S. company ChampionX, which works in chemical and drilling solutions. In 2024, ChampionX was acquired for $7.76 billion by Houston-based SLB (formerly known as Schlumberger), one of the world’s largest oilfield services companies.

In Russia, SLB works with Gazprom, Rosneft, and Lukoil. After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the company did not wind down its business but instead expanded, hiring close to a 1,000 new employees. To bypass sanctions, SLB buys equipment in China and India.

Vyacheslav Proshkin, Rosatom’s representative in Armenia, will almost certainly attend Myshlyavkin’s banquet. Proshkin’s duties include overseeing the Soviet-era Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, located 26 kilometers from Yerevan. In reality, that job is only cover, as Proshkin is a career GRU officer who closely monitors Armenia’s leadership.

Proshkin began his military service in the Defense Ministry’s Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation before being transferred to the “scandalous” Center for Financing Special Programs of the Defense Ministry, military unit 22280. The center controls huge sums of money and finances the Defense Ministry’s secret projects in the nuclear field, along with vaccine production. However, a separate part of its budget goes to military intelligence needs.

A major scandal broke out in 2020 when a former accountant from military unit 14118 told journalists about a secret scheme to siphon off budget funds. According to the accountant, the center’s commander, Col. Georgy Vasilyev, together with employees of the Defense Ministry’s 48th Central Research Institute and military unit 14118, “stole more than 355 million rubles through all kinds of payments, bonuses, and allowances to front persons.”

The FSB squad: Kivachuk, Kucheruk and Gladyshchuk

Representing the FSB at Myshlyavkin’s birthday celebration will be embassy adviser Sergei Kivachuk and First Secretary Vitaly Kucheruk. Before coming to Armenia, FSB General Kivachuk had never traveled abroad (at least not under his real name) serving in the Altai Krai, Krasnoyarsk Region, and Udmurtia. In 2017, he was appointed head of the FSB regional office in Mari El. In Altai Krai, court bailiffs pursued him over unpaid vehicle taxes. In Udmurtia, he arranged for his wife to work in classified records management at the Kalashnikov Concern. Soon after Sergei Shchukin, editor-in-chief of the newspaper Den, reported the appointment, his home was searched. In 2017, Shchukin was sentenced to 2.5 years in a maximum-security penal colony for allegedly extorting Kalashnikov CEO Konstantin Busygin.

General Kivachuk is not only spying on Pashinyan, but also closely tracking Russians who left for Armenia after the start of the “partial” mobilization campaign in September 2022. Many Russian emigres became open critics of Putin after leaving the country and continue to oppose the war in Ukraine. All of them need to be entered into operational records, and agents need to be embedded among them, meaning General Kivachuk has plenty of work to do in Yerevan.

Another guest at the banquet will be embassy First Secretary Sergei Kucheruk, whose CV has nothing to do with diplomatic work. Before Armenia, Kucheruk served in the FSB Directorate for the Baltic Fleet and troops of the Kaliningrad Region, which is part of the FSB’s Military Counterintelligence Department. He is often seen at the Russian military base in Gyumri, where he meets with his agents.

A source in Russia’s security services told The Insider that Kucheruk was part of a group that carried out operational work targeting the head of Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, Kristinne Grigoryan.

In 2023, Pashinyan created Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service and appointed Grigoryan, the country’s chief ombudswoman, to lead it.

“Kristinne was invited to Moscow for a short internship at the Foreign Intelligence Service Academy, for a conversation, but she went to learn the ropes at the CIA instead, and then the Americans helped her create the necessary structures in Yerevan. Of course, they dug into her personal life. They were especially interested in why she still lives without a husband. Well, they checked who she flew with through us to Beijing, but they did not obtain any operationally significant information,” the security service source told The Insider.

In March, Grigoryan’s service said foreign intelligence agencies were pressuring Armenian citizens living abroad ahead of the elections. Of course, that was primarily a reference to Russia, home to over 1 million people of Armenian origin.

Attaché Alexander Gladyshchuk will most likely come bearing gifts for resident Myshlyavkin. Before Yerevan, he served in the Defense Ministry’s 946th Main Center for Geospatial Information in Noginsk, near Moscow. The secret unit is tasked with “providing special geospatial information necessary for use in various types and systems of high-precision weapons.”

Gladyshchuk was previously sent to Belgium, where he drew up detailed maps showing NATO military sites and economically important facilities. In 2020, after fighting began in Nagorno-Karabakh, he was transferred to Yerevan, suggesting he has already marked several of Armenia’s critical sites on operational maps.

Russia’s candidates: One convicted of sexual assault, another had the FSB as a "place of work" 

During Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow in April, he and Putin clashed verbally after the Russian dictator said pro-Russian forces should be allowed to take part in the upcoming Armenian elections. Pashinyan replied that Armenia’s Constitution bars citizens of other countries from running in parliamentary elections, let alone becoming prime minister. Putin did not name anyone explicitly, but it was understood that he had in mind billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who founded the Strong Armenia electoral bloc and plans to assume the post of prime minister if it wins.

Karapetyan is currently under arrest on charges of money laundering and publicly calling for the seizure of power. Born in 1965 in the Armenian city of Tashir, Karapetyan began his business career selling enamelware. In the early 1990s, he moved to Kaluga and took Russian citizenship. Stores, restaurants, shopping centers, and a brick factory appeared in the city under the Tashir brand. He later moved to Moscow and eventually became one of the capital’s 10 largest builders and developers. Tashir is listed as a major contractor for Gazprom, while Karapetyan also owns 71.29% of Fora Bank. In November 2024, the U.S. Treasury Department placed the bank under sanctions. His personal fortune is currently estimated at $4.1 billion, and he promised to invest several million in promoting Strong Armenia.

In June of 2025, Prime Minister Pashinyan demanded the resignation of Karekin II, head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, after rumors intensified that the priest allegedly had a child, which would violate his vow of celibacy. Karapetyan came out strongly in defense of the catholicos and vowed to fight the “godless” authorities by every means.” Soon afterward, law enforcement raided the billionaire’s home, and Karapetyan himself was arrested.

“Samvel never got involved in politics. His business was building bridges with officials and security officers and making money — although he never refused the Kremlin’s sensitive financial requests. Apparently, he was put under serious pressure and was forced to create the Strong Armenia bloc as a counterweight to Pashinyan,” a source familiar with the billionaire’s inner circle told The Insider.

In 1999, Karapetyan applied for a foreign passport in Kaluga. According to leaked offline databases, his passport file listed an Interior Ministry notation under “place of work”: “IC FSB.” This note means that if a citizen is to be checked, the FSB must be contacted first. The Interior Ministry operative told The Insider that these markings are usually reserved for foreigners working under FSB supervision or for confidential informants.

When Karapetyan was issued an international passport in Kaluga, the “place of work” field listed “IC FSB”

Another Kremlin ally, Gagik Tsarukyan, leader of the Prosperous Armenia party, is also running in fierce opposition to Prime Minister Pashinyan. Tsarukyan served in the police but in 1979 was convicted of robbery and the gang rape of two female tourists from Russia. The police officer served his prison term at the “Krasnaya Utka” (lit. “Red Duck”) penal colony near the city of Nizhny Tagil.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union Tsarukyan entered the list of Armenia’s 100 richest people, and a court acquitted him. But his biography contains another blemish: in November 2004, a Niva vehicle belonging to Nikol Pashinyan, then the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Armenian Times, was blown up in central Yerevan. Pashinyan accused Tsarukyan of ordering the attack, allegedly because he was unhappy with one of Pashinyan’s articles. The criminal case, however, remains unsolved.

In Armenia, Tsarukyan made his fortune in dairy and brandy production. In Russia, he is among the founders of three companies: Tikhivz, Zh Invest, and Elit Stroy, which build luxury housing in the Moscow Region.

Tsarukyan is a frequent guest in high-level offices in Moscow. In February 2019, his Prosperous Armenia party signed a cooperation protocol with United Russia. Leaks from the now-disbanded Directorate for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, whose espionage activities The Insider has reported on, included a copy of Tsarukyan’s passport and a financial estimate for his 2017 election campaign.

The money was sent to Yerevan from a special fund on Staraya Square, where the Russian presidential administration has its headquarters. Most likely, however, the funds allocated for the Tsarukyan bloc were skimmed off within the presidential administration itself given the fact that Tsarukyan was more than capable of paying for his own election campaign.

The Israeli port of Ashdod has unilaterally decided to stop receiving vessels from Russia and Ukraine. The chairman of the port’s operating company sent a letter to Israel’s National Security Council and published it in the Israeli outlet Globes.

The port will refuse entry to vessels if they meet one of four criteria: the ship sails under a Russian flag; it has a Russian name, even if registered in another country; it called at a Russian or Ukrainian port on its way to Israel; and/or it is carrying cargo originating from Russia or Ukraine.

The letter states that the proposed policy contradicts the company’s legal obligation “to provide port services to all who request them.” At the same time, it notes that receiving such vessels could expose the port and its executives to criminal prosecution and sanctions from the European Union and Ukraine. The port is asking the National Maritime Administration for guidance on how to avoid such liability, thereby shifting responsibility to the state.

The port made the decision following a scandal involving two vessels that arrived in Israel. According to Kyiv, they were carrying grain from Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia.

The first vessel, the Abinsk, carrying 43,700 tons of wheat, was unloaded at the port of Haifa in mid-April and returned to Russia despite repeated requests from Ukraine to detain the bulk carrier. According to Kyiv, part of the wheat came from Sevastopol and Berdyansk.

Israeli journalist Barak Ravid claims that at the end of March, Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel, Yevhen Korniychuk, met with senior officials at Israel’s Foreign Ministry. The diplomat allegedly provided information about the vessel and warned that its entry into port amounted to a violation of international sanctions. A request for legal assistance was also submitted.

On April 26, two weeks after the Abinsk, another grain vessel anchored off the coast of Haifa. This time it was the Greek bulk carrier Panormitis sailing under the Panamanian flag. According to Myrotvorets, part of the cargo – 6,087 tons of barley and 954 tons of wheat – had been transported from occupied Berdyansk aboard the Leonid Pestrikov and transferred to the Greek vessel.

This time Kyiv reacted even more sharply. A note of protest was delivered to Israel’s ambassador to Ukraine, Michael Brodsky. Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha publicly expressed dissatisfaction with Israel’s actions on social media, while President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced preparations for a sanctions package against carriers and companies involved in trading such grain. “The Israeli authorities cannot fail to know which vessels and what cargo are arriving at the country’s ports,” he wrote.

The European Union also warned Israel that it was prepared to impose sanctions on those facilitating the trade in Ukrainian grain. “We condemn all actions that help finance Russia’s illegal military activities and circumvent EU sanctions. We are prepared to stop such actions by placing, if necessary, people and legal entities from third countries on sanctions lists,” a European Commission representative told Euronews.

For his part, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar accused the Ukrainian side of engaging in “Twitter diplomacy.” He said diplomatic relations between friendly countries are not conducted through social media. In addition, according to him, the vessel had not yet docked or submitted its customs declarations, making it impossible to verify the accuracy of the claims.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar said diplomatic relations between friendly countries are not conducted through social media

As Ambassador Michael Brodsky later explained, the Ukrainian request “contained significant factual gaps and did not include any supporting evidence.” According to him, Israeli police asked the Ukrainian prosecutor’s office to provide additional information.

The Panormitis left Haifa without entering the port after the Israeli grain importer Tzenziper stated that, in light of the circumstances, it was forced to postpone unloading the vessel.

However, the story did not end there. The Ukrainian embassy in Israel filed complaints with Israeli police against Tzenziperand another company, Dizengoff Trading Company, which had received cargo from the Abinsk. According to reports in the Israeli media, the allegations concern document forgery, false declarations of origin, fraud, and money laundering. At the same time, Kyiv appealed to the EU to consider sanctions against the Israeli companies.

“As with other importers in the industry, we were surprised to learn about this issue [the stolen grain], and we are awaiting instructions from the relevant authorities in Israel. Our company operates in accordance with generally accepted international trade standards, and we possess all the necessary documentation,” Dizengoff Trading Company said. The company also stated that it has no new orders for Russian wheat.

Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel, Yevhen Korniychuk, reportedon May 7 that Israel’s largest agricultural importers had approached the embassy with a request to sign a memorandum of cooperation. The document would make it possible to prevent grain stolen by Russia from being supplied to Israel. According to the ambassador, the key factor behind the request was the threat of sanctions-related risks.

“We believe this is a step forward, a leap forward, because the association of major importers complained that over the past two weeks the Israeli government has been unable to provide them with guidance on how to act in this situation,” Korniychuk noted.

According to remarks by Kateryna Yaresko, grain from occupied territories is shipped to Israel quite frequently. But proving it is difficult because the port of origin is listed as Port Kavkaz in Russia’s Krasnodar Territory. That was the case with both vessels that arrived in Haifa in April.

According to an investigation published in late April by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, in 2023 – about a year after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces – at least two vessels carrying stolen grain arrived in Israel, and at least one of them was unloaded.

Haaretz also identified seven more vessels that unloaded wheat in Israel in 2023 after taking cargo from unidentified ships near the Russian-controlled Kerch Strait. The ship-to-ship transfers were carried out with the AIS tracking system switched off. The available information does not make it possible to determine the origin of the wheat they transported. This year, according to the newspaper, four shipments of stolen Ukrainian grain have already been unloaded in Israel, including the cargo from the Abinsk. The vessels unloaded in Ashdod and Haifa.

The threat of European sanctions could have serious economic consequences for Israel in addition to legal ones, given that the country imports 90% of the grain it consumes. According to Globes, Russia has supplied more than 40% of that volume in recent years. Ukraine, which was the main supplier before the Russian invasion, accounted for a much smaller share in 2025.

Israel imports 90% of the grain consumed in the country, most of it from Russia

According to an analytical report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the situation is even more critical: about 70–80% of imported wheat comes from Russia. Ukraine and Romania rank next among exporters. The report notes that imports of Ukrainian wheat have declined over the past four years as Kyiv increased shipments to European countries.

At the same time, the Israeli government has repeatedly spoken of its desire to purchase more non-Black Sea wheat in order to diversify imports. Nevertheless, supplies from Russia, Ukraine, and Romania remain the most economically advantageous.

In this context, the proposal by Ukraine’s chief rabbi, Moshe Reuven Asman, who sent a letter to Israel’s economy minister Nir Barkat urging him to reconsider procurement policy and abandon Russian grain in favor of American wheat, appears unrealistic.

According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, American wheat has historically cost Israel at least $25 more per ton than Black Sea wheat, while shipping from the United States could add up to another $25 per ton compared with freight costs from the Black Sea basin. As a result, the price advantage of Russian and other Black Sea wheat could reach about $50 per ton – nearly 20% given an average price of $260–280 per ton. This significantly limits imports from the United States.

Political background

The grain dispute also has a political dimension. At the very least, it is another problem in relations between Israel and the European Union, which have already become highly strained in recent months. This is evident from the EU sanctions recently imposed on Israeli settlers in the West Bank.

In April, several European countries, including Spain and Ireland, once again attempted to suspend the EU–Israel Association Agreement. However, as before, no consensus was reached on the issue. Such efforts have been ongoing since 2024. Initially, they were prompted by Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip during the war with the terrorist group Hamas. The latest debates are linked to rising violence against Palestinians in the West Bank and Israel’s adoption of a law introducing the death penalty for terrorists, which also applies to Palestinians.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said there was insufficient support to suspend the agreement, though discussions on relations with Israel would continue. She promised to raise the concerns voiced by European ministers with the EU trade commissioner.

Last September, the European Commission had already proposed freezing some of the trade-related provisions of the Association Agreement. Such a move would require the backing of 15 of the EU’s 27 member states. Suspending the agreement entirely, however, would require unanimous approval from all EU countries. At the same time, the European Union remains Israel’s largest trading partner: trade in goods between them totaled €42.6 billion in 2024.

Against this backdrop, the Kyiv Post quoted a senior Israeli official who pointed to the timing of the uproar over the grain scandal alongside what he described as an “EU-orchestrated campaign” against Israel amid worsening tensions between Jerusalem and Brussels, as well as the EU’s approval of another €90 billion loan package for Ukraine over two years. More broadly, the newspaper reported that some Israeli officials were caught off guard by the intensity of Kyiv’s reaction. However, there is no direct evidence linking these developments beyond their coincidence in time.

Kyiv had previously raised the issue of grain shipments to Israel that Ukraine considers stolen. According to Ynet, the first known episode dates back to September 2024. At the time, following diplomatic pressure from Ukraine, Israel halted the purchases. But until this April, Kyiv had not mounted a large-scale public campaign, including social media posts by the foreign minister and president. The implication is that without public pressure and the threat of sanctions, Kyiv would have achieved little from Jerusalem. Even now, the initiative ultimately came from importers and the port authorities rather than from the state itself.

War of resolutions

Notably, the grain dispute erupted just as relations between Jerusalem and Kyiv appeared to be thawing. In February, Israel voted in the UN General Assembly for a resolution supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, even as the United States abstained.

Only a year earlier, in February 2025, Israel had voted alongside the United States and Russia against a Ukrainian-backed resolution. It marked just the second time since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion that the Jewish state opposed a Ukrainian proposal.

In November 2022, Israel abstained on a resolution establishing a mechanism to compensate Ukraine for damages caused by Russian aggression, while the United States and most Western countries voted in favor. Israeli media noted at the time that the vote reflected frustration in Jerusalem after Kyiv once again backed an anti-Israel resolution at the UN.

Even before 2022, Jerusalem did not always act as Kyiv had hoped. In March 2014, Israel did not participate in the UN General Assembly vote on a resolution affirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity following the annexation of Crimea. Officially, the absence was attributed to a strike by employees of Israel’s Foreign Ministry. But U.S. officials said at the time they were surprised by Israel’s absence from the vote.

As for Kyiv’s own position, Ambassador Michael Brodsky said in 2023 that Ukraine supported anti-Israel resolutions in the UN Security Council in 90% of cases, calling it an “abnormal situation.”

In 2023, Israel’s ambassador to Kyiv said that Ukraine supported anti-Israel resolutions in the UN Security Council in 90% of cases

This February, however, Israel made a point of voting in support of Ukraine at the instruction of Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar. More broadly, relations between Jerusalem and Kyiv appeared to become more trusting under Sa’ar. Last July, he paid an official visit to Ukraine, where he met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Ukraine’s foreign minister. The sides agreed to launch a strategic dialogue on the Iranian threat.

The visit came a month following the Twelve-Day War between Israel and Iran. Officials in Jerusalem repeatedly stressed that the conflict also served Kyiv’s interests. In particular, after the killing of IRGC Aerospace Force commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Ambassador Michael Brodsky recalled that in 2020 the Iranian general spent three days insisting that the Ukraine International Airlines flight traveling from Tehran to Kyiv “had not been shot down by IRGC air defense forces but had supposedly ‘crashed due to technical reasons.’”

“It turns out that Israel today thus avenged both the UIA flight and the other victims of Hajizadeh,” Israel’s ambassador to Ukraine wrote.

Weapons: for and against

Another persistent source of friction between Israel and Ukraine was the issue of arms supplies. After the outbreak of the war, Israel provided Ukraine with humanitarian aid, helmets and body armor for medical personnel, and opened a field hospital. But from the very first months of the invasion, Kyiv sought from Jerusalem not only humanitarian assistance but also air defense systems capable of protecting Ukrainian cities from Russian missiles and Iranian drones.

In June 2022, Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel, Yevhen Korniychuk, openly stated that Kyiv wanted to purchase Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system. Ukraine also asked Jerusalem to authorize Berlin to transfer Spike anti-tank missiles to Kyiv, since they are manufactured under Israeli technology and license. The request was later repeated and expanded. Some of the systems Ukraine sought, however, had not yet entered operational service.

Israel avoided complying with the requests, primarily out of concern that a confrontation with Russia could undermine Israeli security interests in Syria. After the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 and the sharp reduction of Russia’s military presence in Syria, the situation began to shift. In January 2025, the Israeli Air Force transferred around 90 MIM-104 Patriot air defense systems from storage facilities in Israel to Poland for onward delivery to Ukraine.

At the same time, according to Axios, Jerusalem informed Moscow in advance about the move and stressed that it was “only returning the Patriot system to the United States,” rather than supplying weapons to Ukraine. Israeli officials reportedly argued that the step mirrored Washington’s decision two years earlier, when Ukraine received American artillery shells from stockpiles stored in Israel.

Another example was Belgium’s purchase of 15 FlakpanzerGepard systems for Ukraine from OIP Land Systems, a company linked to Elbit Systems. Details of the deal were published in April 2026. Formally, these were not direct Israeli arms deliveries, but some level of military-technical cooperation was clearly present, albeit in an extremely cautious form.

Particularly revealing was Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s trip to the Middle East in late March 2026. The visit took place during the war with Iran and resulted in agreements between Ukraine and several Arab states on defense cooperation, including cooperation in countering drone attacks. Zelensky did not visit Israel. Asked why by Israel’s Channel 12, the Ukrainian president replied that he had “received no information” from either Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or President Isaac Herzog since the start of the war with Iran.

Earlier reports said Netanyahu had sought to arrange a phone call with Zelensky, reportedly to discuss protection against Iranian drones. Although Zelensky agreed, Netanyahu never followed through, according to Channel 12. The last conversation between the two leaders took place in January 2025. “I have the impression that the prime minister is always trying to balance between Russia and Ukraine. And even when Russia is helping Iran, I feel that the prime minister is still trying to find a balance,” Zelensky said of Netanyahu.

Israeli officials may also have viewed with some unease the growing demand among Gulf monarchies for Ukrainian military expertise. A similar reaction may follow Zelensky’s recent visit to Azerbaijan, with which Israel maintains particularly close ties, including in the sphere of military-technical cooperation. Ukraine and Azerbaijan signed six agreements, and Zelensky made clear that their primary focus was cooperation in the defense-industrial sector, with energy taking a secondary role.

Still, this does not mean that Baku will be forced to choose between Kyiv and Jerusalem. Nor does it mean that relations between Israel and Ukraine have stopped developing despite the tensions. For Ukraine, however, Israel’s attitude toward Russia remains a fundamental issue.

“As we can now see, this thaw did not touch the core issue: Israel has still not changed its basic approach to the sanctions regime against Russia and to issues where its own commercial interests intersect with those of Ukraine,” writes Ihor Semivolos.

Israel, for its part, has no intention of sacrificing either its economic or strategic interests for anyone else. At the same time, opinions within Israel differ significantly over the necessity of cooperating with Russia.

Israel has no intention of sacrificing either its economic or strategic interests for anyone else

The official Israeli line toward the Kremlin shifted from openly warm before the war in Ukraine to markedly more cautious after it began. That position was shaped by Russia’s military presence in Syria under Bashar al-Assad, Moscow’s ties with Tehran, Russia’s contacts with Palestinian groups including Hamas and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and, more broadly, Russia’s influence across the Middle East.

Jerusalem also relied on Moscow during efforts to secure the release of Israeli hostages from the Gaza Strip. For that reason, Israel has no intention of slamming the door on relations with Russia – at least not under the current government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, who is widely seen as having close personal ties with Vladimir Putin.

At the same time, Israeli think tanks and media outlets have increasingly voiced differing views in recent years, especially after Russia began using Iranian drones against Ukraine and Moscow and Tehran deepened their military cooperation. The think tank Mitvim wrote that Israel’s policy of “sitting on the fence” was becoming ever harder to justify. Experts at the Institute for National Security Studies argued that Israel could respond more forcefully than in the past to hostile actions by Moscow while still carefully avoiding the risk of a broader confrontation.

“Our responses to Russia’s prolongation of the war and strikes on our cities and communities are absolutely justified. This time, Ukrainian long-range capabilities reached the Moscow region, and our message to the Russians is clear: their state must end its war. Ukrainian drone and missile manufacturers continue their work.”

Zelensky noted that the distance from Ukraine’s state border to Moscow is more than 500 kilometers, and that the concentration of air defense systems around the Russian capital is “the highest.”

Serhii Sternenko, an adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister, in turn threatened larger-scale attacks on Russia, including Moscow.

At least three people were killed and more than 10 injured in the drone attack. Apartment buildings, private homes and businesses were damaged, including the Solnechnogorsk fuel station. Fires also broke out at the Moscow oil refinery and Sheremetyevo Airport.

Russia’s Defense Ministry said it intercepted more than 550 drones overnight over Moscow, the Moscow Region, Belgorod, Kaluga, Kursk, Oryol, Bryansk, Voronezh, Tula, Smolensk, Pskov, Lipetsk, Tver, and Rostov regions, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea.

“Probably they need more people to send to the war in Ukraine,” Sandu said, referring to Putin’s decree. She said many residents of the region had sought Moldovan citizenship after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion because they “felt safer” holding Moldovan citizenship rather than Russian citizenship.

Sandu also said Moscow is using Transnistria to pressure Moldova as Chișinău seeks to reintegrate the region. Asked whether the Transnistria conflict could affect Moldova’s EU accession, she said any decision on membership rests with the EU and that “Russia has nothing to do with it.”

Putin signed a decree May 15 introducing a separate procedure for residents of Transnistria to obtain Russian citizenship. Under the decree, adult residents of the region can apply for Russian citizenship without permanently residing in Russia or proving knowledge of the Russian language.

A simplified procedure for residents of Transnistria to obtain Russian passports had existed before, but it did not apply to everyone. According to figures previously cited by the unrecognized region’s authorities and the Russian state-controlled news agency TASS, at least 220,000 Transnistrian residents already hold Russian passports.

Transnistria is a breakaway region of Moldova that emerged after a 1992 armed conflict between Chișinău and Tiraspol. Moldovan authorities refer to it as the “Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova” and insist on preserving the country’s territorial integrity, while the unrecognized authorities in Tiraspol consider Transnistria a separate state.

The four-year investigation identified trading company Global Trade as the core of the scheme. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the company supplied goods to Russia directly. Investigators believe that after the invasion and the tightening of sanctions, Global Trade changed its supply routes to conceal the end users in Russia.

The Lübeck-based company’s Russian partner was reportedly Kolovrat LLC, which is under U.S. sanctions. German investigators say Kolovrat served as the hub of a procurement network supplying Russian industry, including defense companies.

Nikita S. became Global Trade’s managing director in March 2022. Case materials describe him as the link between the German company and its Russian partner. Investigators also found that he worked directly for Kolovrat, coordinating orders, payments and shipments.

Customs data showed that the shipments included microcontrollers, electronic components, sensors, ball bearings, mechanical parts, oscilloscopes and other measuring equipment. Investigators said many of the items are dual-use goods, meaning they can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Several shipments were traced to end users in Russia linked to defense or nuclear research.

The scheme also involved two other German entities, ER Industriebedarf GmbH and Amtech Solutions, as well as the Turkish company MR Global. The goods were sent to Russia through third countries, including Turkey. In some cases, only five to 10 days passed between their dispatch from the EU and delivery in Russia.

According to The Insider’s review of the North Data database, Global Trade GmbH’s managing director is Nikita Siegle.

On May 26, the Higher Qualification Board of Judges will consider Nefedov’s candidacy for the post of deputy Supreme Court chair and chair of the panel. The position is currently held by Yury Glazov.

The legal news outlet Pravo.ru noted that Glazov’s term expires in September. He did not put himself forward for another term.

A Vedomosti source said Nefedov is considered one of the most prominent Supreme Court judges of recent years, as he regularly handled high-profile political cases.

It was Nefedov who ordered the liquidation of the independent PARNAS party; refused to allow anti-war candidates Yekaterina Duntsova and Boris Nadezhdin to run in the 2024 presidential election; declared the nonexistent “international LGBT movement” and “international Satanism movement” extremist; and designated the Anti-War Committee of Russia and the U.S.-registered legal entity of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF), as terrorist organizations. He also heard Navalny’s lawsuit against the penal colony in the Vladimir Region where the opposition leader was held, as well as his claim against the Ministry of Justice.

Nefedov also suspended Russia’s ban on the Taliban, effectively allowing the group to operate in the country after two decades of being recognized as a terrorist organization.

Vedomosti noted that the civil cases panel is one of the Supreme Court’s busiest, helping shape legal practice in disputes involving banks, insurers, government agencies, and employers.

Supreme Court Chair Igor Krasnov, Russia’s former prosecutor general, has endorsed Nefedov’s nomination.

The decision applies to all five disciplines overseen by the federation: artistic gymnastics, rhythmic gymnastics, trampoline, acrobatic gymnastics, and aerobic gymnastics.

Russian athletes are expected to compete under their flag and anthem for the first time at the acrobatic gymnastics World Cup stages in Bulgaria from May 29 to 31.

Since early 2024, Russian and Belarusian athletes have been allowed to return to competition as “neutral” athletes and take part in qualifying events for the 2024 Summer Olympics. The easing of restrictions in gymnastics comes amid a broader move by international sports bodies toward fully reinstating Russian and Belarusian athletes in global competition.

In a parallel development, the United World Wrestling federation (UWW) lifted all restrictions on Russian and Belarusian athletes on May 15. World Aquatics also ended its neutral status rules in April, allowing senior Russian and Belarusian swimmers to compete in national colors and have their anthems played.

Prior to the UWW’s decision, the International Olympic Committee recommended allowing Belarusian athletes to compete, saying that as it “continues to navigate the ever-increasing complex realities and consequences of the current geopolitical context, including the rising number of wars and conflicts, and amidst growing global instability, it must uphold its mission to preserve a values-based and truly global sporting platform that provides hope to the world.”

The IOC’s decision notably did not apply to athletes with a Russian passport. “Whilst the ROC has held constructive exchanges with the IOC on its suspension, it remains suspended while the IOC Legal Affairs Commission continues to review the matter,” the Committee said in a press release on May 7.

The aircraft in question is an Airbus A320-232 with serial number 4934, previously carrying the Cayman Islands registration VQ-CEK. Built in 2011, the plane was originally operated by the UAE airline Etihad Airways. In 2022, the aircraft was transferred to the U.S. company GA Telesis and was leased to Air Albania. In 2025, the plane returned to GA Telesis and was placed in storage in Istanbul. On April 14, 2026, the aircraft flew to Muscat, Oman, and on May 15 arrived in Moscow with the Russian registration RA-73899.

This is not the first case of its kind. In 2024, the airline Severo-Zapad already imported an Airbus A320neo with serial number 8774 into Russia.

Suspicious requests

U.S. aviation parts supplier GA Telesis was previously a notable Western lessor in Russia’s aviation market. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it was among many aircraft leasing companies unable to recover planes from Russia because of international sanctions and countermeasures imposed by Russian authorities.

GA Telesis leased two Airbus A319 aircraft and their engines to Rossiya Airlines. After sanctions were imposed, the aircraft remained in Russia without the lessor’s consent. In 2022, GA Telesis’ Irish subsidiary sued Rossiya Airlines and its parent company, Aeroflot. In 2023, the company said the claims had been settled, with compensation paid by Russian insurer NSK Insurance Company. The settlement amount was not disclosed. Under the agreement, GA Telesis withdrew its claims against NSK, Rossiya Airlines and Aeroflot over the two Airbus A319s and their engines.

After the start of the full-scale invasion, GA Telesis began receiving a large number of suspicious inquiries from firms based in the UAE and former Soviet countries, including Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, according to reporting by Forbes Ukraine. According to company founder Abdol Moabery, many of the firms had been established shortly before contacting GA Telesis and sought to buy aircraft parts apparently intended for Russian airlines.

GA Telesis began requiring documents showing which airline and specific aircraft the parts were intended for. Moabery said potential buyers usually stopped responding after those requests. “We have a large legal department that monitors compliance with all regulations and laws. But not everyone has one,” he said.

Context

After the start of the full-scale war and the imposition of EU and U.S. sanctions, Russia was effectively cut off from legally acquiring new Airbus and Boeing aircraft, as well as from leasing, maintenance services, and spare parts. The Airbus A320 is one of the core aircraft types in Russia’s civilian fleet, while the majority of domestic air travel in Russia relies on Airbus and Boeing planes.

The aircraft with serial number 4934 passed through several countries, including Turkey and Oman, and changed registration before arriving in Russia. The case shows that sanctions-evasion schemes and channels for supplying Western aviation equipment remain active.

Despite official statements about “import substitution” and reliance on the SSJ and MC-21 programs, whose serial production was recently once again postponed until 2027, Russian civil aviation remains critically dependent on Western aircraft. Years after sanctions were imposed, Russia is still obtaining Airbus planes through semi-legal “gray” market channels.

Businessman Tymur Mindich, a long-time close personal associate of Zelensky’s, has also been implicated, along with several former cabinet level ministers from different Ukrainian governments. The court ordered that Yermak be held in custody for two months, with the possibility of release on bail set at 140 million hryvnias (approximately $3.2 million). The former head of the presidential office said he did not have that kind of money, and that his lawyers would seek the funds “among friends and acquaintances.”

Dynasty: key details of the Yermak case

An organized group that allegedly included the former head of the Presidential Office has been uncovered, Ukraine’s Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) claims. According to the allegations, these people were involved in laundering 460 million hryvnias (€8.9 million) through financing the construction of the elite “Dynasty” cottage complex outside Kyiv.

Members of the scheme allegedly agreed to build four private residences for personal use and one shared residence — with a spa area, swimming pool, gym — the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) said. The estimated construction cost of a single residence was around $2 million. According to the anti-corruption agencies, one of the houses belonged to Yermak.

According to investigators, the construction was financed using illegally obtained funds funneled through controlled entities, cooperatives, and companies believed to be fictitious entities. Part of the money was disguised, and the real owners of the properties were concealed.

During a hearing earlier this week, it emerged that Yermak consulted a fortune teller about appointments to government posts. She was listed in his contacts as “Veronika Feng Shui Office” and was unlikely to have had official access to government information. Yermak sent her candidates’ dates of birth and asked for advice. Veronika, meanwhile, allegedly turned him against NABU and SAPO.

Yermak consulted a fortune teller about appointments to government posts, and she was listed in his contacts as “Veronika Feng Shui Office”

According to investigators, on Dec. 24, 2025, during a search of Yermak’s driver, a contact saved as “Andriy 2025” (presumably Yermak) sent Veronika the message: “Klymenko, Kryvonos.” Veronika replied that the attacks against him were intensifying and urged him to show resolve and take active countermeasures: “The situation is such that either you [act], or they get you.”

Yermak denies any involvement in the “Dynasty” scheme. Answering journalists’ questions after being served with notices of suspicion, he said that he owned “only one apartment and one car.” He claims that law enforcement agencies were subjected to “unprecedented public pressure” demanding that charges be brought against him. “The investigation must remain independent from political statements, media campaigns, or any other forms of influence,” the former head of the Presidential Office wrote on Telegram.

Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies have also spoken of pressure — this time on potential witnesses involved in the “Dynasty” case. According to NABU Director Semen Kryvonos, investigators are examining the possible involvement of officers from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in the alleged influence plot.

In addition to the former head of the Presidential Office, six other alleged members of the organized group were also served with notices of suspicion on May 12: businessman Tymur Mindich (once again), former Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov (whom investigators describe as the organizer of the scheme), as well as four people allegedly subordinate to the former deputy prime minister. All of them stand accused of large-scale misappropriation and the laundering of criminal proceeds. NABU has denied any evidence of personal involvement by Volodymyr Zelensky in the case.

NABU denied any involvement by Volodymyr Zelensky in the case

Oleksiy Chernyshov, whom NABU recordings refer to as “Che Guevara,” was formally charged back in November with abuse of office and receiving unlawful benefits.

The court placed him in custody, though he was later released from pretrial detention after posting bail. According to investigators, in June 2020 “Che Guevara” brought a certain “Carlson” — allegedly the aforementioned Mindich — into the construction of the “Dynasty” complex. The businessman himself left Ukraine just hours before the searches began.

It was during the “Midas” investigation that detectives established that one of the conversations between suspects concerned the construction of a cooperative housing complex outside Kyiv. Amid the public outcry surrounding the case, on Nov. 28, 2025, Yermak was forced to submit his resignation.

As reported by Ukrainska Pravda, Yermak did not believe until the very last moment that he would be dismissed. According to the outlet, when he was asked to write a resignation letter, he reportedly launched into a half-hour tirade in front of the Ukrainian president, one “filled with insults, reproaches, and accusations.”

Commenting on the decision to reshuffle his office, Zelensky said: “I want there to be no questions whatsoever about Ukraine.” After his dismissal, Yermak promised to go to the front, though he never made it into the Armed Forces. Instead, he met with the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), Rustem Umerov, who has witness status in the “Midas” case, and also with Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel, Yevhen Korniychuk. Mindich is currently living in Israel.

Many expected charges to be brought immediately after Yermak’s resignation, and media outlets were reporting that NABU was already preparing them. But the process dragged on.

The Insider asked SAPO why the charges were brought only now, and spokeswoman Olha Postoliuk explained that Yermak was formally notified of the suspicion regarding his activities as soon as sufficient evidence had been gathered: “At this point, sufficient evidence has been collected to notify the individual in question that he is under suspicion.”

According to Yermak’s lawyer, Ihor Fomin, the case file consists of 16 volumes averaging 250 pages each. NABU insists that the delay was unrelated to any pressure on the bureau.

When preparing to formally notify Yermak that he was under suspicion, the anti-corruption agencies tried to calculate every possible scenario as carefully as possible. “They moved deliberately so that the case would not collapse even at the stage of bail hearings,” says Ihor Reiterovych, head of political and legal programs at the Ukrainian Center for Social Development. Reiterovych agrees that external pressure played no role, and that NABU and SAPO have already demonstrated that “it makes no difference to them what position a person held or currently holds.” He also does not consider the possibility of international pressure to have been significant in the Yermak case: if anything other than the facts and the law influenced the investigation, he says, it was public demand.

Who was swept up by “Midas”

The detectives working on “Midas” began their investigation in the summer of 2024, though the operation itself only became public in the fall of 2025. During that time, NABU collected more than 1,000 hours of recorded conversations involving participants in the scheme and conducted dozens of searches.

According to investigators, Tymur Mindich organized a large-scale embezzlement scheme in the energy sector. His trusted associates allegedly skimmed 10–15% from the value of contracts awarded by Energoatom — Ukraine’s largest electricity producer and the operator of all active nuclear power plants in the country.

Six people were initially charged: former Energy Ministry adviser Ihor Myroniuk (“Rocket”), former Energoatom security director Dmytro Basov (“Tenor”), as well as four employees of the so-called “laundromat” allegedly responsible for concealing the money trail — businessman Oleksandr Tsukerman (“Sugarman”), Ihor Fursenko (“Ryoshik”), Lesya Ustymenko (“Lesya Kyiv financier of the brothers”), and Liudmyla Zorina (“Electronic”). Later, the case expanded to include Herman Halushchenko (“Sigismund”), a former Energy Minister who, at the time of his detention, was heading Ukraine’s Ministry of Justice.

Halushchenko was detained while attempting to cross the border and was accused of creating a criminal organization and “laundering illegally obtained assets.” Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court ordered his arrest with the possibility of release on bail.

According to investigators, the group received more than $112 million in cash from schemes in the energy sector after it was allegedly laundered through cryptocurrency and an offshore fund managed by members of Halushchenko’s family. NABU recordings reveal that while heading the Energy Ministry (2021-2025), Halushchenko wanted to leave his post and “go somewhere as an ambassador.”

NABU wiretaps revealed that while heading the Energy Ministry, Herman Halushchenko wanted to leave his post and “go somewhere as an ambassador”

The former minister explained his acquaintance with Tymur Mindich simply by saying that their children had been in the same class at school. “Since then, we stayed in touch, but I wouldn’t say we were close friends... The last time I spoke to and saw Mindich was in the summer of 2025 at an apartment on Hrushevsky Street. It was just a personal meeting. We talked about various things, nothing special was discussed, no issues,” he said, adding that Oleksandr Tsukerman was also present at the meeting.

Halushchenko denies all of the accusations against him. He remains in pretrial detention, as does Ihor Myroniuk. An attempt was made to post bail for the latter, but Ukraine’s financial monitoring service blocked the funds based on the suspicion that they originated from illegal sources.

Four other suspects were released on bail, including “Tenor” — Dmytro Basov from Energoatom, whom investigators consider one of the key participants in the alleged “laundromat” — and the “laundromat’s” suspected accountant, Ihor Fursenko.

The main figures in Operation “Midas,” however — businessmen Oleksandr Tsukerman and Tymur Mindich — left Ukraine before the searches began and have remained in Israel ever since. They were placed on a wanted list in November and arrested in absentia in December. Tsukerman said that he would “gladly return to Ukraine when the time comes.” Needless to say, he has not done so.

Mindich commented publicly on the scandal for the first time at the end of December, when journalists from Ukrainska Pravda managed to track him down in Israel. The businessman said he believed he had been made a “scapegoat” and that he was being accused of “a million things” that he knew nothing about. However, he was unable to refute the allegations made by NABU and SAPO.

The “Midas” leak: top figures may have known about the investigation

At the end of April, Ukrainska Pravda began publishing transcripts of intercepted conversations involving suspects in the case — the so-called “Mindich tapes.” The recordings were made by NABU and SAPO in the Kyiv apartment of businessman Tymur Mindich and were added to the criminal case file. More than ten volumes of materials have already been sent to Israel as part of a request for the extradition of Mindich and Tsukerman.

As it turned out, senior officials speak Russian among themselves and refer to one another by nicknames or first names. The recordings mention “Vova,” “Andriy,” “Lyosha,” “Oleg,” and “Surgeon.” Journalists had to separately explain who was who. “Lyosha” is believed to refer to former Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov. “Vova” is thought to be Volodymyr Zelensky. “Andriy” and “Surgeon,” according to Ukrainska Pravda, are two designations for Andriy Yermak. “Oleg,” who allegedly “solves problems and became much more intense during the war,” is believed to be Deputy Head of the Presidential Office Oleh Tatarov.

As it turned out, senior Ukrainian officials speak Russian among themselves

In the first batch of recordings, Mindich and former presidential adviser Serhiy Shefir discuss raising bail money for the arrested Oleksiy Chernyshov – with part of the money to be provided “officially” and part “unofficially.” In the second recording, Mindich and then-Defense Minister Rustem Umerov talk about the defense company Fire Point and contracts with the ministry.

According to Ukrainska Pravda, Mindich may have been one of the beneficiaries of the company, which receives more defense contracts than any other firm in Ukraine. According to lawmaker Yaroslav Zhelezniak, 311 billion hryvnias (nearly €6 billion) passed through the company, while Mindich’s personal profit amounted to roughly €1.3 billion. The businessman himself denies any connection to Fire Point. After the publication of the recordings, the public anti-corruption council under the Defense Ministry called for Umerov to be suspended from his duties as Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council; however, he remains in that post. At a May 12 briefing, SAPO head Oleksandr Klymenko said that Umerov had been questioned and that he held witness status in the case.

The second batch of transcripts added new figures to the story. Brothers Andriy Veselyi and Vasyl Veselyi allegedly gained control of the state-owned Sense Bank and the chemical plant Karpatnaftokhim with the assistance of Mindich and Yermak. According to the recordings, six members of the bank’s supervisory board “were supposed to be under the control” of the suspects.

The conversations about construction at the “Dynasty” complex also revealed a curious detail: the fence between Mindich’s plot and “Vova’s” plot had almost already been in place. “There were ten meters left. Everyone dropped everything and left,” Mindich says in the recording. Following the publications, NABU opened criminal proceedings, and the houses in the “Dynasty” complex were placed under arrest.

But the most explosive material was revealed in the third batch of “tapes,” published on May 8. These recordings suggest that the suspects may have been warned about the operation from inside the system. In a September 2025 recording, Ihor Myroniuk and Dmytro Basov discuss then-deputy head of SAPO Andriy Syniuk as “a good contact” who was “ready to help and provide warnings,” though they allegedly said he should only be used in critical situations.

About a month after that conversation, Andriy Syniuk accessed the internal database of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies and reviewed files on Oleksandr Tsukerman, Ihor Myroniuk, and Dmytro Basov. Notably, they did this one month before Operation “Midas” was publicly announced.

Ten days later, an aide to Tsukerman allegedly told associates: “The boss called ten minutes ago. He says ‘pack up, we’re going to Palanca.’” Tsukerman crossed the Moldovan border and ended up in Israel. Tymur Mindich left the country four hours before investigators arrived with search warrants.

Syniuk resigned from SAPO of his own accord back in November, immediately after NABU’s first publications. SAPO head Oleksandr Klymenko confirmed that there were at least two separate leaks during the operation, and criminal investigations were opened into each of them. Active investigative measures were not pursued at the time in order not to jeopardize the main operation.

Brussels is watching closely

“Midas” triggered a chain reaction. In January 2026, NABU detained Yulia Tymoshenko, leader of the Batkivshchyna parliamentary faction, on the suspicion that she had bribed lawmakers in order to secure their votes in parliament (she says the case was fabricated). Money seized during the searches has already been returned to her.

That same month, former deputy head of the Presidential Office Oleksandr Shurma was arrested in absentia in connection with a case involving the embezzlement of funds allocated under the “green tariff” program affecting Ukraine’s Russian-occupied territories. He said he was prepared to cooperate with investigators from his current whereabouts in Germany. In April, another former Yermak deputy — Andriy Smyrnov — was formally notified that he was under suspicion of bribery.

In total, in 2025, NABU and SAPO opened 737 cases (compared with 669 the previous year), sent more than 750 indictments to court, and secured over 400 convictions. April polling showed rising public trust in the country’s anti-corruption agencies. Researchers link this to the summer 2025 protests, when civil society thwarted the Zelensky administration’s attempts to limit the independence of NABU and SAPO, as well as to the high-profile cases that followed.

In Brussels, the developments have been viewed as a signal. “This demonstrates that Ukraine’s anti-corruption bodies are functioning and carrying out their work,” European Commission spokesman Guillaume Mercier said while commenting on the suspicions against Yermak. Effective anti-corruption efforts, he added, remain a key condition for Ukraine’s progress toward EU membership.

But has Ukraine’s anti-corruption system truly become independent? Skeptics point out that the agencies’ growing effectiveness has been accompanied by tighter personal control by leadership. Former prosecutor Stanislav Bronevytskyi claims that under Oleksandr Klymenko, SAPO prosecutors have turned into “pens” signing documents at the direction of their superior.

For the first time in the history of NABU and SAPO, Ukraine’s anti-corruption apparatus has systematically reached people from the president’s inner circle. But putting the alleged malefactors behind bars will still be no easy task: the main figures in the “Midas” case remain in Israel, leaks risk compromising the process, and former prosecutor Andriy Syniuk can no longer be held accountable after resigning. The system’s ability to see high-profile cases through to actual convictions will become the real test for the institutions that Ukrainian civil society defended in the streets last summer.

“Today, RIA Novosti reported, based on information from law enforcement agencies, that our sister Nina Litvinova took her own life. [...]

Of course, neither RIA nor Gazeta.ru, which reported this, will publish the note. It lays bare the reasons for her passing all too clearly, so we have decided to reveal the real reasons:

Putin killed her! [...] Here is what she wrote about the reasons for taking her own life:

‘I love you all and think of you. But I must go; I can no longer bear to live. Ever since Putin attacked Ukraine and has been killing innocent people, and here at home he has been endlessly imprisoning thousands of people who are suffering and dying there simply because, like me, they are against war and against killing. There is nothing I can do to help them. Zhenya [Evgeniya] Berkovich, Svetlana Petriychuk, Karina Tsurkan, and thousands of others are suffering and dying behind bars. I tried to help them, but my strength has run out, and I am tormented day and night by my powerlessness.

I am ashamed, but I have given up. Please forgive me.’”

Nina Litvinova’s death was confirmed on May 13. She was found unconscious beneath the windows of a residential building on Frunzenskaya Street. Medics who arrived at the scene were unable to save her.

Litvinova was born in 1945 to mathematician Mikhail Litvinov and physiologist Flora Yasinovskaya (Litvinova). She was the granddaughter of Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet people’s commissar for foreign affairs from 1930 to 1939. Her brother, Pavel Litvinov, is a physicist, teacher and dissident who took part in the 1968 “Demonstration of the Seven” on Red Square against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

For more than 40 years, Nina Litvinova worked at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oceanology, where she studied the biology of brittle stars, a class of bottom-dwelling echinoderms. She published several scientific papers and described several new species of the animals.

Litvinova had helped political prisoners since the 1960s. The Nobel Peace Prize-winning human rights organization Memorial wrote that in the past eight years, she attended the trials of Yury Dmitriev, a Karelian researcher of Stalin-era repression, veteran rights activist Oleg Orlov, and theater director Evgeniya Berkovich. She also helped lesser-known political prisoners who received little media attention. Russian literary critic Anna Narinskaya said Litvinova brought books to the women in the “New Greatness” case who were under house arrest and cared for them.

According to the journalists, the central role in the network belongs to Moscow-based company Instratech (formerly known as “Vertical”), which is linked to the Hüter and Resanta brands. Through the firm Tekhnoinvest, Instratech is connected to Kreuss, which sells products under the Vikhr brand. The same network, according to Systema, is also linked to the production association Globus, which holds the trademark for Groza and a patent for a drone jamming system.

The investigation names businessman Viktor Podchufarov, his sons Ivan and Grigory Podchufarov, and his presumed daughter, Anna Sukhareva. Systema reported that members of the Podchufarov family have owned companies at various times that were linked to both tool sales and the production of drones and military software, including Vertical, Tekhnoinvest, Kreuss, Globus, Media Effect, Novotekh and Vysota.

The Groza brand is used for FPV drones, the Zanoza heavy strike UAV, the Sova reconnaissance drone, the Slon cargo copter, and the Night Witch hexacopter. The latter is commonly described as a Russian analogue of the Ukrainian “Baba Yaga” drones. The Zanoza, according to its developers, can carry up to 10 kg of payload, while the Night Witch can carry up to four mines and is also equipped with a thermal imaging camera.

Two more companies linked to military development are also mentioned in the investigation: Media Effect holds patents for the Glaz and Groza software systems used for drone control and artillery targeting, while Vysota, owned by Ivan Podchufarov, has registered the Sova trademark — the name of a reconnaissance UAV which, according to Systema, is supplied to the Russian armed forces.

Russian pro-government media and Telegram channels regularly report the use of Groza systems in Ukraine, while Glaz/Groza software is taught at Russian military universities. Most companies in the network are now registered as non-public joint-stock companies, making their ultimate owners impossible to identify. Viktor Podchufarov and representatives of affiliated companies did not respond to Systema’s questions.

According to the group, local authorities in the northeastern German town of Burg bei Magdeburg issued the order requiring Rudnev to leave the country. He went to the immigration office May 7 to extend his documents but was given a departure order instead of a temporary residence permit.

Germany’s Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) is currently reviewing Rudnev’s renewed asylum application. On May 5, two days prior to being handed the departure order, Rudnev attended a personal interview with BAMF, presenting new evidence in support of his case.

Rudnev told the Ochevidcy (“Eyewitnesses”) project that his previous lawyer “ruined his case.” In Germany, he learned German and joined the local Red Cross. Before leaving Russia, he worked as an environmental and civic activist and helped fight wildfires through Greenpeace’s Russian branch.

The Anti-War Committee of Russia said Rudnev and his lawyer consider the migration authorities’ actions unlawful. Lawyers for the project told The Insider that the issue is largely bureaucratic:

“The agencies do not communicate with each other, and often, when issuing a deportation order, they are unaware that the person is in the status of an asylum seeker. It is difficult to assess [the number of such cases], but the incidents are alarming.”

Germany adopted a much tougher migration policy after a change of government in May 2025. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s administration has pursued a highly visible crackdown on migrants that has often been compared with the Trump administration’s policies in the United States. In 2025, Germany forcibly deported 22,787 people, including 126 Russian nationals, a 14% increase from the previous year.

According to Budrys, he had previously denied the existence of such pressure, but now “additional activity has ⁠appeared, from the U.S.” The Lithuanian foreign minister stressed that Vilnius supports EU sanctions on Belarusian potash and does not intend to negotiate resuming transit while the restrictions remain in force.

The issue concerns shipments by Belaruskali, one of the world’s largest producers of potash fertilizers. Until 2022, Belarus exported potash through the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda to India, China, and Brazil. The transit was halted after the U.S. imposed sanctions on Belaruskali over the crackdown on public protests that followed the 2020 presidential election, whose results Western countries did not recognize.

The European Union imposed sanctions on Belarusian potash in 2022 following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and support in Minsk for the Kremlin’s war effort. The restrictions are set to remain in force at least until February 2027.

U.S. sanctions on Belarusian potash were lifted in March 2026 after a Washington-brokered deal under which Minsk released 250 political prisoners. John Coale, the U.S. president’s special envoy for Belarus, later told Lithuanian broadcaster LRT that resuming exports through Lithuania “would be beneficial to the United States.”

In March 2025, the Belarusian Investigative Center reported that Belaruskali continued supplying products to the EU in circumvention of sanctions. The investigation found that industrial halite salt produced by the sanctioned company was entering the EU through other firms under the label of Norta de-icing agent. Belaruskali confirmed to journalists that the agent is made from its halite, but said it is formally distributed by third parties.

At least three children were among the 24 people killed and another two among the 48 injured, according to a report by Ukrainian Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko.

Kyiv declared May 15 a day of mourning for the victims, Mayor Vitali Klitschko wrote. In his post, he called the attack the largest strike on the city to date.

Rescue operations lasted about 28 hours.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Thursday that Russia had launched more than 1,560 drones at Ukrainian population centers since Wednesday, damaging about 180 sites across the country, including more than 50 residential buildings.

Previously, the biggest Russian drone attack was registered from the evening of March 23 to the evening of March 24, when Russian forces launched nearly 1,000 drones and missiles at Ukraine.

Zelensky said the Kh-101 cruise missile that hit the apartment building had been produced in the second quarter of this year, pointing to a Ukrainian analysis of the wreckage.

“This means Russia is still importing the components, resources, and equipment necessary for missile production in circumvention of global sanctions," Zelensky wrote on X late Thursday. "Stopping Russia's sanctions evasion schemes must be a genuine priority for all our partners."

The fake videos and images are being posted on X and TikTok. Bots are placing them in comments under posts by well-known fact-checkers, demanding that the information be verified, and are even sending them to journalists’ personal email addresses. Views, reposts, and likes on X are being artificially inflated.

In one video that uses the logo of the media outlet France 24, Matryoshka paints a truly apocalyptic picture, claiming hantavirus has already been detected in 210 people across 60 French cities. It also claims France’s healthcare system and economy have been so weakened by support for Ukraine that the country will be unable to cope with a new epidemic, which it says could have more severe consequences than the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

In reality, as of May 14, French Health Minister Stéphanie Rist said only one hantavirus case had been recorded among French citizens — a female passenger from the affected ship. Another 26 people who had contact with the passenger tested negative, and their health continues to be monitored.

Another video disguised as content from the German outlet Deutsche Welle accuses Ukrainian refugees of phone fraud. They allegedly call residents of Germany and France, offering to sell hantavirus medications. To add credibility, the first part of the video describes the evacuation of passengers from the ship where the outbreak occurred fairly accurately.

The bots are also spreading images disguised as scans from the French newspaper Libération. The photos show building walls with graffiti in French reading “Hantavirus ici,” or “Hantavirus here.” The posts claim unknown people marked several dozen homes where infected people live.

In a recent video on her YouTube channel, biologist and science journalist Irina Yakutenko said that hantavirus, unlike COVID-19, is not transmitted from person to person through coughing or sneezing. Humans are not its main host, as the virus reproduces in rodents. The specific strain that infected passengers aboard the MV Hondius is carried by the long-tailed rice rat, whose main habitat is in South America.

Human-to-human transmission is possible only through large droplets of saliva and other bodily fluids, for example, among members of the same family or in cramped conditions, such as on a cruise ship. An analysis of the virus genome cited by Yakutenko shows that it “has not adapted and has not even begun to adapt to reproduce more efficiently in humans or to transmit more effectively.” For that reason, epidemiologists consider an epidemic or pandemic on the scale of COVID-19 unlikely in the case of hantavirus.

In Kenya, the cases of men who supposedly left for jobs in Russia only to end up in the ranks of the Russian army were discussed for months. On Feb. 18, the country’s parliamentary majority leader Kimani Ichung’wah stated during debates that his fellow citizens were being deceived through promises of civilian employment into serving as cannon fodder in a foreign war.

Later, in comments to local media, he stressed that recruits were being sent into combat with virtually no training: “Some were trained for only nine days. They are simply handed weapons and sent off to die.” The remarks came after the release of a report by Kenya’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), excerpts of which were published by Reuters. According to the document, more than 1,000 Kenyan men had been recruited — at the time, at least 39 had been hospitalized with injuries, 28 were missing in action, and 89 were still on the front line.

On the day the information became public – Feb. 19, 2026 – dozens of relatives of recruited Kenyans staged their first organized protest in Nairobi. As reported by Al Jazeera, one of the demonstrators, Winnie Rose Wambui, was trying to obtain information from the authorities about her brother, Samuel Maina, who had told her he was going to Russia to work as a security guard. The last time he contacted her was in October 2025, when he sent a distressing voice message “from the forest” asking her to pray for him.

According to Wambui, Kenya’s Foreign Ministry has provided neither assistance nor any information about her brother. The Russian Embassy either failed to respond to inquiries or denied the allegations of illegal recruitment, albeit while acknowledging that foreigners may voluntarily join the Russian armed forces.

Kenyan men were not the only victims of fraudulent recruitment schemes. This past February, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry stated that at least 1,700 Africans from dozens of countries were fighting on the Russian side. South African authorities managed to repatriate several illegally recruited citizens, though their investigation remains ongoing. Ghana’s foreign minister confirmed the deaths of 55 Ghanaian citizens who had also been lured to Russia with promises of employment, only to be sent to the front lines. Reports of recruitment carried out through the same deceptive scheme also emerged from Uganda.

In February 2026, the Geneva-based investigative group IMPACT, which tracks Russian recruitment networks, reported that it had obtained several files containing lists of recruited Africans, including a more comprehensive database with information on 1,417 citizens from 35 countries. Journalists verified the file through the digital footprints of the alleged recruits and concluded that, despite containing some inaccuracies in categories such as citizenship data, the list was authentic. The largest number of recruits came from Egypt (361 people), Cameroon (335), and Ghana (234).

A separate IMPACT list contains the names of 316 African recruits who were killed in combat. The highest number of deaths was recorded among citizens of Cameroon, Ghana, and Egypt. In Gambia, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, dozens of cases of recruited individuals returning home have also been documented. 

Details have also emerged of how the recruitment network in Kenya actually operated. A report by the NIS alleged that the scheme involved Kenyan intermediaries connected to recruitment agencies and human traffickers, as well as employees of diplomatic missions.

Kenyans traveled on tourist visas using routes passing through Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. However, after security checks were tightened at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi, recruiters began rerouting people through neighboring countries, including Uganda, South Africa, and other states in the region, in order to avoid heightened scrutiny from Kenyan border authorities.

Mercenaries wanted

Any African using social media can come across direct appeals to join the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Such ads are presented without references to “security companies,” “civilian jobs,” or other euphemisms. The Insider found one such advertisement in the comments under a post about 22-year-old Kenyan David Kuloba. According to the post, the young man was deceived, recruited, and likely killed in combat.

Kuloba’s mother says that David believed he was traveling to Russia to work as a security guard – that was what the “recruitment agency” had told him. Among comments asking “how to join” and “where recruitment is taking place,” there was also an advertisement presented as an official offer to serve in the Russian army. It featured a prominent English-language headline that read: “Join the Russian Armed Forces – now open to foreign citizens.”

Potential recruits are required to be between the ages of 18 and 55. They are promised access to an “official state program” offering financial and social support. Recruiters assist them with visa applications and arrange and pay for flights to Russia, often to the city of Ufa.

The training period before deployment is said to last between seven and 10 days. The advertisement also guarantees Russian-language courses. However, it does not specify when exactly Kenyan recruits are expected to study the language – before, during, or after combat assaults.

Recruiters also promise free uniforms, housing, food, and medical care. The financial terms are written in small print at the bottom: a one-time payment of 1.4–1.7 million rubles ($19,000-$23,000) upon signing a contract, plus a recruitment bonus of up to $2,600 for bringing in a friend. The advertisement appeared twice in the discussion thread under the news post, published by two different users.

Contact information was also listed at the bottom, including a Telegram account and a phone number. The Insider identified the owners of the listed contact details. The Telegram account, @Za_SVOih102, was displayed under the name “Contract Service, CIS Countries Iran Turkey South Africa,” with the description “We accept foreign citizens.”

No additional information was found about the Telegram username itself, but the phone number +7-962-539-40-21 was saved by different users under the names “Matveeva Olga,” “Bikkuzina Gyuzel,” “LLC Peshkom,” “Bashkir Telecommunications Systems,” as well as “Contract Service” and “Russian Army.”

In the profile of a 2GIS account registered to the number, the “Company” section read: “Central Headquarters for the Formation of Volunteer Battalions of the Republic of Bashkortostan, company for the recruitment of foreign citizens into military service, center for Russian-language instruction and combat training.” According to a CRM database export, the contact was labeled: “GCC CONTACT FOR PROJECT BTEL WEBSITE CONTRACT MOD.”

The recruitment of foreigners into the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces was also carried out through the website workinrussia2025.ru. The domain was registered in August 2025 to a private individual and was paid for one year. Indexed references to the site are relatively scarce, but it does appear on social media.

For example, on Threads, users posted links to the site in the comments section under a post by a young woman who said she was tired of being an Indonesian citizen and wanted to move to Russia. On X, a user named Stepan shared the link to the site, writing in English that it was a contract service for foreign citizens in Russia.

Even AI chatbots appear to know how foreigners can join the Russian army. Grok quoted the recruiters’ website while responding to a user named SirMoyi18480. The potential recruit asked about salary levels and, apparently satisfied with the information, replied: “Good money, I wanna join!” – only to receive another link to the recruitment website.

A potential recruit asked about salary levels in Kenyan shillings and, apparently satisfied with the answer, replied: “Good money, I wanna join!”

SirMoyi18480 posed the question to the chatbot directly in a thread discussing Kenyan officer Peter Kimani, who had sent his mother 1 million Kenyan shillings ($7,700) before being killed in the war against Ukraine. News of his death appeared in the Kenyan press in late February 2026. Kimani had been serving in the military in Embu and decided to travel to Russia during his leave in order to fight. After arriving, he did indeed send money to his mother “to buy land for him.”

He remained in contact with his family online for three months before disappearing. On Jan. 28, the family learned that Peter had been shot dead. His mother is now seeking assistance in repatriating her son’s body.

It remains unclear how this story may have motivated the user SirMoyi18480 to consider joining the Russian Armed Forces or whether he ever contacted recruiters. He did not respond to questions for comment from The Insider.

References to the recruitment website also appear on Facebook, often posted by the same user. Jimmy Åkerlund, whose profile picture features a Russian flag, shared the advertisement in the community “The Knights Templar UK,” which is dedicated to a pseudo-Templar “brotherhood” featuring Christian and militarized symbolism. It also appeared in the group “The People’s Resistance Ireland.”

There are also recommendations from identifiable “real accounts.” For example, a user named Kingscouncil01 – who describes himself as a web designer, a brand influencer, and the CEO of The King Council perfume – advises those interested in joining the Russian Armed Forces to visit the recruitment website. In a follow-up comment, he laments that Nigerians are unable to take part.

The website workinrussia2025 does not resemble an official government resource but rather a landing page – a one-page site designed for a single purpose: to entice potential recruits with financial and social promises and motivate them to contact recruiters. On the homepage, military service is described as “contract work” that does not require knowledge of Russian. Foreign recruits are promised a one-time payment of up to 3.1 million rubles ($43,000) and a monthly salary of 260,000 rubles ($3,500).

The site has six versions: in Russian, English, Arabic, Indonesian, and Burmese, as well as a separate version for citizens of Russia and CIS countries. The terms are identical across all language versions — except that recruits from post-Soviet countries are offered a lower one-time payment of 2.1 million rubles ($28,500), along with assistance in “assignment placement.”

According to information published on the website, the recruitment of foreign citizens for contract military service is handled by the already mentioned Central Headquarters for the Formation of Volunteer Battalions of the Republic of Bashkortostan. The site’s authors specifically address citizens of several countries and regions: “We accept citizens from Africa, Zimbabwe, Iraq, Indonesia, Panama, Colombia, the Philippines, Myanmar, and CIS countries.”

The contract-signing process is described step by step, with recruiters promising support “at every stage, 24/7.” Nothing is said about health requirements, physical fitness, or even the age of prospective “applicants.” For communication, recruits are primarily encouraged to use messaging apps: a WhatsApp account under the name “Work RF” and a Telegram account called workinrussia2025ru, which bears the description “Contract service in Russian Army.”

The phone number listed at the bottom of the website differs from the one used to register the messaging accounts. In various contact directories, it appears under the names “Russian Army,” as well as “Russia” in Arabic and “Peace Throughout the World” and “Russian Army” in Bengali. Addresses linked to the number are located in Ufa.

The recruiters’ contact details also lead to an advertisement posted on the VKontakte page of a woman identified as Darya Artyomovna. Her profile description states: “Information support and coordination center for the volunteer movement of the Republic of Bashkortostan. Current programs, guarantees, payments.”

In August 2025, her page featured a post showing a photograph of dark-skinned men with suitcases alongside the message: “We invite you to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense in the city of Ufa! We also accept citizens from countries beyond the near abroad: China, Colombia, Africa, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, the CIS, etc. Foreign military personnel WITHOUT knowledge of the Russian language!” The post promises tickets and visas, although the payments offered are more modest: a one-time payment of 1.4–1.7 million rubles ($19,000-$23,000)  and a monthly salary of 230,000–260,000 rubles ($3,100-3,500)

In one of her posts, Darya explains why foreigners choose to serve in what Russia calls the “special military operation.” One of the factors she cites is “historical memory,” writing that “People from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Latin America, and Africa believe that Russia has always helped in the fight against external aggression.”

According to her, citizens of 30 countries are currently serving in the Russian Armed Forces: “These are not mercenaries, not random people. These are contract servicemen who made a conscious decision.” The style and formatting resemble AI-generated text. The post concludes with the slogan: “Your country is not always geography. Sometimes it is a choice of the heart. Russia awaits the strong. Russia awaits the honest. Russia awaits you.”

Darya Artyomovna is also listed among the contacts for the community “Volunteer Headquarters of the Republic of Bashkortostan,” which is dedicated to service in the Russian Armed Forces. The headquarters has an official address in Ufa, and its photo albums feature images of servicemen. A post pinned to the top of the community page calls on foreigners to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense, and the list of regions from which recruits are being sought includes Africa.

The last publication in the community appeared in January 2025, but the recruitment website is clearly still active. It now has a “twin” site, “workinrussia2026.ru,” that was created on Feb. 9. It has nine language versions: Russian, English, Kazakh, Uzbek, Indonesian, Burmese, Filipino, and Arabic.

The promises have expanded as well, with the one-time payment now said to reach up to 4 million rubles ($54,500), the monthly salary listed at 250,000 rubles ($3,400), and total annual earnings advertised at up to 14 million rubles ($19,000). Recruits are also offered the possibility of obtaining Russian citizenship through a fast-track procedure.

The 2026 version also introduces basic eligibility requirements for candidates — only men between the ages of 18 and 60 with a valid passport, general education, and no serious illnesses or disabilities. Knowledge of Russian and prior military experience remain unnecessary, although the site states that professional skills can increase monthly payments.

Candidates are promised “preparatory courses,” though no duration is specified. Recruits are also assigned a “personal supervisor at every stage.” The terms and contact details are identical across all language versions of the website. No references to the new site have been found on social media or other online resources, suggesting that its active promotion may not yet have begun.

Through deception, willingly, or out of necessity

Africa is experiencing economic growth, but it has not been accompanied by a reduction in poverty or an increase in employment opportunities. According to the International Labour Organization, while the average unemployment rate stands at 6.3%, the measure of inadequate access to decent work reaches 17.4%. Youth unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa remains at 8.9%, and the region accounts for 71% of the world’s population living in extreme poverty.

Nominal economic growth has not resolved the problem. In Kenya, for example, GDP per capita grew by 43% between 2005 and 2022, while the share of the population living below the national poverty line declined from 46.8% to 39.8% over. Nevertheless, according to World Bank forecasts, more than 43% of Kenyans will still be living in poverty in 2026.

Kenyan human rights activist Otieno N. told The Insider that poverty is the main factor driving Africans to fight for the Russian army:

“I don’t think young Kenyans would voluntarily fight for Russia. There are no ideological ties that could encourage this. But I would not rule out that someone, desperate to find work or hoping to escape poverty at home, might take the risk of signing a contract.”

Otieno says that before the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, former Kenyan servicemen sometimes found work in Russia in spheres connected to the private security industry. However, after 2022, numerous agencies luring young, unemployed Kenyans with promises of jobs abroad emerged. According to Otieno, corrupt local officials may have received payments from agencies that profited from the “fees” charged to men seeking employment opportunities.

In the comments under a Facebook post about Kenyan men recruited into the Russian army, users write that they, too, would like to contact recruiters and go to war. Many of these users, according to their profiles, live in Kenya and other African countries.

In one of the first comments, a woman from Zimbabwe expresses the view that participation in the war is a conscious choice, while another woman from Ghana asked, “Why would you fight in someone else’s conflict? Don’t they have their own citizens in that country? If they cannot get all their own citizens to fight, why should you risk your life?” However, the comment that received the most likes came from an empty profile claiming that Kenyans needed combat experience in order to “become a superpower nation in the future.”

Other comments include statements such as: “the unemployment situation in Kenya is deadly,” “better to die in battle than die poor, drowning in poverty, I need a job, help me,” and “better to die for a purpose in life than to live uselessly with empty hope here in Kenya… I wish West Africans dying in deserts and at sea trying to reach Europe would also take advantage of this opportunity.”

The Insider contacted several Facebook users who had commented on the issue, and one of them, a Nigerian man named Nwosu, said that he himself had “almost given in to the temptation” to go to the front. However, after thinking it over, he decided against it, seeing no reason to “go and die for the glory of another country.” Nwosu believes that Black men, after only three weeks of firearms training, are being asked to risk their lives in a war in which even well-trained Russian soldiers have been unable to secure victory for several years.

“These people do not love us,” Nwosu says. “Otherwise, why has participation in a deadly war become the only way to come to Russia?” The Nigerian describes the recruitment of African men in financial hardship as fundamentally unjust. “Why not open schools for us with affordable tuition so that we could study and assimilate into their way of life and culture? Then we would come to love them and, guided by love rather than poverty, desperation, or hopelessness, decide to leave our mothers behind in another country in search of a better life.”

His compatriot Ib was more radical in comments to The Insider: “We believe it is better to die earning money than to sit at home and be killed for nothing. Everyone knows that the offer from Russia is a golden opportunity to build a better life back home in the future.”

Ib is convinced that “80% of young people” in Nigeria — and across the continent — would embrace such an opportunity “with open arms.” Among his friends are several Nigerian soldiers who want to defect to the Russian army.

As an example, Ib points to Nigerian serviceman Obiora Okechukwu, who fought alongside Russia against Ukraine and said in his videos that Africans were going to the front voluntarily. According to Ib, their signing bonus amounted to $5,000 – an enormous sum in Nigeria, where the average monthly salary ranged from $60 to $130. According to Ib, Obiora had helped Africans join the Russian Armed Forces but later stopped because they “started twisting their stories once things went bad.”

Ukrainian-American journalist and political analyst Peter Zalmayev, who regularly visits African countries, questioned whether soldiers in Africa are recruited solely through deception. As he told The Insider, “It’s like a conveyor belt: one person goes, then your friend from the village or the neighborhood hears something, then your cousin follows, then you go after your brother, and so on.”

Some Kenyans interviewed by The Insider are convinced that “security work” is simply the explanation recruits themselves invent “so as not to worry their mothers, wives, and children.” Zalmayev considers that possibility plausible: “Perhaps this formula helps them save face with their families and gives the fighters a chance to legalize their status later and avoid prosecution. People can come up with different explanations to justify their choices.”

“Security work” may simply be the explanation recruits themselves invent “so as not to worry their mothers, wives, and children”

Speaking to The Insider, political scientist and African studies specialist Irina Filatova recalled how, in South Africa, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, one of the daughters of former President Jacob Zuma, was accused of recruiting men to participate in Russia’s war against Ukraine: “They thought they were going to security training courses, but instead ended up at the front. The government did everything it could to get them out because the situation became public. But some had already been killed or maimed.” Following the accusations, Zuma-Sambudla voluntarily resigned her parliamentary seat.

Filatova also notes that in South Africa and in some West African countries where Wagner mercenaries previously trained local armed forces, some people may indeed travel to Russia voluntarily, including to the front line, out of political sympathy alone: “Several factors come together here: Russia is popular, I’m going to do a good thing, and I’ll also be well paid – so everything seems wonderful.”

The propaganda of nostalgia and hope

Attitudes toward Russia across the African continent vary significantly from country to country. In 2024–2025, the research service Afrobarometer conducted a survey involving more than 50,000 respondents from 38 African countries. Participants were asked to assess Russia’s political and economic influence.

The results showed that 36% of respondents viewed Russia’s influence as “somewhat/very positive,” while 23% described it as “somewhat/very negative.” Around 42% were unable to give a definite answer. In Central Africa, roughly half of respondents expressed sympathy toward Russia, with 43% in West Africa, 27% in Southern Africa, and 26% in East Africa expressing similar sentiments.

At the country level, the most positive attitudes toward Russia were recorded in Mali (80% of respondents) and Cameroon (60%). The war in Ukraine did not significantly worsen perceptions of Russia: in 24 countries, researchers recorded an increase of around three percentage points in positive assessments compared with the 2019–2021 period.

Code for Africa (CfA), the continent’s largest network of civic technology laboratories and data centers, confirmed in comments to The Insider that Russian influence in African countries is built through different models taking into account the local context.

In Mali, for example, the central narrative is security: pro-Russian campaigns emphasize military cooperation with Moscow and the effectiveness of Russian forces while simultaneously downplaying the achievements of the Western presence. In Kenya, emphasis is placed primarily on soft-power tools, including the network of Russian Orthodox Church parishes – 37 in total across the country – which researchers describe as one of the channels of Russian influence. In Nigeria, the Russian Orthodox Church also operates several parishes that CfA suspects of cooperating with influencers. There, the operation also includes planting material in local newspapers and countering anti-government protests. According to the researchers, the overall effect of these activities has been to protect the interests of coup leaders in the Sahel, fuel anti-Western sentiment, and increase sympathy for Russia’s military actions in Ukraine.

Irina Filatova notes that after the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Russian propaganda activity on the continent intensified sharply, diplomatic engagement increased, official visits became more frequent, and cooperation expanded across multiple sectors. She describes West Africa – particularly the Central African Republic – as the region most friendly toward Russia, while South Africa also remains relatively close. Kenya, in her view, is more distant: “At the UN, it did not always vote with Russia, and it did not even always abstain.”

Ukrainian-American political analyst Peter Zalmayev believes that Russia currently exerts its strongest influence in Francophone Africa – including Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, and parts of Libya. He says that Africans are increasingly being presented with the image of Burkina Faso’s military leader Ibrahim Traoré as a role model:

“It’s the image of the kind of personalist, authoritarian power that now exists in Russia. On both the western and eastern coasts of Africa, I’ve seen these kinds of iconostases displayed in the rear windows of buses – for example, in Burundi there was one with the local president, Putin, and Gaddafi. Gaddafi, as we know, also promoted a pan-African vision and wanted to unite the continent. In other countries, if it’s not Gaddafi, then it’s the local president, Putin, and Traoré. I’ve seen this in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and elsewhere.”

Zalmayev’s observations are echoed by investigators at Code for Africa, who say that propaganda campaigns supporting Burkina Faso’s leader Ibrahim Traoré are aimed in part at audiences in Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, and Kenya. They also note that some of this content consists of AI-generated videos designed to project an image of economic growth and overall stability.

In this way, propaganda attempts to capitalize on young people’s frustration – their anger over unemployment, corruption, and weak democratic institutions. More importantly, it seeks to normalize the idea that military regimes can serve as an acceptable alternative. Assessing which groups are most vulnerable to recruitment, CfAresearchers point to several target demographics: soldiers in Cameroon, taxi drivers in South Africa, and craftsmen in Nigeria.

According to Zalmayev, even countries that were not previously known for pro-Russian positions have shifted in recent years because of worsening attitudes toward the United States: “With Donald Trump returning to power, with aid to Africa being cut – including through USAID – a vacuum has emerged, and nature abhors a vacuum. Many countries understand that they need to attach themselves to some kind of harbor.”

Against the backdrop of China’s growing appetite – Beijing has long since strengthened its presence on the continent – the number of countries sympathetic to Russia is also increasing. On March 16, 2026, for example, Namibia began considering prospects for cooperation with Rosatom.

“Russia is also expanding its influence through propaganda built around a continent-wide narrative: ‘This is about the Soviet Union’s assistance in anti-colonial struggles, in the fight against apartheid and imperialism. Russia presents itself as the defender of the Global South, fighting oppression and advocating for a multipolar world,’” Irina Filatova explains.

The continent-wide narrative promoted by Russian propaganda centers on the Soviet Union’s support for anti-colonial struggles and the fight against apartheid and imperialism

Filatova believes the specific reasons for sympathy toward Russia vary from country to country. In South Africa, narratives of Soviet assistance remain especially influential: the USSR is still regarded as a friend of both South Africa and the ruling African National Congress, as well as “those who are still in power or only recently left office.” When it comes to West Africa, Filatova agrees with Zalmayev that there is a strong anti-French element in Russian propaganda and that Moscow’s influence is particularly strong in former French colonies.

Another narrative, more widespread in Southern and Central Africa, revolves around the promotion of traditional values, which many on the continent perceive as being similar to Russia’s own: “There is an emphasis on the religious values of Africans, resistance to the dominance of Western mentality, and opposition to the imposition of Western norms and rules. And in all of this, Russia presents itself as helping Africa.”

Peter Zalmayev also points to strong nostalgia across the continent for Soviet-African ties, especially in South Africa. According to him, that past is associated primarily with Russia, even though Ukraine, in his words, “played second fiddle in this alliance.” As he explains it: “More than half of the doctors, engineers, and other members of the intelligentsia in Mozambique during the 1970s were from Ukraine.” He argues that this history needs to be discussed more openly in order to counter anti-Ukrainian narratives promoted by Russian propaganda and Moscow’s attempts to appropriate the Soviet legacy.

For many pro-Russian Africans, the image of Russia as a defender against colonialism coexists with support for the invasion of Ukraine – something Zalmayev also attributes to propaganda. Having spoken repeatedly in countries across the continent, he says he has developed his own approach to promoting the Ukrainian narrative: “For Africans, it can be difficult to understand the difference between Russians and Ukrainians – to them, we all ‘look the same,’ just as they sometimes do to us. You have to explain to them that just as they fought against their colonial rulers, Ukraine is now fighting what is, in a sense, a colonial relationship with Russia.”

Zalmayev notes that Ukraine faces greater difficulty promoting its narratives because Kyiv’s diplomatic presence on the continent is objectively much weaker than Moscow’s: Ukraine has only 17 embassies in Africa, while Russia has 54, having inherited the Soviet diplomatic network.

According to his observations, in nearly every country the Russian Embassy resembles “a small city with a skyscraper, shops, and a cultural center.” He adds that “after the start of the full-scale war, Russia seriously stepped up its brainwashing efforts, including against Ukraine.”

In Mali, Zalmayev says, anti-Western sentiment is particularly intense: “Even for someone arriving from the West, it would be unsafe there.” Tanzania, meanwhile, has an authoritarian regime that maintains close ties with both Russia and China. Kenya, by contrast, remains “an island of democracy” with a large and active media landscape.

Irina Filatova describes the situation in many of the countries where Russia has expanded its influence and where Wagner forces have operated – a list that includes the Central African Republic, Mali, Chad, and Niger – as catastrophic: “These are extremely underdeveloped and impoverished regions, marked by deep tensions between local populations and Islamist groups that regularly attack villagers, kill those they dislike, and fight governments for control over enormous natural resources. Russian military personnel apparently receive some share of those resources in exchange for protecting these regimes.”

According to Filatova, propaganda in Africa is spread using almost exactly the same language as in Russia itself. It generally consists of narratives about Russia’s “invincible strength” and supposed battlefield “successes,” along with hostile statements about Volodymyr Zelensky and other demonstrably false information. As a result, in countries where Russian influence is strong, many people develop pro-Russian attitudes, especially regarding the causes of the war against Ukraine.

The Insider spoke with Africans who had expressed support for Russia on social media and who said they wanted to help Russia at the front for ideological reasons. Joe Sergeant, from Namibia, has no military experience, but says he “loves the army with all his heart” and wants “to fight evil and the deceivers in NATO.” He believes that Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran are fighting for truth and justice.

A Nigerian man named Wilfred Father said that all countries except Ethiopia had been colonized, but that Russia had never been among the colonial powers: “Fighting for Russia would mean fighting for freedom from neocolonialism. Why should Africans today depend on Western aid in order to develop? Why is Africa a dumping ground for Western goods? Why do they take our mineral resources and give us pieces of paper in the form of dollars, which they print in enormous quantities?” Wilfred says he knows many people who share these views.

Notably, his comments about Ukraine closely mirror Russian propaganda narratives: “The war was not started by Russia, but by America through Ukraine. Russia will not lose – it has the military power to continue fighting for the right cause.” He describes opposing views as the result either of ignorance or of an unwillingness to seek out “reliable information.”

A Kenyan man named David shared with The Insider his dream of fighting for Russia:

“I want to fight the terrorists from the United States, but my health does not allow it. The people who joined the Russian army have been given a great honor – to stand against true evil, depravity, and slavery. Two of my friends are still there. They call and write to their families and do not want to return until victory. Long live Putin!”

David refused to provide any further details about his friends serving in the Russian military, adding only that the work is well paid and that “nobody mistreats them because Russians are like brothers.”

Russians living in Kenya have noticed the effects of the Kremlin’s efforts. An entrepreneur named Alexander told The Insider that Kenyans are aware of the presence of “recruiters urging people to join the special military operation,” but that speaking openly about those who have been recruited is uncommon. He believes that the people who appear in the news are “the ones who ran into problems,” while those serving without incident prefer not to publicize their experience. According to Alexander’s observations, local media coverage tends to revolve around “what can be gained from Russia.” In particular, there was extensive coverage of the Russia–Africa summit and Russian wheat imports to Kenya.

Empire of propaganda: media, culture, and the African MAX

After the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the dismantling of his media structures, Russia began rebuilding its system of informational influence in Africa. A key element of this new propaganda architecture is the “African Initiative” (AI), a media project established in Moscow in September 2023.

According to a joint investigation by the European anti-disinformation bodies VIGINUM, the EEAS, and the FCDO, the organization presents itself as “an information bridge between Russia and Africa.” In practice, however, it functions as part of Russia’s public diplomacy strategy, serving as a major instrument of informational influence on the continent.

The report’s authors suspect that the activities of AI are directed by the Russian state, particularly its intelligence services. The organization allegedly exploits existing instability and anti-Western sentiment across Africa in order “to shape the information environment in favor of pro-Kremlin ideology” using both online and offline tools.

According to the investigators, manipulative schemes are concealed behind the façade of public diplomacy. An investigation by the French media outlet Forbidden Stories states directly: “African Initiative is a new springboard for Russian interference in African affairs.”

According to findings published by investigators in May 2025, the organization also promotes the “Africa Corps,” the successor to Wagner, and several figures involved in African Initiative’s operations were affiliated with Prigozhin’s “Lakhta Center.” Among them are editor-in-chief Artyom Kureyev (accused of participating in disinformation campaigns in Europe and Africa and linked to the FSB), liaison officer and contributor Viktor Lukovenko (a.k.a. Vasilyev, who is linked to the GRU and was convicted in Russia of racially motivated murder before later being arrested in Kyrgyzstan on suspicion of recruiting mercenaries), and deputy editor-in-chief Anna Zamaraeva (the former head of the press service for the Wagner Center PMC).

The deputy editor-in-chief of the African Initiative news agency is Maxim Solopov, formerly a special correspondent for Meduza and a reporter for RBC. He became widely known after publishing, together with Kristina Safonova, an article about a double murder that suggested possible involvement by defendants in the Penza “Network” case.

Following the publication, Solopov was granted witness status and testified during the trial. Within the Russian journalistic community, the article was described as “raw and unverified” and “resembling a leak,” while The Insider pointed out a number of inconsistencies and other questionable aspects of the investigation.

African Initiative operates as a full-fledged media outlet, with versions in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic, as well as a Telegram channel. Articles published on the website are reposted to the Telegram channel and then distributed across dozens of affiliated groups and communities.

One of the outlet’s most widely circulated posts, published on Jan. 24, 2023, concerned the arrival of one hundred Russian servicemen in Burkina Faso, along with military equipment and weapons. According to an investigation by DisinfoAfrica, the post was shared across 87 public groups and channels, generating approximately 1.5 million views and 537 interactions. The outlet’s content ranges from neutral topics such as culture and sports to political material promoting anti-European and anti-Western narratives.

The Insider found similar material on Russian social media platforms. For example, the VKontakte community “Empire News” posted a “news item” claiming that “Africans burned an effigy of Zelensky.” Attached to the post was a video in which a rag doll bearing a photograph of Zelensky was first hanged from a gallows and then set on fire. One of the children in the video repeatedly struck the burning “body” in the head with a stone. According to information published on a pro-Russian website, the “event” took place in Mali in October 2024.

However, the role of African Initiative extends beyond publishing propaganda materials – the organization is also preparing potential future collaborators. In July 2026, a content school titled “From Kilimanjaro to the Desna” opened in Bryansk. African Initiative organized the project in cooperation with the “African Bloggers Union,” the “Union of Bloggers of Russia,” and Bryansk State Engineering and Technology University.

Thirty African bloggers with “professional experience” have already been selected to participate. The educational program includes “lectures on the traditional values of Russia and Africa,” a “discussion on interfaith dialogue,” master classes on “fact-checking” and video production, as well as a “seminar on viral marketing.”

Another increasingly popular avenue of influence is video games. In comments to The Insider, the organization Code for Africa pointed to the propagandistic influence of the online video game Africa Dawn, which portrays the September 2022 coup in Burkina Faso. The game was created by African Initiative and is aimed directly at young people in the country. An information report by the French National Defense and Armed Forces Committee states that the game contributes to distrust of France in the Sahel while portraying Russia as a savior and ally.

In the game, a pro-Western imperialist bloc confronts a pro-Russian pan-African bloc. Missions on the “Russian side” revolve around Yevgeny Prigozhin and culminate in the “liberation of the African people” and the “death of Western imperialism.” The final mission, French television channel TF1 describes it, is “a Russian veni vidi vici glorifying the former Wagner leader as an emperor crowned with a laurel wreath.”

African Initiative also placed considerable hopes in its mobile application Afree – a messaging platform developed specifically for the African market and intended to “unite everyone in Africa and free them from total censorship by giving everyone a voice.”

The launch of the app was announced in Kenya in September 2024. CEO Bakhtibek Batyrkanov stated that “the platform was designed to function in regions with limited internet access, features an intuitive interface for people with low literacy levels, and offers numerous functions for internet-savvy youth.”

The application’s official website is itself an example of crude propaganda. Its developers claim that Chinese and American social media platforms “often have a negative impact on national cultural values,” while Afree’s “mission” is “to protect the African population from the harmful influence of foreign cultures.”

Afree declares its mission to be the protection of African populations from the harmful influence of foreign cultures

Afree is also promoted as “an excellent source of income and a business with high capitalization potential.” Its creators say they plan to build an ecosystem around the platform that will include a payment system, marketplaces for goods and services, hotel-booking tools, and “much more.” Among the technical features highlighted are the ability to watch “long-form videos” similar to Netflix and short videos similar toTikTok, to create and follow channels in the style of Reddit and Telegram, and to use livestreaming functions designed for monetization. The platform also claims it will incorporate features resembling services ranging from PayPal to Alibaba.

The application can only be downloaded through the App Store and third-party services hosting Android installation files. The African messaging app has already been removed from Google Play, although the page remains available in the Yandex cache. According to the listing, the application was uploaded by developer Zhyldyz Moldogaziyeva, was downloaded more than 100,000 times, and held a rating of 3.3 based on 428 reviews. However, only a handful of written comments were left by users. Two were positive, while a third complained about a violation of platform rules: “This application…does not provide the ability to delete my account.” That complaint may have been the reason Afree was removed.

However, another possible factor was information about the app’s links to the Russian Federation, which was explicitly mentioned in the privacy policy published on another website associated with the application. The current version contains no references to Russia and states that users’ facial data is neither downloaded nor stored on servers. However, as can be seen using the Wayback Machine, the version of the page saved on Nov. 14, 2025 contained six references to the Russian Federation. Up until November 13, no edits had been made. But beginning with the version saved on Dec. 15, 2025, the policy instead referred to the laws of the Kyrgyz Republic and stated that personal data was stored on servers located in Kyrgyzstan.

The above-mentioned Moldogaziyeva is listed as the director of LLC Kaganat, according to official records. Investigators also report that Afree head Bakhtibek Batyrkanov studied at the Russian Diplomatic Academy in a field related to international security.

Peter Zalmayev believes Afree is clearly part of an influence operation: “It has a nice façade and a clever name – A-free, not Afri – meaning ‘Africa will be free.’ But it is not a neutral messenger app, because Russian narratives are clearly being pushed through it.” According to him, comments containing false information or pro-Russian opinions on the app and other social media platforms may be written both by bots and by people who are paid to post them.

At the same time, Zalmayev doubts that the application ever gained real popularity or that it is capable of influencing large numbers of people. Kenya alone has a population of roughly 57 million, meaning that even if the figure of more than 100,000 downloads is “organic,” it still represents too small a share of users to be significant for a continent as large as Africa. Residents of African countries interviewed by The Insider said they had never heard of the app.

“I think the whole thing was still in the development stage as an operation, but after the investigation came out, they toned it down. There is not even the slightest chance of Afree replacing WhatsApp. But then again, that was probably the goal they set for themselves. Africa is now highly computerized and smartphone-connected, especially Kenya. But in the end, the money was received, embezzled, and written off in reports,” Zalmayev concludes.

“They’ve got nothing in their heads anyway”

Photographs of African soldiers on the front lines in Ukraine have surfaced not only in foreign media and social networks, but also in pro-Russian VKontakte communities. In February of this year, for example, the “Lyubo-Dorogo” group published a photograph showing three men dressed in military uniforms sitting inside a vehicle. One of the men was Black. His face is uncovered and he is seen smiling at the camera while the other two – apparently Russians – have their appearances concealed. The caption reads: “‘Our Black Russian brothers have already firmly settled into the special military operation zone and are even gradually beginning to speak Russian. They’re kind, cheerful, follow orders, and fight the enemy,’ our servicemen note.”

The nickname “Black Russians” has appeared repeatedly in posts published by Russian servicemen. In October 2024, the group “Patriots of Russia” posted a photograph showing 11 Black men seated at a table with several plates of food in front of them. They are looking at the camera and smiling. The caption reads: “African volunteers. Our Black Russians in the special military operation zone.”

In December 2025, African recruits were given yet another nickname. Under a photograph of a short elderly Black man in military uniform smiling at the camera, the caption reads: “More and more of our Black Russian brothers are taking part in the special operation. Our fighters affectionately call them the Donbas ‘miners.’” One commenter appeared to speculate about the possible motivation behind Africans joining the Russian army: “Russia once helped them, and they remember the favor and are now helping in return.”

According to the community, not all African men who signed up for service were sent to the so-called “special military operation zone.” One video posted in “Lyubo-Dorogo” shows a group of Black men in military uniform standing beside tanks. The caption reads: “Black Russians guarding NATO equipment in Krasnodar” (the reference is to an exhibition of “captured military equipment” held in Krasnodar in October 2024).

One of the videos posted in the VKontakte community, “Overheard POW Search SMO,” reveals the psychological atmosphere surrounding recruits’ first encounters with the Russian army. In the footage, men of different nationalities stand at attention while a voice off camera aggressively demands that they state their “name, age, and citizenship.”

According to the accompanying text, the video shows the “combat coordination” of volunteers from China, Kenya, Colombia, Bangladesh, and Iran (the footage also includes one man from Ghana and several from Russia). The post notes that the events are taking place in the “102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment – Slonim-Pomeranian, Red Banner, Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov regiment, granted Guards status by decree of the President of the Russian Federation on April 16, 2025.”

The battalion is reportedly conducting “intensive training and preparations for deployment to the special military operation zone,” with “drills and live-fire exercises from morning until evening” as recruits are prepared for combat.

The volunteers in the video do not appear enthusiastic. The voice behind the camera refers to recruits with Slavic features by saying, “Alright, Orthodox one,” and at the end mocks the posture of a recruit from Novosibirsk: “If you stand like that, your palms are going to smell like ass.”

Not all users appreciated the cameraman’s tone – some commenters responded by insulting him in return. Most of the other messages in the thread, however, were enthusiastic. There were also expressions of resentment toward those unwilling to fight for Russia, including from two women:

“If that’s the case, then they’ll earn it with blood and sweat, unlike those who come here just for benefits and subsidies, but when it’s time to serve or go to the SMO, they hide in the bushes.”

“Say thank you that they fight shoulder to shoulder instead of running away from the country like some of your own do, even your celebrities like Malakhov, Pugacheva and many others... And then you say only Russians are fighting in the war when most there are not Russians. Thank you guys from the bottom of my heart.”

During training, Africans undergo not only intensive military instruction but also the sacrament of baptism into the Orthodox faith. Priest Alexander Gavrik writes that during one of his trips “to the special military operation zone,” he encountered Africans, and that “our Black Russian brothers were slightly confused when they saw a priest at the deployment point.”

During training, Africans undergo not only intensive military instruction but also the sacrament of baptism into the Orthodox faith

The priest communicated with them “through a Serbian brother” who spoke English and French. The Africans apparently came to the idea of baptism rather quickly: “After a brief introduction about myself and the Orthodox faith, with the help of our Serbian brother, they were baptized.” The text is accompanied by photographs showing several Africans among Russian servicemen as they convert to Orthodoxy.

Some Africans reportedly ended up at the front directly from construction sites. “How do you become a true Black Russian? Ask these guys. Men from Nepal, Africa, and India were building a church near Ryazan. Now they are going as volunteers to the SMO. That’s how steel was forged!” the VKontakte community “Russkost” writes, attaching several photographs of Black men standing near a church.

Searching for the term “Black Russian” produces numerous videos featuring African contract soldiers. In one clip, they say in Russian to the camera: “Wagner Group good, fucking awesome!” In another, they dance to the song “Mother Earth,” while in a third they smile demonstratively and nod as a voice off camera proclaims “Russian world! Victory will be ours!” – apparently without fully understanding what is being said. Meanwhile, one commenter complains: “There’s nothing in their heads anyway, they’re useless.”

It is also possible to get a brief glimpse into the recruits’ training process. One video shows the “instruction” of “Black Russians” unfolding amid the foreigners’ complete inability to understand either the Russian language or the mockery directed at them: “Me, helicopter, tu-tu-tu and go to Sri Lanka, jumping and VDV,” says the “instructor.” He then hands a crushed metal can to a Black recruit and repeats: “Guitar, present.” The man smiles awkwardly and does not know how to respond. “Maybe go to assault? Tu-tu-tu,” the instructor suggests, to which the trainee shakes his head: “No, no.” “Go, go, let’s move!” comes the reply – whether it is said as a joke or deadly seriously is impossible to tell.

Ukraine’s Air Force said 1,362 drones were shot down or radar-lost under the influence of electronic warfare tools. At least 50 drone strikes were recorded, along with falling debris from downed UAVs in 44 locations.

Since the evening of May 13, 41 missiles of various types have also been shot down over Ukraine. Fifteen missiles hit their targets.

The large-scale drone attack mostly targeted western Ukraine. On the evening of May 13, Hungary’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian ambassador to protest the attack on the Zakarpattia Region, which is home to a significant ethnic Hungarian population. 

According to Gostev, Russia’s prison population has shrunk from 465,000 inmates at the end of 2021 to 282,000 now. This number includes prisons, penal colonies, and pretrial detention centers, which currently hold approximately 85,000 people across the country.

The penitentiary service director listed several factors behind the decline. TASS quoted him as pointing to the “humanization of criminal punishment,” including the wider use of forced labor, probation, and noncustodial sentences. Gostev also said “effort to recruit contract soldiers for the Armed Forces” has made “a certain impact.”

The independent investigative outlet Important Stories noted that this is likely the first time the Federal Penitentiary Service has acknowledged that the decline in the inmate population is linked to prisoners leaving to fight in Ukraine under contracts with Russia’s Defense Ministry. The Insider was also unable to find any earlier similar statements by representatives of the prison service.

Notably, a report by the state-owned Interfax news agency on Gostev’s remarks cited the same figures but made no mention of the connection between the decline and the military recruitment of prisoners.

Officials had previously attributed the decline in inmate numbers only to the wider use of noncustodial sentences. In March, Russian Supreme Court Deputy Chairman Vladimir Davydov said the trend was the result of efforts to humanize criminal law and law enforcement practices.

The Federal Penitentiary Service also linked the figures to “the broad use of alternative punishments” and “the liberalization of penal policy.” The Justice Ministry first announced a historic record drop in the number of inmates in October 2023 –the first such statement since the penitentiary service stopped publishing inmate population statistics in November 2022, when the Wagner private military company began recruiting mercenaries in penitentiaries across the country.

In late March, lawmakers submitted a bill to the State Duma that would exempt prisoners returning from the war from mandatory supervision. In 2024, the Duma also passed amendments allowing people under investigation, on trial, or already convicted, to sign military contracts.

Cadex President Serge Dextraze told Global News that meetings with representatives of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, focused on Moscow’s efforts to circumvent the arms embargo. Cadex Defence insists it does not supply its products to Russia. Dextraze said intelligence officers provided the company with specific guidelines. He stressed that authorities had no complaints about the company’s operations.

CSIS, in turn, said the intelligence service is working with arms manufacturers and exporters to prevent sanctioned Canadian goods from reaching Russia. “With increased awareness of this illicit activity, Canadian companies are better enabled to proactively vet customers themselves,” a CSIS spokesperson said.

In its annual report published May 1, CSIS stated Russia is trying to “illicitly procure export-controlled and sanctioned technology from the West, including Canada.” Moscow is particularly interested in Canadian microelectronics, satellite communications, and precision firearms, the report said.

As previously reported by The Insider and Global News, Cadex rifles are used by snipers in at least three Russian army units. Indirect evidence suggests the shipments may be routed through the United States and Kazakhstan.

After the investigation was published, Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand promised to thoroughly examine how Canadian rifles ended up with Russian snipers. But six months after publication, Global News hasyet to receive a substantive response from authorities. Instead, Canada’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying there had been no “direct-to-Russia exports of arms” from Canada since 2015 and that no components had been supplied since 2020.

The Foreign Ministry reiterated that the Canadian rifles in question could have been supplied to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and could have been captured by Russian troops on the battlefield. However, that version does not explain how Russia is obtaining new barrels in branded cases with intact labels. Similar rifles were displayed at the OrelExpo-2025 arms exhibition in Moscow in early October.

Evgeny Stanislavov is expected to appear before Orbán on May 14. Magyar said Orbán would deliver a protest and ask “when Russia and Vladimir Putin plan to finally end this bloody war, which began more than four years ago.”

Magyar, speaking on behalf of the government, condemned the attack on Zakarpattia, a region that is home to a significant ethnic Hungarian population. The attack hit the cities of Mukachevo and Uzhhorod, as well as other settlements in the region. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked Magyar for his “concern and strong position.”

Telex noted that Péter Szijjártó, foreign minister in Viktor Orbán’s government, frequently summoned foreign ambassadors, including envoys from the United States, Austria, Germany, Finland, Denmark, and Ukraine. The Russian ambassador, however, had never been summoned to the country’s Foreign Ministry.

Myroslav Biletskyi, head of the Zakarpattia regional military administration, said that on May 13 the region came under its heaviest attack since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At least 11 drones entered the region’s airspace; some were shot down or radar-lost.

According to the analysts, total oil product shipments reached 4.4 million barrels in April. Of that amount, roughly 2.8 million barrels were Russian, the highest figure in the past year.

The figure is still relatively small compared with Russia’s overall energy exports because it includes only products derived from oil refining, such as diesel, fuel oil, and naphtha, mostly intended for India.

Meanwhile, Russia’s oil exports carried by the “shadow fleet” reached approximately 67 million barrels in April — the highest level in three months. The previous peak was observed in January, at 72.7 million barrels, followed by a sharp drop and then a gradual increase to 50.7 million barrels in February and 64.1 million in March.

Similar estimates of rising oil exports were also provided by the International Energy Agency, cited by Reuters. Compared with March, Russia’s crude oil exports rose by 250,000 barrels per day to about 4.9 million barrels per day, despite production cuts forced by Ukrainian drone strikes on refining and loading facilities.

The increase may have been driven by disruptions to energy supplies from Persian Gulf countries after export routes were blocked during the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran. Amid market turmoil, the U.S. Treasury Department allowed Indian refineries to buy Russian oil for 30 days in first week of the war and later lifted sanctions on sales of Russian oil and oil products loaded onto vessels before March 12.

The latter easing was designed to last one month, and the White House initially did not intend to extend it. Later, however, permission to sell Russian oil already loaded onto tankers at sea was issued again, this time until May 16.

U.S. President Donald Trump indicated this week that Washington could extend the permission once more. Asked by reporters whether the United States could do so, he said the White House would “do whatever is necessary” to stabilize oil prices and promised that energy prices would fall as soon as the war ends.

Since the start of the war in the Middle East, media outlets and analysts have repeatedly noted the economic benefits Moscow has gained from the suspension of exports from the region. In early May, Bloomberg reported that revenue from Russian oil exports had risen to its highest level since February 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while Russian fuel oil shipments to Singapore had reached a 10-year high.

Late payments

Delays in payment for goods and services – a chronic illness of Russian business – are now worsening. This spring, overdue payments from clients and customers exceeded 8 trillion rubles for the first time, signaling a broader deterioration in companies’ financial health.

The war has pushed the situation to the point of absurdity. One might assume that window installers would be thriving at least in border regions, where blast waves regularly shatter glass. In reality, the opposite is true.

“Yes, that logic makes sense. But in practice, many no longer take on this kind of work because they don’t get paid,” a window installation specialist from Belgorod told The Insider. According to him, the government theoretically compensates residents for the damage, but in practice the money gets stuck in limbo: “Newcomers arrive, enthusiasts who think they’ll make good money from this. But they don’t last long – they run into the fact that payments never come through, and they leave.”

The fate of TransYuzhStroy (TUS) – the largest construction company in Belgorod Region, affiliated with the regional authorities – is revealing. Such structures have traditionally benefited from state contracts. But an entrepreneur connected to the regional government, who requested anonymity, sees it differently: “TUS doesn’t pay many of my people, saying that it itself hasn’t been paid.”

“Working with the state is very difficult and dangerous,” the businessman adds. “The scandal over the fortification lines are proof of that.” He is referring to fraud charges related to the construction of defensive fortifications brought against former First Deputy Director of the Russian National Guard Viktor Strigunov and former Deputy Governor of Belgorod Region Rustem Zainullin. A court ordered them to pay nearly 1 billion rubles.

Labor shortages

The shortage of workers is a problem that major enterprises had been complaining about even before the full-scale war. In recent years, it has worsened because of the outflow of specialists abroad, people leaving for the front, tighter migration laws, and the natural demographic decline. The stagnating economy has slightly eased the severity of the situation – companies unable to invest in development and expansion simply do not need more employees. But for those still operating, the problem remains.

The labor shortage is particularly acute in construction. Roman, from Belgorod, says that previously 40–50% of the region’s skilled specialists came from Ukraine. Overall, more than 80,000 working-age specialists have left Belgorod Region over the past four years.

The owner of a large industrial enterprise in the region describes the state of his business as “catastrophic”: “All of 2025 was a year of anxious expectation and survival. The forecasts for 2026 are bleak. Before 2022, there was a streak of good years. Overall, this is Drinkins’s nosedive – every year is worse than the previous one.” Those trying to keep their teams together are paying employees at a loss. “But it doesn’t help. Workers leave anyway, businesses shut down anyway.”

“Construction has collapsed, logistics have slumped, commercial property rentals have fallen. The first companies to close are those tied to major investments. The last are liquor stores,” the industrial business owner says, describing the situation. If measured not in inflation-swollen rubles but in physical indicators – how much has been built, transported, or rented out – he estimates the decline across industries at 30–40%, and in some sectors at 50–60%.

Expensive credit and rising prices

The Central Bank’s high interest rate – and, consequently, the high lending rates charged by commercial banks – is a nationwide problem in Russia. But it hits agriculture especially hard: machinery is constantly needed, it is expensive, and farming without it is impossible. Loans at 25–30% interest are taken only in cases of urgent necessity: with the profitability of a small farm at around 10%, repayments amount to three times what the business earns. Average profitability in Russia’s agricultural sector fell from 23% before the war to 15% in 2025.

The year 2025 proved unprecedented: the sector produced goods worth 10.63 trillion rubles – and suffered record losses of more than 100 billion rubles. Costs rose faster than revenue: fertilizers, spare parts, fuel, and credit all became more expensive, while grain purchase prices remained low. Every year, around 6,000–7,000 farms leave the market. Experts predict that their number will shrink by another 20–30% within the next two to three years.

Every year, around 6,000–7,000 farms leave the market

At the very start of the war, a sprayer belonging to someone else burned down in a field owned by Denis (name changed), a farmer from Voronezh Region. The large machine with long booms was struck after being mistaken for military equipment. “The owners had bought it on credit, traveled around regions – Voronezh, Lipetsk – and lived off that work. They came to my place to do a job, and it got destroyed. I don’t know how they’re surviving now.” Buying new machinery has since become a problem: imported equipment has become more expensive because of sanctions, while loans for domestic machinery are unaffordable because of interest rates.

In January, Denis returned from Thailand, where he had gone for the New Year holidays, and noticed a sharp jump in prices: “During the vacation, everything became noticeably more expensive. Before, I hardly paid attention to how much things cost in stores, but now I’ve started comparing prices.”

Builder Roman complains about the same thing: “Aerobel, the block manufacturer, raised prices, concrete and brick became more expensive.” The market for private homes (individual housing construction, or IHC) in his region has “dried up” over the four years of war. One of the market’s main drivers –the Belgorod Mortgage Corporation – has run out of steam: it cut staff, moved into a more modest office, and now mainly deals with lawsuits against unscrupulous developers. “The price of land plots has risen to market levels – there’s no point in the program anymore,” Roman adds, citing another reason.

Under such conditions, many find it more profitable to put their assets to use elsewhere and change occupations. Farmer Denis spent six years growing sunflowers, barley, and wheat. This spring, he leased his land for three years to a large agricultural holding: “At the end of 2025, I simply earned nothing.” He did not own machinery himself and rented it instead, but because of the rising cost of spare parts and everything else, it became unprofitable. Three out of four neighboring farms did the same. The freed-up land is being taken over by Prodimpex and similar large business entities.

Denis believes he was lucky with the lease deal: previously, land rented for 8,000 rubles per hectare, while he managed to lease it out for 14,000. Those who signed contracts earlier remain stuck with old terms – without inflation indexation. Hence a new grassroots practice: lease agreements now include “indexation based on prices at Pyaterochka.” “They take any three products – eggs, milk, and something else –and fix the prices. If milk goes up, the rent goes up. That’s how people protect themselves,” Denis explains. In this system, there is no place for Rosstat: official inflation figures are not trusted.

“It feels like everything will end in total ruin. Sometimes you think: let the collapse happen faster so we can start over. Living like this means constant stress, and there isn’t even a hint of improvement,” Denis concludes.

Rising prices are hurting even industries where death itself would seem to guarantee demand. Among entrepreneurs, a grim mantra is circulating: the only people with money now are funeral directors. At first glance, that appears true. Russia’s five largest funeral companies generated nearly 15 billion rubles in revenue in 2024 – 24% more than a year earlier.

However, if the market is viewed as a whole, growth has been slowing for two consecutive years: in 2025, revenue rose by only 3.3% – twice as weak as the 2024 figure and below inflation. The reason is the same as everywhere else: rising prices are eroding real demand. More and more families are choosing only the minimum set of services and relying on state subsidies. The nominal revenue growth has instead been driven by the cost of goods and services: during the war, the price of a coffin rose by 90%, while grave digging became 56% more expensive.

The tax squeeze

Tax reform has created a trap for small businesses: as soon as turnover exceeds 15 million rubles, VAT kicks in – wiping out already thin profit margins. Since 2026, the conditions of the patent taxation system have also become stricter: previously, the regime was available to businesses with annual revenue of up to 60 million rubles, but now the threshold has been cut to 20 million. Entrepreneurs have found their own solution: splitting up operations. Registering sole proprietorships in relatives’ names, opening second bank accounts, asking clients to transfer money directly – in other words, moving into the shadow economy.

According to Russia’s Federal Tax Service (FNS), the number of companies established in Russia fell by 20% in 2025. A study by the Public Opinion Foundation and the Higher School of Economics, titled “Small Business Longitudinal Study,” showed that nearly one-third of small businesses are considering closure or sale, while entrepreneurs’ expectations for the first quarter of 2026 were the worst recorded over the entire observation period. Some 52% believe their business conditions will deteriorate. According to the Center for Strategic Research, 75% of SMEs have no profit left for development.

Nearly one-third of small businesses are considering closure or sale – expectations for the start of 2026 were the worst over the entire observation period

Alexander (name changed), the owner of a tire repair shop in one of the regions of Russia’s Central Federal District, is struggling to figure out how to avoid falling under the new law. His business margin is 15–20%. If turnover crosses the threshold, “then it’s simply over.” “I honestly wonder what the government is trying to achieve with this. Because it still won’t get more money – people will start hiding their legal income,” he says. “Nobody is growing. Everyone is trying desperately not to fall under the new VAT law.”

At the same time, expensive credit is weighing on him just as heavily as on everyone else. With profitability at 20%, loans carrying annual interest rates of 25–30% mean having to pay back more than the business earns. Investing in expansion makes no sense – it is more profitable to put the money in a bank deposit. This is how small business in Russia is freezing in place: not collapsing all at once, but ceasing to grow, shrinking, and splitting into smaller entities.

In addition, Alexander gauges the state of the industry through his suppliers. They are connected to major tire plants that plan budgets based on projected demand. The picture is bleak: “Last year – production down 20%, this year – down another 10%.” Factories are cutting capacity because declines are being recorded everywhere.

The government breaks things – IT fixes them

There is one sector where the war, sanctions, and government policy are producing a completely different effect: Western software is being replaced with Russian alternatives, website blocks and censorship are disrupting familiar services, and every new restriction imposed by Roskomnadzor creates demand for circumvention tools.

The IT sector is making money from everything at once –from import substitution, from fixing what the government itself has broken, from creating new tools to replace banned services and to bypass restrictions. Over five years, Russia’s IT market has doubled, reaching 4 trillion rubles by the end of 2025. The cybersecurity market nearly doubled as well – from 193 billion rubles in 2022 to 374 billion in 2025. The number of new IT businesses has risen by 17% since the beginning of 2025 alone.

The mechanism behind this growth is government-created chaos: every block, every forced transition from Western software to domestic alternatives, every new Roskomnadzor requirement – all of it becomes someone’s revenue stream. In July 2025, Russia recorded 2,099 internet shutdowns in a single month – more than the entire world combined throughout all of 2024. In February 2026, Roskomnadzor began slowing down Telegram across the country, and by March the messenger had stopped working for many users without a VPN. According to Rostelecom, mobile service malfunctioned or disappeared entirely in 90% of Russia’s regions in March 2026. In Moscow, demand rose for paper maps, pagers, and landline telephones.

The mechanism behind the growth is government-created chaos: every block and every new Roskomnadzor requirement becomes someone’s revenue stream

“The government is doing all sorts of strange things with digital systems right now. And because of that, we’re constantly fixing something. All my clients are endlessly updating things, reintegrating systems, turning something back on after it shut off and won’t restart,” says the commercial director of a St. Petersburg IT company specializing in custom software development and warehouse logistics optimization.

When Telegram came under pressure, his company started making money by creating bots for MAX. When tax rules changed, he spent two months restructuring the company’s entire contract base in order to qualify for preferential tax treatment for IT firms. “You could sit around saying Putin, the Digital Development Ministry, or Roskomnadzor were to blame. Or you could stop whining,” the businessman says, trying to sound upbeat.

But even in his voice there is confusion when the conversation turns to “white lists” – lists of websites accessible during a complete mobile internet shutdown. “I still don’t really understand how this mechanism works. Sometimes it feels to me as though there are Ukrainian spies sitting in the State Duma. In that sense, yes, the prospects are worrying. Personally, I don’t see anyone at the government level offering any genuinely workable solutions.” But he quickly regains his composure: “And from a business point of view –so what? Is this the first time? You grab a bigger shovel and throw the dirt farther away. That’s the whole business.”

“All that may be left of your workers are burning sneakers”

Shelling deep inside Russia primarily affects large businesses: ports, oil refiners, and defense industry enterprises. Flight delays caused by drone threats are not only a problem for airlines, but also for tour operators and the hotel industry. But in border regions, nationwide problems are compounded by something found nowhere else: even work at non-strategic facilities has become physically dangerous.

Roman (name changed), the owner of a Belgorod company that builds private homes, refuses on principle to take government contracts for housing reconstruction in Shebekinoand other affected districts: “They promise three or four times the normal rates there, but it’s dangerous – tomorrow all that may be left of your workers are burning sneakers. And there’s also the risk of becoming the scapegoat, because wherever government money is involved, there are immediately kickbacks, the FSB, and problems.”

“Wherever government money is involved, there are immediately kickbacks, the FSB, and problems”

According to city authorities, half of the 22 multi-story residential construction sites in Belgorod have effectively been frozen – over three years, active projects have utilized only 9% of their potential capacity. Investment in the regional economy fell by 14.6% in 2025, while investment in fixed capital dropped by 17.7%.

The few who are still making money operate differently: they buy a plot of land, put up a simple one-story shell of a house, and post an ad on Avito. People who received compensation certificates from the Construction Ministry for lost housing buy even these properties. The market is literally being sustained by destruction.

Who profits from the war

When asked whether there are businesses in Russia that have benefited from the war, the business community responds evasively, but in remarkably similar terms.

“There are none in Belgorod Region. And there won’t be any. All of that is idle speculation,” says the owner of an industrial manufacturing business. According to him, there are no companies “close to the feeding trough” – “rather, there are a number of unfortunate people burdened with assets who would gladly leave if they could.”

“The winners are the ones sitting in the hall at meetings of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs,” says one businessman who asked not to be named. “The people from Rosneft, Gazprom, Kerimov's circle and the rest. Everyone who ‘chipped in for daddy’s birthday party.’ Plus the banks. And those working on Defense Ministry contracts. You won’t find anyone else.”

True, even large businesses are hardly enthusiastic about having to “chip in.” VTB Chairman Andrei Kostin said that “neither the government nor the Central Bank supports” the idea of introducing a windfall tax on banks’ excess profits –and Kostin believes the sector will manage to fend it off.

“Russia is run by large state-run corporations. And the task of small business is not to make money, but to provide employment. If they manage to earn anything, that’s their personal achievement,” a Russian businessman concludes.

Trump, who by then had served roughly half of his first presidential term, broke a rule that all of his predecessors had strictly followed since the days of Franklin Roosevelt: he began asking what Washington could receive from Riyadh in exchange for its provision of military assistance.

The Carter Doctrine

Since the historic meeting between President Roosevelt and Saudi King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud in February 1945, no consequential figure in America had asked such questions. Back then, the two leaders agreed that Saudi Arabia would ensure uninterrupted oil supplies to the West — first and foremost to the United States, of course — while the Americans, in return, would take responsibility for the security of their new Middle Eastern ally.

By the 1980s, the “oil for security” arrangement, also known as the Carter Doctrine,  had become the standard model for U.S. relations with the oil- and gas-rich countries of the Persian Gulf. The concept envisaged active U.S. involvement, including the use of force, to protect its interests in the Middle East — and Washington’s main interest was, of course, the uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbons.

The doctrine worked so well that the U.S. Navy was able to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to shipping even during the Iran–Iraq War of 1980-1988. The Carter Doctrine also played a significant role in the 1991 U.S. intervention in Iraq, as Operation Desert Storm was largely motivated by fears that Baghdad’s occupation of neighboring Kuwait — and a possible further advance by Saddam Hussein’s forces into parts of Saudi Arabia — would lead to an oil shortage.

Overdue response

In 2019, when Saudi Arabia’s critical oil facilities were hit by an unprecedented missile and drone attack, Riyadh had every reason to expect an immediate and powerful U.S. response. In line with the spirit of the doctrine, Washington viewed threats to the oil industry of its Middle Eastern allies as a threat to its own security.

The expected response to the attack would have been American strikes against the Houthis — Iranian proxies in Yemen who were immediately suspected of carrying out the attack — or even against Iran itself. After all, without Tehran’s technologies and weapons, the Houthis would not have been able to pull off such a large-scale operation — as a result of the attack, global oil production fell by as much as 5% for several months.

Instead, Trump asked the Saudis what they could offer him in exchange for U.S. intervention. Later, the United States did send additional radars to the Persian Gulf and increased its troop presence there, but this response was delayed and far less powerful than Riyadh had expected. Observers even began speaking of the demise of the Carter Doctrine — in other words, the breakdown of Washington’s model of interaction with its Middle Eastern allies.

These were not just empty words. Without rupturing their alliance with the United States, Middle Eastern countries focused on building up their capacity for self-defense, albeit without overly jeopardizing relations with Washington, as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and several other Gulf states are critically dependent on the United States for the maintenance and repair of their air defense systems, aircraft, and armored vehicles, since practically their entire stock of weapons is produced in America.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are critically dependent on the U.S. for the maintenance and repair of their American-made air defense systems, aircraft, and armored vehicles

Probably the most notable of these “additional” alliances is the Saudi–Pakistani partnership. In September 2025, the two states signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Treaty. Its full text has never been published, but it is known that under its auspices several thousand Pakistani troops are permanently stationed in Saudi Arabia. Their official objective is to train Saudi soldiers and integrate the two national military command-and-control systems.

Furthermore, an attack on either country of the alliance would be considered an attack on both, requiring an immediate response from the other ally. In other words, Saudi Arabia has come under the nuclear “umbrella” of Pakistan, which has officially maintained a nuclear arsenal since the 1990s, along with a significant fleet of delivery systems.

In the meantime, without much publicity, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have been forging new security alliances with a range of other states, most notably Turkey and China. This effort noticeably accelerated after the U.S. attack on Iran, a move all the more disruptive due to the fact that Washington decided not to announce it in advance to any of its regional allies, leaving them exceptionally vulnerable to Iranian counterattacks.

Alliances with China: from human shield to cloud services

After the outbreak of hostilities, China presented its Arab partners with a reliable option for the vital transport of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, which had been blocked by Iran. Beijing reached a behind-the-scenes agreement with Tehran that tankers with Chinese crews, along with those carrying oil to China, would be provided with a green corridor, through which China is known to be receiving Iraqi and Saudi oil.

Kuwait, meanwhile, went as far as to use Chinese citizens as a human shield against Iranian attacks. In March, the authorities in Kuwait City requested emergency assistance from Chinese companies to complete the construction of a port in the Persian Gulf. Officially, of course, Kuwait does not acknowledge that inviting Chinese nationals is a security measure, but it remains the most plausible explanation for its sudden desire to urgently complete a port that is not scheduled for completion until the mid-2030s.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported China’s peace plan despite the fact that it clearly contradicts Trump’s goals. Beijing calls for respect of Iran’s sovereignty and an end to forcible regime change attempts, and also urges active involvement of the United Nations in resolving the region’s problems. The latter is essentially a diplomatically phrased call to strip the United States of its status as the main enforcer in the Middle East.

The last item of the Chinese peace plan is a diplomatically phrased call to strip the U. S. of its status as the main enforcer in the Middle East

In some sectors, Washington is already beginning to lose its position as the region’s go-to partner. By the end of 2026, trade turnover between the Gulf countries and China is expected to exceed that with the United States and the European Union combined. Despite its role as the dominant currency for energy supply settlements, the dollar is facing increasing competition from Arab currencies and the yuan. And China is demonstrating readiness for increasingly deep cooperation.

The U.S. cannot be happy about these trends. Even more infuriating for Washington is the increasingly close technical cooperation between Arab states and Beijing. Following Iranian missile and drone strikes on American data centers in the UAE and Bahrain, China began promoting its capacities as a safer, more reliable alternative. The Chinese corporation Huawei, which is under U.S. sanctions, has even started using the phrase “regional disruptions” in advertising its cloud services, pointing out that its infrastructure is unaffected by such disruptions.

Huawei, which Washington regards almost as a high-tech arm of Chinese military intelligence, has affected American relations with its Arab partners on several occasions. In 2021, negotiations on the supply of American F-35 fighter jets to the UAE were frozen due to Abu Dhabi’s reluctance to abandon cooperation with the Chinese corporation, which had secured a contract to build mobile phone networks in the UAE. Then, in 2025, negotiations on the supply of F-35s to Saudi Arabia stalled for the same reason. The Americans fear that a Huawei mobile network covering the territory of both Gulf states could be used to identify and steal sensitive technologies used in the production of the aircraft.

Nevertheless, against the backdrop of the war in Iran, several Arab states are expanding their cooperation with Huawei. In addition, for several years Saudi Arabia has been purchasing Chinese laser air-defense systems, and the U.S. ban on selling strike drones to the Middle East has led several Gulf states to acquire Chinese alternatives instead.

The unexpected war has also accelerated the integration of Chinese AI solutions within Arab states’ armed forces for use in analyzing battlefield conditions and processing intelligence data. This trend undermines the Trump administration’s efforts to promote American AI for military and dual-use applications.

The Americans are trying to counter the evident tilt of its Middle Eastern partners toward China by offering F-35s in exchange for the abandonment of cooperation with Huawei.

It has been argued that China could begin supplying Iran with modern radar systems and man-portable air-defense systems, and American officials caution that such a move would trigger harsh sanctions against Beijing. “China is going to have big problems,” Trump promised — and in his formulation, such threats usually translate into new financial sanctions against both the source of concern and its active trading partners. It would be reasonable to assume that one of the first targets of Trump’s sanctions strike would be the electronic platform mBridge, where Middle Eastern oil is traded in yuan.

Turkey: drones and intelligence

The war has also given a new impetus to cooperation between Arab countries and Turkey, which boasts one of the largest armies in the region, a powerful defense industry, and breakthrough unmanned aviation technologies.

Military-technical cooperation with Turkey can allow Gulf states to close the security gaps revealed by the war against Iran by adding a Turkish drone component to their American-made air-defense networks. Moreover, they would gain the ability to compare limited intelligence data provided by the United States with information coming from Ankara. In addition, with Turkish assistance, Gulf countries would establish their own production lines of drone and missile interception systems.

Several years before the start of the current war, Saudi Arabia signed a $3 billion contract to purchase Turkish Bayraktar drones. Last year, several additional contracts with companies producing weapons and military vehicles were added to this agreement.

Just before the bombing campaign against Iran began on Feb. 28, it was revealed that the Saudis are among the investors in the development of the Turkish KAAN fighter jet. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has intensified its cooperation with Gulf states, both as a diplomatic mediator and as an arms exporter. Several other Middle Eastern countries are considering Ankara’s offering of the “Steel Dome” integrated air-defense system, which is being marketed as a more affordable alternative to the American Patriot system.

The growing rapprochement between Washington’s partners and Turkey is unlikely to please the Americans, as Ankara is effectively challenging the U.S. monopoly as the protector of the Persian Gulf states. However, Washington is unlikely to react by threatening “problems” or hinting at sanctions, as it did with China. After all, NATO member Turkey is a long-standing and reliable ally.

Indeed, the parties have every chance of reaching an amicable agreement: Turkey could undertake not to supply the Gulf with intelligence data that could pose a threat to the United States’ own security, and in return, America could agree not to obstruct the Gulf states’ purchase of Turkish radar systems and drones.

Ukraine: trading weapons for investment

Drones will also flow to the Middle East from Ukraine. Arab states are particularly interested in interceptor UAVs capable of destroying heavy kamikaze drones such as Shahed — actively used by both Russia and Iran.

Ukraine has already reached strategic partnership agreements with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to support the production of drones and other military equipment in exchange for investment. This cooperation is clearly not to the liking of the Trump administration, since Ukraine is acting as an independent player and securing additional sources of funding, making Kyiv less vulnerable to pressure from Washington.

In fact, Trump has gradually stripped himself of leverage over Ukraine all on his own. When Kyiv signed the “defense pact” with Gulf states, Ukraine had already been left without direct financial, military, and even diplomatic support from Washington, which had effectively sided with the Kremlin. As a result, the U.S. no longer has any real mechanisms at its disposal to prevent Zelensky from pursuing an independent Middle Eastern policy.

The United States no longer has any real mechanisms to prevent Kyiv from pursuing an independent Middle Eastern policy

Arab states are all the more inclined to increase their cooperation with Ukraine given that Russia has clearly supported Iran in this war. While making loud statements about its readiness to deepen security cooperation with the Arab world, Moscow is maintaining demonstratively warm relations with the very regime responsible for shelling Doha, Riyadh, and other regional centers.

The issue at hand could have other dimensions as well. Iran is reportedly using Russian intelligence data when selecting targets. So far, this concerns only American and Israeli objects “highlighted” by Russians for Iranian missiles. But the satellites that transmit the coordinates of U.S. Navy ships or Israeli military bases to the Iranians could in theory also be used to guide strikes against military or civilian infrastructure in Arab countries.

In addition, Iran — which for several years supplied strike drones for Russia’s daily attacks on Ukrainian cities — is now itself importing Russian drones, according to Western intelligence reports. Meanwhile, the only country in the world with real experience in countering these kamikaze UAVs is Ukraine, one of the key factors behind Kyiv’s growing rapprochement with the Gulf states.

South Korea and India

The war in Iran, which Trump likely hoped would be a brilliant, lightning-fast operation to achieve regime change, has already resulted in the United States losing part of its influence in a region that Americans had long regarded almost as their own backyard. Now even South Korea has committed to supplying the UAE with tens of billions of dollars’ worth of weapons and military vehicles — in addition to the localization of production of its missile systems, air-defense systems, and radars in the UAE and Saudi Arabia as part of an agreement reached prior to the current war. Additionally, France has increased its military presence in the region and may also be prepared to offer its own weapons systems to interested Gulf states.

India, too, is unlikely to remain idle as its adversary Pakistan gains new allies and increases its geopolitical weight. And Israel, with its advanced air-defense systems and highly sophisticated data analysis capabilities, is also becoming an increasingly attractive security partner for Arab states — even those that are yet to recognize the Jewish state.

In short, without realizing it, when Trump launched his war against Iran, he set in motion a cascade of events that will significantly weaken American influence in the Middle East.

Under the bill, Vladimir Putin is given the authority to deploy the army on his own decision to “protect” Russian citizens. Commenting on the law, State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said that “Western justice has effectively become a tool of repression against those deemed undesirable.”

As follows from the language of the bill, the amendments will apply to Russians who have been arrested or subjected to criminal or other prosecution pursuant to decisions by courts of foreign states, as well as international judicial bodies “whose jurisdiction is not based on an international treaty of the Russian Federation or a UN Security Council resolution adopted in the exercise of the powers provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.”

The amendments will be proposed for the second reading of a bill tightening the requirements for obtaining citizenship. The initiative was introduced to the State Duma in early March. In its original version, the draft stipulated that foreigners would be denied citizenship or a residence permit if they had an unexpunged or outstanding conviction. On May 13, the lower house of parliament passed the bill in its first reading.

The bill had been expected to apply to convictions for any crime. Under the new amendments, foreigners with outstanding convictions could still obtain temporary stay permits, residence permits and citizenship if they were “illegally convicted in other countries for supporting Russia’s policy of countering neo-Nazism and supporting the special military operation” — meaning the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

“We are confident that, ahead of the second reading, we will have to additionally consider cases of people being unlawfully prosecuted in other countries for supporting the Russian Federation,” Yarovaya said.

The State Duma is considering several other amendments that would tighten migration laws. In early April, State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said that MPs planned to double the number of grounds for expelling migrants from Russia, including violations of public order and failure to comply with the demands of police officers and National Guard personnel. 

On the demand side, Ukraine continues to endure relentless Russian missile strikes. This persistent threat runs counter to some of the initial expectations from the early days of the full-scale war. Shortly after the invasion, many expected that sanctions, export controls, and the Russian economy’s inability to replace certain key components like semiconductors would significantly reduce Russia's ability to sustain ballistic missile strikes at a high volume due to the collapse of its domestic missile industry. In October 2022, as sanctions and export controls began to bite, the U.S. State Department announced that “Russian hypersonic ballistic missile production has nearly ceased due to the lack of necessary semiconductors.” And indeed, Russian missile strikes of all kinds declined throughout 2023, perhaps reflecting the depletion of the Russian stockpile, coupled with production challenges.

Shortly after the invasion, many expected that sanctions would significantly reduce Russia's ability to sustain ballistic missile strikes at a high volume

However, this was not to last, as the Russians manoeuvred to circumvent these new constraints. In the fall of 2023, Russia began importing Hwasong-11 missiles, called the KN-23 and -24 by the U.S. intelligence community, from North Korea. Pyongyang even expanded the factory that manufactures and assembles the Hwasong-11 series. While part of that expansion was likely to fill domestic production, the Russian demand signal likely played a role as well.

In addition to importing whole missiles, Russia has succeeded in building networks to evade export controls and acquire key components. They are still able to acquire U.S.-made components for their ballistic missiles, likely through unsanctioned secondary countries like Turkey or China. China appears to have been a big help beyond providing an unsanctioned import path, letting the Russians maintain access to electronics and many other dual-use goods.

Finally, the Russians have recapitalized their domestic missile industry, expanding solid propellant production plants and factories for ballistic missiles like the Iskander. In combination, these measures have allowed the Russians to rebound from the 2023 nadir in their strike volume against Ukraine.

Since then, the number and size of strikes have picked up. In April 2026, the Russians launched more drones and missiles than in any other month of the war. Just a few days before Zelensky’s comments on ABMs, Russia conducted one of its largest drone and missile attacks yet, launching at least 19 ballistic missiles into Ukraine. Not only is there still demand for missile defenses in Ukraine, but that demand is growing significantly as the Russian missile industry rebounds from the effects of sanctions and export controls.

Unreliable partners and a shortage of missiles

Despite these redoubled attacks, the supply side for missile defenses and missile defense interceptors is the likely source of the uncertainty driving Zelensky’s comments about a European ABM solution. Ukraine currently relies on the U.S.-made Patriot Advanced Capability-2 and -3 (PAC-2/3) systems. Patriot batteries have been donated or sold to Ukraine by a number of countries, including the U.S. and Germany. The Patriots are complemented by two SAMP/T batteries made by the Eurosam Consortium, donated by Italy and France.

Unfortunately, the U.S. has shown itself to be a fickle ally and, therefore, an unreliable source of interceptors for Ukraine for two reasons. The first involves U.S. domestic politics, with elements of the Republican Party having revealed themselves to be uninterested in aiding Ukraine in its fight against the Russian invasion. As the Trump administration took over last year, the Pentagon froze aid to Ukraine, and there still is not a solid base of support for Ukraine in the ruling party in Washington, leaving Ukraine dependent on the whims of American domestic politics for its supply of interceptors.

The U.S. has shown itself to be a fickle ally and, therefore, an unreliable source of interceptors for Ukraine

Second is the Trump administration’s appetite for military adventurism. Military operations in the Middle East have cut deeply into Patriot stockpiles, reducing the number available to go to Ukraine. In the wake of Operation Midnight Hammer last June (the U.S. strikes against the Iranian nuclear program that came on the heels of the Israeli-launched 12-Day War), U.S. Patriot batteries in Qatar were drawn into what was then the largest Patriot engagement in history, defending against retaliatory Iranian missile attacks. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine didn’t specify how many interceptors were fired during the defense, remarking only that “it was a bunch.” Yet it was enough that some figures among the Pentagon leadership were able to worry about whether there was enough slack in the interceptor stockpile to justify halting shipments to Ukraine.

Operation Epic Fury earlier this year has only compounded this problem. While the 12-Day War was mainly a regional-range missile engagement, with longer-range Iranian missiles launched at Israel being intercepted by regional-range American missile defenses like the SM-3 and THAAD, this new Persian Gulf War has been a much shorter-range affair. The deep reservoir of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles aimed at the Gulf states has consumed vast quantities of American Patriot interceptors. Estimates vary, but an analysis by CSIS suggests that somewhere in the ballpark of 1,060-1,430 were used. It doesn’t help that the U.S. has been using Patriots to intercept Iranian drones like the Shahed-136, which have been fired in very large numbers. The mismatch in cost between the two provoked Representative Ted Lieu to compare those intercepts to “throwing Ferraris at frisbees.” It seems imprudent for Ukraine to rely on key munitions from an ally that has demonstrated a liability to start wars of choice, which are a huge drain on the supply of those essential interceptors.

The deep reservoir of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles aimed at the Gulf states has consumed vast quantities of American Patriot interceptors

The rapid consumption of Patriots during the rounds of fighting between the U.S. and Iran has also underscored the anaemic state of Patriot interceptor production. Lockheed Martin plans to expand throughput to around 2000 PAC-3 interceptors per year by 2030. Annual production rates currently sit at around 600 interceptors, and given that 18 other countries rely on PAC for air and missile defense, Ukraine finds itself bumping elbows with many potential competitors for a rather small production pool.

A similar throughput problem afflicts Ukraine’s other source of ABMs, the SAMP/T. Accounting for serious expansions in the production base for that interceptor, annual deliveries of the ABM-capable versions of the Aster 30 used by the SAMP/T are likely around 190-270. However, as fewer countries rely on that system, there is less competition for deliveries, meaning Ukraine could benefit from much of the expanded production. Ukraine will also be part of the operational testing for the upgraded SAMP/T NG system, which is being developed by Eurosam.

Steps taken to develop a pan-European ABM solution

In the meantime, given these supply-side challenges, it is not surprising that Zelensky is floating a European ABM solution. There is already a proto-European ABM solution, but Ukraine isn’t part of it. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz proposed the European Sky Shield Initiative in 2022 to coordinate air and missile defense procurement on the continent. The Initiative has been controversial, drawing criticism from French President Macron, for instance, for failing to prioritize European-made systems like SAMP/T over American-made Patriots or Israeli-made Arrows. Macron complained that by buying American, the Germans were “preparing the problems of tomorrow!”

Marcon’s issue with Sky Shield comports with long-standing French concerns about the U.S. having a monopoly on key defense technologies, and ABM in particular, dating back to even before Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. Despite French frustrations, the ESSI has expanded to include 24 countries, including non-NATO members Austria and Switzerland.

The growth of ESSI reflects a clear-eyed assessment by many European countries of the threat posed by Russia's missile arsenal. The invasion of Ukraine, which Scholz characterized as a “Zeitenwende,” or historic turning point, demonstrated the inadequacy of continental defenses against a mature missile force. While the NATO Integrated Air Defense System and the Aegis Ashore installations in Poland and Romania, in particular, represent good foundations, they were not commensurate with the threat. The initial deficit in the face of the Zeitenwende has become more acute as Germany and others have transferred large numbers of air defense systems and missile defense interceptors, drawing down national stocks. This is not to say they should not have sent those systems to Ukraine — quite the opposite. But there is now a clear space for ESSI to help replenish air and missile defenses in Europe in a consistent and coordinated fashion to address the gap between the enduring Russian missile industry and European interceptor stockpiles. 

The growth of ESSI reflects a clear-eyed assessment by many European countries of the threat posed by Russia's missile arsenal

The fundamental economics of missile defense, the simple fact that offensive missiles will almost always be much cheaper than defensive interceptors, means expanded defenses must be complemented by capable offensive forces. As the 12-Day War and Operation Epic Fury demonstrated, perhaps the best missile defense is a strong anti-missile offense. Nevertheless, ESSI is a good first step toward redressing this divergence.

Causes for optimism

While the initiative will provide some level of coordination for procurement, it is not an industrial policy focused on expanding interceptor production, nor have there been reports that Ukraine will join soon. While ESSI helps coordinate air and missile defense projects across the continent, it does not finance new production lines. Though that might be a knock-on effect of coordinated purchasing, it is not a direct investment in ABM production. This reality means ESSI is not a solution to the near- and medium-term Russian missile problem Zelensky and the Ukrainians face, even if Ukraine were to join — hence the Ukrainian President’s call for a European ABM system.

Returning to that call, the paucity of details in the proposal (if it can even be called that) makes it hard to tell whether it will produce a meaningful initiative. ESSI demonstrates that Europe is paying more attention to missile defense in the wake of the invasion, and I’m sure states are feeling even more pressure as the U.S. burns through interceptors at an astonishing clip in the Middle East. Yet it is still unclear what exactly Zelensky is asking for. Is it an integrated missile defense architecture for Europe? A large-volume production ABM akin to Patriot? I believe it is probably the latter, but we won’t know until more details emerge. The level of detail in any proposal that comes out of this conversation will be the best gauge of whether Zelenzky’s call to action has momentum and could translate into policy and programming. If some sort of framework or roadmap emerges with specifics, that would be a positive sign.

The good news is that investment is already happening, and it is happening with Ukraine. Eurosam is expanding its production lines for SAMP/T to increase throughput, and the Ukrainians will have the chance to test the upgraded SAMP/T NG against Russian missiles. This collaboration isn’t only altruistic; it will help strengthen the next generation of ABMs, which seem to be Europe’s best bet for building a continental ABM system. While other European states can offer hardware, the Ukrainians can offer experience, operational testing, and hard performance data to improve current and future ABMs. In an ideal world, this would be the start of a sustained effort to grapple with the supply side problems that Ukraine — and Europe more broadly — faces in their effort to defend against Russian ballistic missiles in a world where the U.S. is a less reliable partner.

Averin signed a contract with Russia’s Defense Ministry in early January and trained as a drone operator. His foster mother, Oksana Afanasyeva, said his training ended in late March. On April 2, he called her for the last time and said he was going somewhere with “no network coverage.” On April 8, she was told her son had been killed by mortar fire.

“The boy spent three months training how to fly drones, and then they sent him into an assault, into the worst meat grinder — someone who had never served in the army,” Afanasyeva said. She said Averin had wanted to serve in the military but had not been accepted: “They said he was mentally unstable or something. He deceived me, said he had gone to earn money at [retail platform] Wildberries. And when I found out he had signed a [military] contract, I nearly lost my mind.”

Valery Averin was raised in an orphanage until age 11, then placed with a foster family. At the time he signed the contract with the Russian armed forces, he was in his final year at the Buryat Republican Technical Vocational School of Construction and Industrial Technologies.

Russia’s Defense Ministry announced the creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces in mid-2025, establishing a counterpart to the military branch created in Ukraine in early 2024. A campaign to recruit students from educational institutions across the country soon followed.

The Insider has reported that Russian college students are being drawn into service with promises of large payments or tuition-free places, while also facing threats of expulsion or being barred from exams.

This version is reportedly contained in the case files of the Spanish probe into the incident. Investigators suggested that the 50-by-50-centimeter breach in the cargo ship’s hull was likely caused by a Barracuda-type torpedo. Such torpedoes are possessed by Russia, Iran, the United States, and several NATO allies.

Meanwhile, analysts interviewed by the outlet suggested that the incident may have been caused by a magnetic mine planted on the ship’s hull.

Barracuda is a high-speed torpedo that generates an air bubble in front of itself, reducing drag resistance. According to CNN, it could have struck the vessel silently: the Russian captain reportedly told investigators that he heard neither an impact nor an explosion on Dec. 22, when the ship first began to slow down. Only a day later did the crew hear three explosions in the engine room, which killed two crew members. Their bodies were never recovered. 

Ursa Major departed from the port of Ust-Luga on Dec. 11, 2024. On board were two large hatch covers, 129 empty containers, and two large Liebherr cranes. Shortly before the voyage, the vessel’s owner, state-owned transport operator Oboronlogistika, had obtained a license to transport nuclear materials.

The vessel was sailing along the coasts of France and Spain. After sharply reducing the speed on Dec. 22, Ursa Major abruptly veered off course about 24 hours later and issued a distress signal. Three explosions occurred on its starboard side, causing the ship to list. Fourteen surviving crew members evacuated in a lifeboat and were rescued by a Spanish salvage vessel.

One of the accompanying Russian vessels, Ivan Gren, reportedly demanded that all ships keep their distance from Ursa Major and return the rescued crew members. Spanish rescue services, however, insisted on continuing the operation: at that point, the vessel appeared stable and was unlikely to sink anytime soon, a source familiar with the investigation told CNN.

However, by the evening of Dec. 23, Ursa Major had completely sunk beneath the water. Earlier that evening, Ivan Gren reportedly fired a series of red signal flares over the site of the incident, after which four explosions followed, and the vessel went down. Seismologists recorded seismic signals consistent with underwater mines or quarry-style explosions.

The crew members were questioned by Spanish police and investigators. The ship’s captain, Igor Anisimov, reportedly admitted that the vessel was carrying components for two nuclear reactors similar to nuclear naval propulsion units. He believed the ship was ultimately bound for the North Korean port of Rason, although Vladivostok had originally been declared as the destination.

Spanish investigators also pointed to North Korea’s status as the Kremlin’s strategic ally. One of the theories explored during the investigation was that the cargo may have included VM-4SG reactors, which are commonly used in Russian Project 667 nuclear submarines equipped with ballistic missiles. However, there is insufficient evidence to conclusively support this claim.

The Spanish investigation also suggested that a lengthy sea voyage would have been unlikely if the goal had simply been to deliver two cranes, hundreds of empty containers, and two large hatch covers to Vladivostok. Investigators speculated that the cranes may have been on board to assist in unloading a secret cargo upon arrival in Rason.

The ship’s crew returned to Russia a few days later. About a week afterward, Russian military vessels reportedly returned to the site of the incident: the research vessel Yantar, which has been accused of espionage activities, spent five days over the wreck of the cargo ship. During that same period, four more explosions were detected in the area, allegedly targeting the wreckage of the vessel on the seabed.

AI is no longer the future of war. Instead, it is part and parcel of any modern conflict. Certainly, the companies building these AI platforms view their growth as unescapable. As Palantir, one of the leading AI providers to the U.S. Department of Defense, asserted, “The question is not whether A.I. weapons will be built; it is who will build them and for what purpose.”

The question is not whether A.I. weapons will be built; it is who will build them and for what purpose

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Claude LLM developer Anthropic are currently involved in discussions that will have wide-ranging consequences. Decisions made by militaries — about what developers they use, the algorithms they rely on, and how their military personnel integrate the systems — will determine whether AI leads to more or less instability. AI can create remarkable advantages on the battlefield, enable logistics and mobilization, and augment early warning. It may also help make war more discriminate and decrease the danger of emotions like fear, anger, or even fatigue, all of which can lead to violations of the laws of armed conflict. In short, the choices made by militaries and AI developers today will shape whether states can harness the power of AI for deterrence and stability or whether the technology will end up driving states to war.

Confidence and overconfidence, technology, and war

Perhaps the greatest danger of any emerging technology is that new technologies shift the balance of power so profoundly that states believe they either have an advantage or are so inherently vulnerable that they must attack. While technologies rarely create immediate, enduring advantages that fundamentally change who can take and hold territory, the lure of the possibility is devastatingly powerful. Confidence, and overconfidence, in what an emerging technology can do on the battlefield can make states more likely to launch preemptive strikes, undertake offensive campaigns, or fail to anticipate how a technology might go awry. Indeed, in research I conducted on cyber vulnerabilities and conflict, I found that players’ routine overestimation of offensive cyber capabilities in wargames led to a greater chance of first strikes on nuclear arsenals.

While technologies rarely create immediate, enduring advantages that fundamentally change who can take and hold territory, the lure of the possibility is devastatingly powerful

The overconfidence technology can inspire when it comes to deciding whether it is worth going on the attack is also exacerbated under certain psychological conditions. The Dunning-Kruger effect, for example, describes a phenomenon in which individuals with less skills or abilities tend to overestimate their capabilities. They don’t know what they don’t know, making them overconfident in tasks in which they have little expertise. As the authors explain, “people who are unskilled in these domains suffer a dual burden: not only do these people reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it.” 

This tendency to overestimate a technology’s capability can likewise come to the fore when decision-makers are faced with situations that have no easy solution, and also when the technology seems to support decisions they already wanted to make. For example, in the cyber wargame I referenced earlier, players were faced with a no-win situation: put on the brink of nuclear conflict, with no clear way of either de-escalating or defeating the enemy. When given a new cyber capability to attack the enemy’s nuclear command, control, and communications, players were willing to suspend disbelief about the technology’s feasibility. Even though the game told players that it wasn’t clear what the scope and duration of the effects of the cyber exploit could be, players wished away the uncertainty and leaned into the technology in the hopes of getting out of the tricky situation. This phenomenon was most powerful with players who had limited knowledge or training with nuclear strategy, and we found that those with limited nuclear expertise had a greater tendency to resort to use of the cyber exploit and attacks on enemy nuclear arsenals.

The AI bubble: Are we overconfident in AI?

Does AI imbue overconfidence? Emerging research suggests this is a possibility, and experiments with young teachers and inexperienced investors suggest that the Dunning-Kruger effect is particularly powerful with AI. Further, many AI agents are designed specifically to engender confidence in their users, leading AI agents to both underestimate the uncertainty of their own recommendations and to intentionally obfuscate that uncertainty to users. This leads to overconfident AI models and agents that then overconfidently present information to users who may — based on experience, beliefs, or personality — already be primed to put more faith in the technology than they perhaps should.

This confidence in the power of technology is concerning because, despite extraordinary progress with AI, there are fundamental concerns about the safety and reliability of existing AI systems. Research has found that AI itself can be overconfident when faced with uncertainty — when placed in a game of Go, the AI agent took risky offensive plays with sometimes catastrophic results. Further, wargames played with AI agents (as compared with to human players) demonstrated not only a pattern of escalation, but also the fragility of the models and tendency to hallucination when asked to iterate over time.

Despite extraordinary progress with AI, there are fundamental concerns about the safety and reliability of existing AI systems

The limitations of AI in lab and non-conflict environments will become dangerous vulnerabilities in war when models, training data, and users will be targeted, manipulated, and deceived. Users, inexperienced with interrogating AI, may find themselves in a scenario of binary trust in the AI tools they rely on to fight war. Trusting everything the machine is telling a user may lead to overconfidence, accidents, and inadvertent pathways to war. On the other hand, however, trusting nothing will leave militaries dead in the water, unable to respond when they don’t know what they can believe from AI tools.

This will be especially dangerous for young military personnel — new to combat, primed for the Dunning-Kruger Effect, and less likely to push back against AI errors in complicated military systems. Similarly, new decision-makers without significant military experience will be vulnerable to the Dunning-Kruger Effect and therefore may be more confident in AI assessments that present optimistic beliefs about the ease of victory. The applicability of the Dunning-Kruger Effect to these important populations demonstrate how even with the inclusion of “human control” in the most dangerous and violent weapons decisions — like the choice to go nuclear — young missile silo operators or new commanders-in-chief may fail to properly understand the uncertainty of AI.

Overconfidence, the machine, and authoritarian regimes

Is this overconfidence in AI more likely to occur in some types of regimes than others?  And how might that manifest on the battlefield? Scholarship on the impact of regime type on military effectiveness finds that authoritarian regimes are less likely to trust their militaries and, therefore, they build less capable militaries. This occurs for a variety of reasons but much of the phenomenon stems back to trust and how a lack of trust in military subordinates leads authoritarian regimes to consolidate control at the highest level, making their forces less resilient and adaptive.

The tendency for authoritarian regimes to distrust their military leaders has significant implications for AI. If a political leader does not believe their subordinates will comply with orders, they may be more likely to use loyal AI agents as a substitute for humans. Those AI agents, designed to defer and support the regime, will likely exaggerate sycophantic tendencies and buttress authoritarian leaders’ desired policies. Further, regimes can invest in AI agents developed to optimize regime goals without ethical concerns, engineering out human emotions like empathy, disgust, or horror and thereby remove some of the most important factors limiting the use of violence. Imagine, for example, a deadhand AI developed not just as a response to an adversary’s first strike, but also as a way for leaders to ensure that human subordinates will push the button in situations when all minimum conditions doing so are present.

The biggest danger of AI is humans

Like many technologies, the danger of AI is inherently human: how we use and develop machines as agents of our worst tendencies. After the horrors of World War I, scholars tried to make sense of how a war that made no sense could have killed millions. One of the early explanations was technology — that railroads, telegraphs, and steam had built arsenals that necessitated a war no one wanted. However, despite the desire to defer guilt to the machines, it was humans who made the choices to build those arsenals. It was great men like Kaiser Wilhelm who believed they could use those technologies to win a war, the costs of which they significantly underestimated. 

The danger of AI is inherently human: how we use and develop machines as agents of our worst tendencies

Today, humans will make decisions about how we build AI arsenals, how we use those arsenals in war, and what role they play in the most important decisions — including the decision to embark on nuclear war. Teaching decision-makers about the limitations of the technology and training users to interrogate AI will decrease the dangers of overconfidence, while prioritizing safety within development will decrease the possibility of accidental failures. Together, human agency over the inevitability of the technology can steer its adoption to safer integration of that technology in war.

Efimov’s laboratory at Northwestern University studies the mechanisms of cardiovascular diseases and develops new diagnostic and therapeutic methods, including implantable, interventional, and wearable bioelectronic devices for treating heart disease.

In 2025, Efimov co-led a Northwestern University study focused on developing the world’s smallest pacemaker. The device is smaller than a grain of rice and can be injected into the body with a syringe. It is activated by light pulses from a soft wearable sensor placed on the patient’s chest and dissolves inside the body once temporary cardiac pacing is no longer needed. The study was published in the journal Nature, and the device was tested on animal models and on human hearts obtained from deceased organ donors.

The pacemaker is intended primarily for newborns with congenital heart defects, who often require temporary cardiac pacing after surgery. “Our main motivation was children,” Efimov said in a Northwestern University release. According to him, about 1% of children are born with congenital heart defects, and many of them need pacing after surgery – only for a few days, but that period is critically important.

TIME included the millimeter-sized pacemaker developed by the scientists in its list of the best inventions of 2025, noting that the wireless dissolvable device could change the treatment of congenital heart defects in children, as conventional temporary pacemakers with wires are associated with risks of tissue scarring and other complications.

In an interview with the independent Russian outlet T-invariant, Efimov explained that in conventional temporary pacemakers used after heart surgery, the electrodes are attached to the heart, with wires brought outside the body and removed about a week later. In some cases, this procedure damages the heart muscle. “Our goal was to create a miniature device that would not have to be removed from the chest cavity. It would dissolve on its own once it was no longer needed,” Efimov said.

According to Efimov, the device has not yet entered clinical practice: in order to begin human trials, researchers must submit an application to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and gather additional safety and reliability data. Efimov said that an optimistic timeline for the wide adoption of the new technology is about five years.

In the same interview, he said that 99% of members of the Russian-American Science Association (RASA) oppose the war and stand with Ukraine, and that the association is helping scientists and students who left Russia after the start of the full-scale invasion.

In a conversation with The Insider, Igor Efimov linked the Justice Ministry’s decision to his work with the Russian-American Science Association, which had previously been designated an “undesirable organization”:

“It was expected. Quite recently, the Russian-American Science Association was declared an ‘undesirable organization.’ I was one of its founders and its first president. In addition, I have never concealed the fact that I do not consider the current Russian government legitimate. So none of this comes as a surprise to me.

It will not affect my life in any way. I have practically nothing left in Russia: no property or other ties. I had an honorary affiliation with the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, my alma mater, but when the full-scale war began, I wrote to Rector Dmitry Livanov the very next day saying that I was severing all ties with MIPT because my relatives were being bombed. I have family living in Ukraine – in Poltava and Kyiv. They were literally being bombed that day.

It reminds me of what happened a hundred years ago. Chicago, where I now live, was once home to Academician Vladimir Ipatieff. After the revolution, he stayed in Russia, despite being a monarchist, a lieutenant general in the tsarist army, and a member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, because he considered himself a patriot. He helped build the chemical industry, but in 1930 he realized he would soon be arrested, and so he had to leave. In 1937 he was publicly expelled from the Academy of Sciences and stripped of Soviet citizenship. There is nothing new about this.”

Efimov’s case is not the first involving a Russian scientist working abroad. This past April, Russia’s Ministry of Justice designated chemist Alexander Kabanov a “foreign agent.” For many years, Kabanov has worked on methods for targeted drug delivery in cancer treatment and is considered to be one of the pioneers in the field of nanotechnology-based drug delivery. He participated in Russia’s “megagrant” program and now heads the Center for Nanotechnology in Drug Delivery at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The scientist himself also linked the ministry’s decision to his anti-war stance and his role as co-head of the Russian-American Science Association.

Polls in the spring and fall of 2025 recorded record levels of trust among Europeans in the European Union and its institutions. Seventy-four percent of EU citizens believe their individual country has benefited from membership in the bloc, while 52% continent-wide say they trust the EU and the European Commission. Ensuring peace and strengthening security rank first among the benefits of EU membership, with respondents describing the EU as a point of stability in today’s troubled world.

However, with the war in Ukraine showing no sign of ending, 78% of respondents are concerned about the state of EU defense and security, and in almost every European country, Russia is named as the main threat.

At the same time, Europeans no longer view America as a reliable ally and support rearming their own militaries. There are also calls for creating a single European army, but that is an idea that could gain momentum only if relations with the United States deteriorate further. For now, France is negotiating with Germany on the joint development of a nuclear shield, while Poland has even threatened to develop its own nuclear weapons.

These moves may have been influenced by Trump’s actions. The U.S. president demanded that NATO countries raise defense spending from 2% to 5% of GDP while effectively casting doubt on America’s willingness to live up to its obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for collective defense. Although the sides reached an interim agreement, a debate began over Europe’s ability to defend itself without U.S. help. The crisis over Greenland and the war against Iran have deepened that debate.

The EU’s strategic autonomy rests on several flagship projects, including a “drone wall” and the creation of a unified air defense network. These systems will be integrated into NATO, but the trend is clear: the EU is standardizing its procurement efforts and plans to produce and buy key weapons inside Europe rather than from third countries. In this way, the European Union is trying to close gaps in its defenses.

For the first time, the EU is introducing a common regulation for the defense industry: the European Defence Industry Programme, or EDIP. The project is expected to establish a joint procurement system and localize the purchase of components. More than half of the products must be of European origin, a necessary condition for access to preferential loans from the new SAFE defense fund. All these initiatives are being discussed against the backdrop of a reassessment of relations with the United States.

The EU is also trying to reduce its dependence on U.S. arms supplies. However, as NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said shortly after the situation over Greenland was resolved, Europe will not be able to build its defense without U.S. involvement.

The possibility of war with Russia also matters, as it is seen as the most likely short-term threat. Rutte, for example, has previously said Moscow will be ready to attack NATO countries within the next five years. Collective defense will therefore need to make a “quantum leap,” which would require a significant increase in spending.

But Europeans are not giving up on the idea of defending itself. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, for example, said Europe’s rearmament and a reduced dependence on the United States should be top priorities for European leaders. Supporters of strategic autonomy also include Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz, Donald Tusk, and even Giorgia Meloni.

Meloni summed up the prevailing mood most vividly:

“Trump has said most emphatically that the US intends to disengage and Europeans must organise to defend themselves: hello Europe. For eighty years we outsourced our security to the U.S. pretending it was free, but there was a price to pay and that price is called conditioning. Freedom has a price. We have spoken in unsuspected times of the need to strengthen our defence and security capacity and claimed when no one else did the need to finally create a European NATO norm of equal strength and respect to the American one.”

Unexpected allies

“Canada is the most European of the non-European countries,” Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said during his first foreign trip, visiting France and the UK. In doing so, Carney sought to show that the country was returning to its roots and looking for allies where the foundations of Canadian statehood were born.

During the visit, the prime minister made clear that Canada had no intention of becoming “America’s 51st state,” as Trump had proposed. “Canada will never, under any circumstances and in any form, become part of the United States,” he said.

44% of Canadians believe the government should consider the possibility of Canada joining the EU

In a Davos speech that was widely quoted, Carney urged middle powers to stick together: “The strong have their strength. But we also have something — the ability to stop pretending, name reality, strengthen ourselves at home, and act together. That is Canada’s path.”

In practice, this is already taking shape through Canada’s participation in joint defense procurement under SAFE and a series of trade and investment projects with the European Union. Polls show that 44% of Canadians believe the government should consider the possibility of Canada joining the EU.

German politician Joachim Streit has even launched a campaign for Canada’s EU membership, arguing that Canada could become the bloc’s fourth-largest economy by GDP, while its energy resources would help Europe reduce dependence on Russian gas. Aware that he may not succeed, Streit hopes the EU will use the moment to build ties with Canada as deep as those it previously developed with Norway and Switzerland.

However, under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, only a “European state” may apply for membership. Canada is not considered one, and the European Parliament clearly has no plans to revise that provision for Canada’s sake, even though EU documents do not provide a clear definition of a “European state.”

The line of candidate countries is long enough without Canada, with nine currently seeking EU membership. The last to join the bloc was Croatia in 2013, and under the European Commission’s latest “enlargement package,” admitting new members is again a priority — one that is expected to show results by 2030, with Montenegro and Albania considered to be the most likely candidates.

The European Union expects Montenegro to close the remaining negotiating chapters by the end of 2026 and join the bloc in 2028. Its accession is expected to serve as a showcase, demonstrating that the EU’s doors remain open to new members. Montenegro’s example is meant to encourage reforms in other countries, especially Moldova and Ukraine. For Ukraine, EU membership is closely tied to security guarantees, President Volodymyr Zelensky has said. Zelensky expects Ukraine to join the EU as early as 2027.

Polls show that more than half of EU citizens support the accession of Montenegro and Ukraine. A comparable level of support exists only for the highly unlikely “Breturn” — Britain’s return to the EU.

Countries that are not at the front of the accession line are also expressing a desire to join the EU. Serbia has held candidate status for 14 years but clearly has not lost hope of moving negotiations forward and recently created a task force to speed up the progress.

For years, the main obstacle has been the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina and the possible recognition of Kosovo’s independence. President Aleksandar Vucic is regularly criticized for trying to maneuver between the EU and Russia, but after the crisis over the sale of Russia’s stake in the Serbian oil company NIS, Belgrade began drifting toward the European Union. Now even Vucic is talking about the possibility of joining the bloc without veto power over its decisions.

Commenting on Vucic’s meeting with EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, U.S. presidential envoy Richard Grenell wrote on X that Brussels is suffocating European economies and that Serbia’s president should steer the country toward the United States, not the EU. In response, Vucic said Serbia wants a strategic partnership with America but is located on the European continent.

For years, the main obstacle has been the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina and the possible recognition of Kosovo’s independence. President Aleksandar Vucic is regularly criticized for trying to maneuver between the EU and Russia, but after the crisis over the sale of Russia’s stake in the Serbian oil company NIS, Belgrade began drifting toward the European Union. Now even Vucic is talking about the possibility of joining the bloc without veto power over its decisions.

Commenting on Vucic’s meeting with EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, U.S. presidential envoy Richard Grenell wrote on X that Brussels is suffocating European economies and that Serbia’s president should steer the country toward the United States, not the EU. In response, Vucic said Serbia wants a strategic partnership with America but is located on the European continent.

Friends on the right

A separate issue is Europe’s far right, with which Trump and his team have long sought to build ties. Elon Musk marked the start of his brief but high-profile campaign in support of Germany’s far-right party, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), with a post reading “Only the AfD can save Germany.” At the time an ally of Trump and one of the largest donors to his presidential campaign, Musk not only publicly backed the AfD but also took part in one of its rallies.

The German government accused him of trying to influence the election, and Friedrich Merz, then the leader of the conservative opposition, said in February 2025 that Musk’s interference would not go unanswered. Germany did not respond directly, but in late 2025 the social network X was fined 125 million euros in the EU for violating European transparency requirements. Trump responded by again saying that Europe was moving in the wrong direction and should be careful.

Similar ideas appeared in the new U.S. National Security Strategy. According to the document, Europe suppresses political opposition, restricts freedom of speech, and is moving toward “civilizational erasure” due to high immigration and low birthrates.

But the document also notes a positive trend: the growing influence of so-called “patriotic parties.” According to the strategy’s authors, the United States should help them resist what Washington characterizes as Europe’s false course from within. An expanded version of the strategy (the existence of which the White House denies), reportedly contained even more radical statements.

“In the first drafts, it said the United States should do everything possible to persuade Poland and Italy that they do not need to be in the European Union, that they should carry out some kind of Polexit, Italexit, Hunexit. It said they should continue working to effectively divide society by explaining how harmful an actor the European Union is,” commented Petar Tanev, an expert on EU policy.

European right-wing parties, however, no longer always return Trump’s support. The conflict over Greenland, along with various tariff wars, prompted some to distance themselves and others to openly criticize U.S. policy. Among the latter were Alice Weidel of the AfD, whom Musk had previously supported, and Giorgia Meloni, whom the press had described as one of the European leaders closest to Trump.

The conflict over Greenland and Trump’s tariff wars prompted some European right-wing politicians to distance themselves from Washington, while others openly criticized U.S. policy

Any support that exists is highly conditional. Polish President Karol Nawrocki and the prime ministers of Hungary and the Czech Republic said the question of Greenland should be resolved by Denmark and the United States. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico also distanced himself. Experts say it is easy for the right to align with Trump on ideological issues like migration, climate, and anti-elitism, but difficult on foreign policy, because the national interests of European countries and the United States really do diverge.

No one is rushing to leave

As for the recommendation to leave the EU, various “exits” are used rhetorically by the right but do not have significant public support, even in countries where Euroskeptics effectively hold parliamentary majorities, such as Slovakia, Austria and, until recently, Hungary.

“Hungary will not leave the EU; it will fall apart on its own,” Viktor Orban said in January. However, on April 12, Orban himself fell apart — or, more precisely, his party suffered a crushing defeat.

Orban appears to have succeeded in flattering the Americans, but such statements do not resonate with Hungarians: 82% of those surveyed by Eurobarometer consider EU membership beneficial for the country, and 52% trust the bloc. In fact, Hungarians’ trust in the EU showed more growth in 2025 than that in any other EU country. In addition, 72% of Hungarians support adopting the euro, the highest figure among states outside the eurozone.

The only country to leave the EU so far — the UK via Brexit — is coming to regret the move six years on. More than half of Britons consider Brexit a mistake, and only 11% see it more as a success than a failure. Moreover, 53% would support a “Breturn” — Britain’s return to the European Union.

Within the bloc, such an idea is most popular in Denmark, Germany, Spain, and France, but with one condition: no more special terms. Any future accession could be granted to the UK only as a new membership on standard terms. At the same time, EU citizens support closer cooperation with the UK regardless of its status.

Despite a significant level of Euroskepticism in the UK, Brexit has shown that leaving the EU costs far more than was promised by supporters of the exit. Many now acknowledge that the divorce from the European Union only weakened the country, especially critical given the threat posed by Trump.

Many in the UK now acknowledge that the divorce from the EU has only weakened the country, especially in the face of the threat posed by Trump

Although there is no serious discussion of Breturn underway — as Keir Starmer himself and other officials have stressed — Trump has clearly brought the EU and Britain closer together. In 2025, their defense talks led to the signing of a framework agreement on Britain’s participation in defense initiatives, particularly joint procurement through SAFE.

Together for the long term

Sharp criticism of Europe and attempts by the United States to challenge its autonomy have instead led to stronger collective defense and closer ties — both within the EU and between the bloc and its neighbors. By 2030, Montenegro, Albania, and Ukraine are quite likely to join the EU, while relations with the UK may reach, if not the point of its return, then at least the highest possible level of policy coordination.

Commenting on the U.S. National Security Strategy, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt noted that, despite all the challenges, no region on Earth provides such a high standard of living to such a large share of its population as the EU. The firmness with which European politicians are pushing back against the United States has moved far beyond the once-memed expression of “concern.” It may all still be more word than deed, but Europeans are slow to get moving — and once they do, the process of change becomes irreversible. Especially now, when they must not only get through Trump’s second term, but also prepare for whoever succeeds him, however unpredictable that person may be.

From OPEC to OPEC+: the history of two partnerships

Abu Dhabi joined OPEC in 1967, four years before the emirates achieved statehood. Oil diplomacy preceded sovereignty. The primary goal of the early members was not a quota system, but sovereignty over natural resources: OPEC gave the smaller Gulf states a collective voice against the “Seven Sisters” — the Western majors that controlled production and pricing. The UAE participated in the 1973 oil embargo, which pushed the price of a barrel from $3 to $12 within a few months. In 1971, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) was established, and between 1974 and 1976, Western concessions were replaced with equity participation structures featuring a majority state stake.

In the first 40 years of existence, OPEC enjoyed unrestrained growth. UAE production alone increased from 300,000 barrels per day in the first half of the 1970s to 2.5 million barrels by the turn of the century. Membership in the organization provided price stability, international recognition, and access to a major platform for dialogue with consumers.

Created in 1976, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) is now one of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds, with assets exceeding $1 trillion, accumulated over decades of steady oil revenues.

The UAE’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has historically been built on close alliance. When the price of Brent sank below $9 per barrel in 1986 due to oversupply, coordination between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi helped the cartel formulate a unified response. During the 2000s supercycle, both states increased production in sync. In 2006–2008, the UAE produced around 2.9 million barrels per day.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia were long-standing allies within OPEC and expanded production in sync during the 2000s

A turning point in the oil cartel’s history was the creation of OPEC+ in December 2016. After Brent once again collapsed below $28 per barrel, OPEC for the first time concluded an agreement with Russia and nine other producers. The total production cut amounted to 1.8 million barrels per day, with the UAE quota set at around 2.87 million barrels per day. For Abu Dhabi, this opened a pragmatic framework for engagement with Moscow: both countries regularly coordinated positions within the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC). The Saudi Arabia – Russia – UAE trio formed the core of the alliance, while other participants played largely symbolic roles.

A key test for OPEC+ came with the April 2020 deal. When negotiations collapsed in March and Saudi Arabia launched a price war against Russia, the UAE initially backed Riyadh by increasing supply. Oil prices dipped below $20 per barrel, and in April, WTI futures dropped into negative territory for the first time in history.

The price collapse forced the recent partners back to the negotiating table, this time to agree on unprecedented production cuts of nearly 10 million barrels per day across the alliance. Consensus among the three key players was an imperative for overcoming the crisis. The precedent effectively cemented the UAE’s indispensable role in any major oil agreement.

In 2021–2023, ADNOC invested more than $150 billion in production capacity. Output potential soared from 3.5 million to 4.85 million barrels per day, while the daily quota remained stuck at 3.2 million barrels. In June 2023, OPEC+ raised the UAE’s baseline production level to 3.22 million barrels per day, acknowledging the accumulated investments, but this concession only partially eased tensions. By February 2026, the UAE was already producing 3.42 million barrels per day, or 12% of total OPEC output. A situation in which a country that had poured massive funds into infrastructure was forced to keep it underutilized could not continue for long.

The rationale behind Abu Dhabi’s decision

The gap between capacity and quota is not just an accounting issue. At oil prices above $100 per barrel, every 1 million barrels per day of idle capacity translates into more than $36 billion in lost annual revenue. For a country with production costs below $10 per barrel and a fiscal breakeven point of around $50 per barrel — nearly twice as low as Saudi Arabia’s $90 — this effectively amounts to a real tax on its own infrastructure.

ADNOC's 150-billion-dollar investment came with the expectation of reaching full capacity by 2027. On one hand, remaining within the quota system meant effectively financing competitors through its own idle capacity. On the other hand, the International Energy Agency forecasts that global oil demand will peak before 2030. For the UAE, with the world’s sixth-largest oil reserves (113 billion barrels), this is a direct source of concern. Continuing to constrain production within rigid quota limits means leaving money on the table.

However, a purely economic explanation does not fully account for the timing or the tone of the exit. Another factor is a growing political strain that has accumulated over the years. At first, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the UAE’s de facto ruler and future president Mohamed bin Zayed, acted in tandem, launching joint military operations in Yemen, the blockade of Qatar, and coordinated opposition to Iran. From 2019 onward, however, their trajectories began to diverge. In December 2025, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council seized territories in Yemen that were under the control of Saudi-aligned groups. After Saudi Arabia carried out airstrikes on an Emirati weapons convoy, the UAE withdrew its troops from the country.

The economics alone do not explain either the timing or the tone of the exit; another factor is a growing political strain accumulated over the years

Sudan opened a new front of discord. While Abu Dhabi was arming the Rapid Support Forces, Riyadh backed the regular army fighting them. The two countries found themselves on opposite sides of the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. The UAE’s normalization of relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords — a step Saudi Arabia has yet to take — was perceived in Riyadh as further evidence that Abu Dhabi is steadily moving out of its orbit.

The Iranian crisis became a catalyst for an already emerging rift. Tehran’s missile and drone strikes on Emirati infrastructure unexpectedly called into question the UAE’s membership in OPEC and OPEC+, where Iran is an equally full-fledged participant.

On April 27, UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash publicly accused the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman, of a “weakest in history” stance. Unlike its GCC partners, which limited themselves to statements of support, Israel provided the Emirates with air defense systems.

Finally, behind all the accumulated contradictions lies the direct rivalry of two OPEC leaders. Over time, the future Saudi king began to view Abu Dhabi as a threat to Saudi hegemony, while the UAE leader, no longer his mentor, turned into an antagonist. Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 is a direct challenge to the Emirati development model.

Riyadh has long been trying to lure the headquarters of transnational corporations away from Dubai by creating competing projects in tourism and aviation and claiming the role of a regional financial hub. The UAE, which is ahead of Saudi Arabia in economic development by roughly two decades, has no intention of ceding ground. An exit from OPEC/OPEC+ is not only, or even primarily, about oil. It is a symbolic statement of sovereignty.

The end of managed uncertainty: What OPEC stands to lose

As long as the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, the UAE’s exit from both structures will not make much of an impact on the market. According to the International Energy Agency, regional oil production had shrunk by 10 million barrels per day by mid-March. The UAE’s output nearly halved — from 3.47 million barrels per day in February to 1.89 million by the end of March. Meanwhile, oil exports through the strait dropped from 20 million barrels per day to just over 2 million.

Alternative routes — such as the Saudi East-West Pipeline to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea and the Emirati pipeline to Fujairah — have compensated for only a small portion of the lost volumes. According to Rystad Energy, even under an optimistic scenario, it will take until the end of the year to return to 3.5 million barrels per day. Paradoxically, the very crisis that triggered Abu Dhabi’s demarche is temporarily nullifying its market impact.

OPEC has seen departures before. Indonesia has twice suspended its membership. Ecuador left in 1992 and again in 2020. Gabon exited back in 1995 but returned 21 years later. Qatar withdrew in 2019, officially citing a desire to focus on its core gas sector, though the move also reflected tensions with Riyadh. Angola left in 2024 over a reduced quota. But none of these departures involved the cartel’s third-largest producer, with capacity approaching 5 million barrels per day and accounting for roughly a quarter of OPEC+’s spare capacity. The UAE is a fundamentally different case.

Kazakhstan (a member of OPEC+) and Iraq are being named among the possible candidates to exit next. Kazakhstan has chronically exceeded its quota due to obligations to international oil companies at the Tengiz field. However, the country’s Energy Ministry has stated that it has no plans to change its format of participation in OPEC+.

With the UAE’s departure, Kazakhstan’s influence as a major oil producer within the alliance could even increase. Iraq, the second-largest OPEC producer with a daily output of 4.33 million barrels, has also breached its quotas. However, Baghdad quickly dismissed any speculation, telling Reuters that it has no plans to leave the organization. The remaining OPEC members either fall short of their production quotas or are too dependent on price support to risk an exit.

Saudi Arabia will seek to preserve unity at any cost. At the May OPEC+ meeting, the group agreed on another quota increase — a clear attempt to maintain a sense of normality regardless of the circumstances. The question is not whether Riyadh wants to preserve the alliance, but whether it has enough tools to keep the skeptics on board.

The question is not whether Riyadh wants to preserve the alliance, but whether it has enough tools to keep the skeptics on board

Under the IEA’s baseline scenario, once shipments through the Strait of Hormuz resume by mid-year, supply is expected to recover at a monthly pace of 1–2 million barrels per day. The UAE’s exit is a new factor in this recovery. Abu Dhabi was quick to reassure markets that production increases will be gradual and aligned with market conditions. However, if the UAE ramps up output without quota constraints, Rystad Energy estimates that it could add up to 1 million barrels per day of additional supply over 6–12 months. In a normalization scenario, Brent could move into the $85–100 per barrel range.

If Saudi Arabia responds by increasing production to defend its own market share, and Kazakhstan and Iraq further loosen discipline, the lower bound of that range risks becoming entrenched for an extended period. The UAE’s withdrawal has not dismantled OPEC overnight, but it has forced the organization to give up managed uncertainty for a new setup in which the rules of the game still need to be written.

What should Russia expect?

Moscow reacted to the UAE’s exit from OPEC and OPEC+ in a markedly restrained — and notably swift — manner. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that Russia had not been informed in advance, but stressed that Moscow respects Abu Dhabi’s decision. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also described the UAE’s withdrawal as a “sovereign decision” and ruled out the risk of a price war: “In the current situation, what kind of price war can there be when the market is in deficit?” Russia, Novak added, does not intend to leave OPEC+.

The UAE’s exit from OPEC objectively weakens Saudi Arabia as the cartel’s single dominant leader, while putting Russia in the seat of an indispensable co-chair of OPEC+, now without any potential competition from Abu Dhabi. Notably, throughout 2021–2023, the UAE watched with growing frustration as Russia turned a blind eye to Kazakhstan’s overproduction, while dismissing the UAE’s own claims and grievances.

Moscow views OPEC+ in part as a diplomatic platform that provides regular contact with Riyadh at a time when most channels for international dialogue remain closed for the Kremlin. Relations with the Saudi crown prince, despite periodic tensions, provide a pragmatic working foundation, given the shared interest in keeping oil prices above the fiscal breakeven levels of both countries.

At the same time, since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UAE has become the largest transport, logistics, and financial hub for the Russian economy. Bilateral trade surged from $5.4 billion in 2021 to $12 billion by the end of 2025. Direct Russian investment in the UAE has exceeded $25 billion.

The UAE has become indispensable for Russia for multiple reasons: from parallel imports of sanctioned goods and components to the transit of gold and diamonds, re-export of petroleum products, and international settlements. Dubai remains one of the few major financial hubs where Russian companies, under sanctions pressure, can still open accounts and conduct payments. Abu Dhabi’s gradual pivot toward the United States, which is interested in weakening OPEC, and toward Israel introduces additional risks for existing channels.

For Russia, any potential concerns still ultimately come down to the state budget. Oil and gas revenues in the first quarter of 2026 fell by 45.4% year-on-year, while the deficit for January–March reached 4.58 trillion rubles, exceeding the planned full-year figure. The Iranian crisis will temporarily reverse the downward trend, and price-cap sanctions will not prevent Russia from securing a war-related price premium.

First, because the price cap is a poorly enforced mechanism that can be bypassed using a “shadow fleet.” (According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), sanctioned tankers already transport about 68% of Russian oil.) Second, the system has become further fragmented once the EU and the UK lowered the cap to $44.1 per barrel, while the United States kept it at $60.

At the same time, structural problems have not gone away: Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development forecasts a budget deficit through 2042. The pain threshold — a sustained price for Urals below $50 per barrel — could again come into play in the event of a global recession or de-escalation in the Middle East.

The pain threshold for Russia’s budget — a Urals price below $50 per barrel — could again come into play in the event of a global recession or de-escalation in the Middle East

Therefore, the prospect of a rapid increase in UAE oil production after the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is more concerning for Moscow than the UAE’s actual exit from OPEC and OPEC+. An additional 1 million barrels per day of Emirati oil on the market is, in effect, a direct subtraction from Russia’s budget, which is already grasping at straws. The UAE’s new sovereign strategy in the Middle East adds another variable to the geopolitical and geoeconomic equation that will ultimately determine Russia’s ability to finance the war and maintain the current regime.

At the beginning of 2026, the Russian economy shifted from slowing growth to outright contraction. In January, GDP fell by 1.8% year-on-year, and by 1.1% in February. Even Vladimir Putin, during meetings on economic issues, consistently spoke of the deterioration of macroeconomic indicators, noting that “for two consecutive months now, economic momentum has unfortunately been declining.”

But in March, the trajectory changed. According to the Ministry of Economic Development, GDP grew by 1.8% year-on-year, thereby recouping almost all of the previous decline. As a result, first-quarter GDP fell by only 0.3%.

The decline is partly explained by a calendar effect: January 2026 had two fewer working days than January 2025, while February had one fewer day. But the reasons go far beyond the calendar. Naturally, the list of causes should begin with massive military spending and, as a consequence, higher taxes — especially VAT, which at the start of the year was expanded to a wider range of payers, with rate hikes for many. Such explanations are conspicuously absent from Putin’s official statements.

If one looks at the data for individual sectors, it becomes clear that most non-military industries remain under pressure. Industrial production is slightly positive, up 0.3%. However, manufacturing output declined by 0.7%, with production of metals, automobiles, construction materials, paper, printed products, and clothing falling by more than 10%. In these sectors, both demand and production capacity are declining as companies suffer from higher taxes, the diversion of resources into the military sphere, internet restrictions, worsening expectations, and the loss of access to foreign technologies.

Companies are suffering from higher taxes, the diversion of resources into the military sphere, internet restrictions, worsening expectations, and the loss of access to foreign technologies

Among the relatively stable indicators are the unemployment rate (which remains low), consumer spending (which is rising in line with inflation), and real incomes (which still outpace inflation).

Forecasts for the year as a whole remain conservative. The September forecast from the Ministry of Economic Development projected GDP growth of 1.3%, but minister Maxim Reshetnikov said that the estimate would be revised downward in May. Meanwhile, the Central Bank insists that the economy will return to growth in the range of 0.5–1.5%.

“In the first quarter, economic activity slowed. This was partly connected to the economy’s adjustment to tax changes. The calendar factor also played a role,” Central Bank chair Elvira Nabiullina said. “In the second quarter, this factor will work in the opposite direction. In May–June of this year, there will be three more working days than a year earlier. All of this means that a more accurate assessment of output trends can only be made on the basis of statistics for the first half of the year.”

Record budget deficit

The way the state is spending money has also changed. Over the first four months of the year, the federal budget deficit reached 5.9 trillion rubles, already exceeding the planned annual figure of 3.8 trillion. To be fair, the deficit after the first quarter of 2025 was also significant, but at that time the Finance Ministry announced that March had ended with a surplus and that the annual structural balance targets would be maintained. In its commentary on the results of the first quarter of 2026, there is no mention of either point — only a reference to accelerated financing of expenditures.

In January–April, spending rose by 16% year-on-year, and the pattern within the quarter is also notable: in 2026, March spending exceeded February spending for the first time, whereas in 2023–2025 March had been a month of relative budget restraint. In the previous three years, March expenditures amounted to 79–90% of February levels, while in 2026, they reached 110%.

Actual spending in the quarter amounted to 29.2% of the annual plan, although under an even distribution of expenditures it should have been 25%. A direct extrapolation of this proportion to the full year would imply spending of 50 trillion rubles – 13–14% above the planned 44.1 trillion rubles. However, historical data show that overspending at the beginning of the year is generally offset in subsequent quarters: in 2025, the final overshoot amounted to only 3.5%.

If a similar pattern emerges in 2026, annual spending will end up in the range of 45.6–45.8 trillion rubles — still in excess of the planned level, and that’s if, over the remaining nine months, monthly spending does not exceed an average of 3.65 trillion rubles.

The monthly budget balance figures are also telling. Over the past three years, March posted a surplus: revenues in that month are traditionally high because of the schedule for payments of the additional income tax on hydrocarbon extraction, while expenditures are lower. In 2026, however, even March closed with a deficit. Moreover, in 2025 only three months posted surpluses: March, August, and September. The loss of the March surplus this year means that reducing the accumulated deficit in 2026 will be even more difficult.

Russia even ended March with a budget deficit, meaning that reducing the accumulated deficit in 2026 will be even more difficult

If one assumes that the 8.3 trillion rubles received in the first quarter represent exactly one quarter of total annual revenues, then the full-year figure would amount to 33.2 trillion rubles. And even when using a fairly optimistic estimate of expenditures of 45.7 trillion rubles, this points to a federal deficit of 12.5 trillion ruble, which would be 2.2 times larger than last year’s and nearly 3.3 times larger than the current year’s budget projection. Such a deficit would amount to more than 5% of GDP.

If financed through borrowing, this would mean that domestic government debt would increase by one and a half times over the year – from 30.7 trillion to 43.5 trillion rubles (in 2025 it grew by almost 30%, from 23.7 trillion to 30.7 trillion rubles). And that is only at the federal level, without taking into account regional deficits and debts.

The Finance Ministry has not yet disclosed the sources used to finance the federal deficit in January–March, but they can be inferred from the movement of domestic debt, which rose by 0.8 trillion rubles to 31.5 trillion rubles, and from the liquid assets of the National Wealth Fund, which declined from 4.08 trillion to 3.89 trillion rubles by April 1 and to 3.6 trillion rubles by May 1.

“The deficit shows that the source of financing for expenditures was not taxes, but something else,” says economist and NEST Center expert Sergei Aleksashenko. “In the first quarter, the federal Finance Ministry made very active use of both domestic borrowing and National Wealth Fund money. But most importantly, it sharply reduced the balances in Treasury accounts — a less well-known piggy bank than the National Wealth Fund, but no less substantial. At the beginning of the year, these accounts held more than 9 trillion rubles; by the end of the first quarter, that amount had fallen by 2 trillion. The reduction in account balances is precisely what financed the deficit.”

The government had even prepared to make cuts of 10% to non-priority budget expenditures, but Finance Minister Anton Siluanov later clarified that this was not a cut, but a redistribution. “We never spoke about sequestration at all. The word ‘sequestration’ is the wrong word — we are talking about budget consolidation,” he said in April. “Right now, we are working with the budget through prioritization — increasing funding for the most important items while secondary, less important expenditures are being ‘pushed to the right,’ or perhaps reduced. This is routine work on prioritizing expenditures.”

Aleksashenko explains the shift this way: “Even if a sequestration were carried out, the government could cut roughly one trillion rubles, meaning it still would not cover the deficit. It’s like shearing a pig — lots of squealing, little wool. And it would damage Putin’s image. So according to my sources, when Siluanov came to Putin with the proposal for sequestration, Putin said: ‘Listen, let’s hold off on sequestration for now — things aren’t that bad yet.’”

The problem is that oil badly let the budget down at the beginning of the year. Oil-and-gas revenues in January–March were 45.4% lower than a year earlier, although the Finance Ministry can find consolation in the fact that other revenues are growing. “With regard to key non-oil-and-gas revenues, positive growth is being observed both in the federal budget (+7.1% year-on-year) and in the budget system as a whole (+6.7% year-on-year),” officials reported. But what does rising tax collection from the non-commodity sector amid shrinking taxable value added indicate? The answer: an increase in the effective tax burden, which is further slowing the economy.

Expensive oil will not save the economy

After the escalation in the Persian Gulf, oil prices surged to four-year highs, and in March Russia’s Urals crude actually traded above Brent, a rarity. The average monthly price of Russian oil used by the Ministry of Economic Development for tax calculations rose to $77 per barrel in March, and this was reflected in April budget revenues, which are calculated using March data.

However, oil-and-gas revenues from more expensive oil did not rise as much as expected. In April, oil companies received 207.5 billion rubles in fuel-damper subsidies from the budget. Before that, when prices were very low, they themselves had paid money into the budget under the same mechanism for two consecutive months, albeit in much smaller amounts: 15 billion rubles in March and 19 billion in February.

Revenues in May will be higher, since they are calculated on the basis of April’s price of $94.87 per barrel. For Russia, this obviously means some increase in oil-and-gas revenues. The budget will receive an additional 200 billion rubles because of higher oil prices, Siluanov said. But it is unclear whether he took into account payments to oil companies, or whether they — rather than the budget — will once again receive most of the premium generated by the spike in prices triggered by the conflict with Iran. Even if the entire additional 200 billion rubles goes to the treasury, it would only partially offset the shortfall, which in March amounted to 234.3 billion rubles.

The budget will receive an additional 200 billion rubles in revenue because of higher oil prices

Overall, March could be split into two completely different periods for Russia’s oil sector. Until March 23, export volumes and prices were both rising sharply. Then Ukrainian attacks on the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga reduced hydrocarbon shipments, even as prices remained high. As a result, seaborne exports rose by 29% in volume compared with February and by 115% in monetary terms, and it is already clear that April’s high prices will affect budget revenues in May, with the prospect that such market conditions could persist for quite some time.

Even so, this windfall pales in comparison with the “normal” situation in March–April of last year, when at an Urals price of $55–60 per barrel the budget was receiving more than one trillion rubles a month in oil-and-gas revenues. High prices alone are not enough — export volumes also have to be maintained, and here problems have emerged on two levels at once.

First, it is unclear how long the drone-affected ports will remain out of operation, and if successful Ukrainian attacks continue, Russia will be unable to export oil. That would lead to lower production and, consequently, to a reduction in budget revenues, which are calculated on the basis of output.

Second, even oil loaded onto tankers may fail to reach foreign buyers. Ship seizures, physical attacks on vessels, and accidents are becoming increasingly common, all of which raise insurance costs and freight rates.

The optimistic scenario for the Russian treasury would involve receiving just under one trillion rubles in oil-and-gas revenues per month through the end of 2026. In that event, the budget would collect slightly less than 9 trillion rubles over the remainder of the year, even higher than the annual 8.9 trillion rubles projected in the budget (though it still would not reach the record levels of 2022, when oil-and-gas revenues totaled 11.6 trillion rubles).

Under a more pessimistic, albeit rather ordinary scenario, oil-and-gas revenues would remain roughly at March levels: around 600–700 billion rubles per month. That could happen if the Strait of Hormuz is reopened on normal terms. If that happens, full-year oil-and-gas revenues would amount to only around 7.4 trillion rubles.

In any case, the entire difference between the favorable and unfavorable scenarios amounts to about 3 trillion rubles – less than 1.3% of GDP. That is insufficient either to offset the trend toward industrial decline or to fully close the budget “hole.” The share of oil-and-gas revenues in the budget’s income structure fell from 41.6% in 2022 to 17.4% in the first quarter of 2026. This means that rising oil prices alone will not be enough to compensate for the budget’s losses.

Caught in a structural trap

The first quarter exposed a contradiction that cannot be resolved by favorable oil-market conditions. The civilian economy is contracting for deeper reasons: the tax burden is rising, credit is expensive, investment activity is suppressed, and access to technology is limited.

High oil prices may temporarily improve Russia’s budget arithmetic, but they do not change the underlying logic. Even under an optimistic scenario of around one trillion rubles in oil-and-gas revenues per month, the deficit will remain record-high, while expenditures will require either cuts or increased borrowing. Government debt is growing faster than GDP, and Russia is gradually losing what for the past 20 years had been considered its main macroeconomic advantage: the lowest debt burden among major economies.

At the same time, monetary and fiscal policy are both working against growth. The high key interest rate is restraining lending, while higher taxes are eroding business margins. Escaping this combination without structural changes — in the tax system, the allocation of resources between the military and civilian sectors, or in access to foreign markets — will be difficult.

Monetary and fiscal policy are simultaneously working against growth

Nabiullina is right that the calendar factor will work in the opposite direction in the second quarter. But if no recovery follows even with oil at $90 per barrel and three additional working days, that will mean the economy has not merely run into a temporary slowdown, but a structural growth ceiling.

Under the circumstances, the latter would be an entirely natural reality, one far from a worst case scenario. An economic decline of 1–2% a year is actually a fairly mild scenario — wars are usually far more destructive. Annual inflation of 5–6% would seem unusually low for Russia even in peacetime, and after five years of such conditions, Russia’s government debt could reach 60% of GDP and still remain lower than that of each of Ukraine’s key sponsors. In purely financial terms, the country’s margin of stability has not yet been exhausted.

What is absent, however, are any positive prospects for Russia, which will continue to grow poorer slowly and steadily, to fall further behind in development, and to sink deeper into debt once again. The bleakness of this new stagnation will gradually become obvious to everyone. But how that understanding will affect the mood in society and the political situation in Moscow and beyone is not a question for the economists to answer.

When the European Political Community (EPC) summit and the first-ever EU–Armenia summit were first announced, only experts in Armenian affairs actually understood the scale and significance of the events, but Yerevan prepared its hosting duties so diligently that even people far removed from politics soon understood that something big was coming. At the Armenian capital’s Zvartnots airport, planes carrying heads of state began arriving one after another. Until the very last moment, intrigue surrounded whether Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would attend the EPC summit, with the hosts hoping he would not.

However, Zelensky did arrive, and even made several high-profile statements. Among them was this one:

“Russia has announced its May 9 parade, but there will be no military equipment there. This will be the first time in many years that they cannot afford to display weapons at the parade. And Ukrainian drones may also fly over that parade. That is telling.”

After this statement, it became completely clear that a reaction from Russia would follow (and it did follow). After all, Zelensky spoke these words in a capital that many Russian figures had characterized as an outpost that would “never go anywhere.” But today, Armenia’s leadership openly states that it is not Russia’s ally in the conflict with Ukraine. Yerevan has even sent humanitarian aid to Kyiv. Yet more than Zelensky, Yerevan was awaiting the leaders of the countries with which it planned to sign declarations on strategic partnership.

What Yerevan gained from the summits

Alongside heads of state, dozens of journalists from the world’s leading media outlets flew into Yerevan, and Armenia became one of the top stories in the news cycle. Much of the attention came thanks to French President Emmanuel Macron, who not only took an evening stroll through the city accompanied by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, but also went for a morning run with members of his delegation…and several stray dogs. The following day, Macron sang songs by Charles Aznavour while Pashinyan accompanied him on the drums.

France is becoming Armenia’s gateway to Europe. In Yerevan, the sides signed a declaration on strategic partnership, along with agreements on the purchase of transport helicopters and aircraft.

Emmanuel Macron also found time to receive Armenia’s Order of Glory from President Vahagn Khachaturyan and to visit Armenia’s second-largest city, Gyumri. And once again, the visit was accompanied by controversial statements about Russia:

“For a long time, it was believed that Armenia’s security was possible only under Russia’s protection. The 2020 war, the ordeal you endured, the tragedy experienced by many families, showed that this protection was not what many had imagined it to be.

We saw that Russia left Armenia to fend for itself, and we realized that these expectations did not correspond to reality, even though everyone seemed accustomed to believing that Russia was supposed to be the guarantor in the region, because the South Caucasus was supposedly always meant to remain under someone’s protection.

Armenia has proven that another path is possible — a democratic path, launched in 2018 — a path of peace and independent development without external domination.”

Macron also stated that 4,000 Russian troops, including more than 1,000 border guards, are still stationed on Armenian territory. Therefore, he said, Europe must commit itself to helping the country establish more independent border security.

During the EU–Armenia summit, the European agency Frontex and the Armenian Interior Ministry agreed on the text of a new cooperation agreement in the field of border management and migration. The deal provides for strengthening bilateral cooperation in the area of law enforcement, including through interaction with Europol, Eurojust, and the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats.

In Gyumri, just a few kilometers from the places visited by the French president, stands Russia’s 102nd military base, home to the aforementioned several thousand soldiers. Armenia’s leadership has no plans to remove them — at least not for now, as repeated high-level statements attest. However, given the shifts underway in the South Caucasus, the status quo is prone to change. 

President of the European Council António Costa stated in Yerevan that the EU must help Armenia adequately cope with present and future challenges:

“Today’s EPC Summit is truly historic. It is historic because for the first time the EPC meets here, in the South Caucasus; and because it places Armenia in the heart of Europe, which is exactly where it belongs – in light of its long and rich history… And I am glad that again, like in previous Summits, the EPC will be a catalyst for action. Action in support of Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia.”

A turning point

Armenia has long looked toward Brussels. Back in 2009, during the presidency of Serzh Sargsyan, Armenia and five other former Soviet states – Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine – became part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative. Its goal was to deepen political association and economic integration with the European Union. However, 2013 proved to be a turning point.

After several years of negotiations with Brussels, Yerevan was preparing to sign an Association Agreement that envisaged deeper political and economic ties with the EU, as well as the creation of a free trade area. But in September of that year, Sargsyan unexpectedly announced that Armenia would refuse to sign the document and would instead join the Russia-led Customs Union, which later became the Eurasian Economic Union.

The decision marked a major shift in the country’s foreign policy and provoked mixed reactions both within Armenia and among its European partners. In Yerevan, the move was explained by security concerns and close military-political ties with Moscow, which at the time remained Armenia’s main ally.

Even after the change of power in Armenia in 2018, this foreign policy course changed only slightly. Nikol Pashinyan still visited Moscow more often than Brussels, and that status quo could have continued for a long time had it not been for the war with Azerbaijan in 2020. As a result of the 44-day conflict, Armenia effectively lost control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

On November 9 of that year, a trilateral ceasefire agreement was signed, with Russian mediation, and Moscow’s peacekeepers entered the unrecognized republic. It seemed that the Kremlin had further strengthened its position in the region. However, Azerbaijan had other ideas on the matter.

When Baku launched further military operations on Armenia’s sovereign and internationally recognized territory, Yerevan appealed for help to its allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization — first on May 13, 2021, when Azerbaijani armed forces entered Armenia’s Syunik Province, and then in September 2022, when the city of Jermuk came under attack. But in neither the first nor the second case did Yerevan receive so much as diplomatic backing. This was another turning point.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization failed to provide Armenia with even diplomatic backing, and this became a turning point for the country

Events unfolded rapidly after that. The negotiation process shifted from Russia to Europe, meaning Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev no longer traveled to the Kremlin for meetings with Vladimir Putin. Instead, they were received in Prague or Brussels.

European mediators asked Yerevan to soften its demands, and some time later Armenia officially recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Then, in September 2023, Baku launched what it called an anti-terrorist operation in the region, causing both the Armenian population and the Russian peacekeepers to leave. Moscow thus lost its main lever of influence over Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The EU as a civilizational alternative

The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh was a painful blow, but it also opened up European prospects for Armenia.

Against the backdrop of the inaction of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and Russia, public opinion began to change rapidly. For many Armenians, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh became the moment of final disillusionment with the previous system of alliances. Increasingly, people in the country began to view the European Union not merely as an economic partner, but as a possible political and civilizational alternative.

Recent sociological studies confirm the shift. According to a survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI) conducted in February 2026, 72% of Armenia’s residents support the country’s possible accession to the European Union. If a referendum were held “next Sunday,” 51% would vote in favor of EU membership, while only 13% would oppose it. Another 32% said they would not participate in the vote.

If a referendum were held “next Sunday,” 51% would vote in favor of EU membership, while only 13% would oppose it

At the same time, the European vector is increasingly linked not only to issues of democracy, but also to security. The authors of the study note that Armenians see closer ties with the EU as a chance to strengthen the country’s economy, reduce its dependence on Russia, and obtain new guarantees of stability.

In 2024, 66% of respondents described relations with Russia as negative — the highest figure in the entire history of IRI observations. At the same time, when asked about the main drawbacks or dangers of joining the EU, those who are not ready to support European integration responded that the EU would be an unreliable partner (22%), that membership would lead to the loss of national values (15%), and that it would undermine Armenian family traditions (12%).

What the EU promises and delivers

One of the European Union’s most visible steps in Armenia was the deployment of European observers on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The mission was established after the escalation in the fall of 2022, when Azerbaijani troops advanced into Armenian territory. Just a few months later, the EU sent the civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to the country. Its personnel patrol border regions, monitor the situation along the line of contact, and prepare reports for Brussels.

For Armenia, the significance of this mission turned out to be far broader than its formal mandate. For the first time in decades, a Western security-monitoring mechanism appeared in the South Caucasus without Russia’s participation. In Yerevan, this was perceived as a political signal: Europe was prepared not only to talk about reforms and democracy, but also to maintain a presence in the region during a crisis. Armenian authorities have repeatedly stated that the presence of European observers helps reduce tensions on the border and makes developments there more visible to the international community.

With the EU Mission in Armenia, a Western security-monitoring mechanism appeared in the South Caucasus for the first time — without Russia’s participation

At the same time, the European Union began providing economic backing to Armenia. After the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and the sharp deterioration in Yerevan’s relations with Moscow, Brussels effectively offered the country a new partnership framework. In April 2024, at a joint EU–US–Armenia meeting in Brussels, Ursula von der Leyen announced a four-year assistance package worth €270 million.

The funds are intended for infrastructure development, support for small and medium-sized businesses, energy projects, digitalization, and assistance for displaced people from Karabakh. Later, the EU clarified that the total volume of European investment in the Armenian economy under the Global Gateway program could reach €2.5 billion.

In Brussels, officials openly say they want to make the Armenian economy more resilient, reduce its dependence on Russia, and gradually bring the country closer to European standards in areas ranging from market regulation to visa liberalization. The latter process is already well underway: at the EU–Armenia summit, European Union leaders presented Armenian authorities with the first report on the progress of its implementation and noted Yerevan’s significant achievements along this path.

How to minimize the risks on the road to the EU

Speaking before the European Parliament in October 2023, Nikol Pashinyan stated that “the Republic of Armenia is ready to be as close to the European Union as the European Union considers possible.” In essence, this statement means that Yerevan is prepared to do so as soon as tomorrow. But for countries such as Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, EU membership is a long and difficult process. Yerevan has not yet received an official offer to become an EU candidate country, so European integration is generally seen more as a civilizational choice than as a real political prospect for the coming years.

The main question is how to minimize the risks, the most significant of which is posed by Moscow. The Kremlin is already stating that Yerevan must make a choice: either Europe or Russia. The first option would mean leaving the military bloc of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as an effective rupture in trade relations with Russia.

Moscow is already stating that Yerevan must make a choice: either Europe or Russia

Troubling signals emerged a week before the two summits in Yerevan. Russia’s consumer protection agency, Rospotrebnadzor, closed the Russian market to one of Armenia’s most recognizable brands — Jermuk mineral water. Armenia also imports gas from the north, and at some point the Kremlin will inevitably make use of that lever as well. Much will therefore depend on how interested Brussels truly proves to be in supporting Yerevan with more than just diplomatic goodwill.

Pope Leo XIV has creatively developed the tradition of his predecessor: like the Argentine-born Pope Francis who preceded him, Chicago native Leo XIV also speaks out actively on political issues. Moreover, he does so more frequently and more sharply than Pope Francis.

During the Easter prayer vigil for peace, the pontiff called for people to “sit at the table of dialogue and mediation, not at the table where rearmament is planned and deadly actions are decided!”

“Enough of the display of power! Enough of war! True strength,” the pontiff said, “is shown in serving life.” He also condemned the use of religious imagery to justify war, thereby indirectly rebuking Pete Hegseth, the United States Secretary of Defense, who has said that America and Israel’s struggle with Iran is a sacred war of Christians against Islamists.

Leo XIV also did not miss the opportunity to recall that, in 2003, the Holy See under Pope John Paul II condemned the American invasion of Iraq. However, he chose not to remind readers that Pope Francis had also consistently criticized the United States — likely because that fact remains so fresh in the public memory that it does not bear repeating.

Donald Trump predictably saw Leo XIV’s remarks as a reproach directed at him. The president of the United States is a self-absorbed egocentric, prone to lashing out at anyone who fails to please him, and unsurprisingly, he lashed out at the American-born pope, calling him “terrible” on foreign policy and “weak” on fighting crime — apparently a reference to the pontiff’s statements in defense of migrants.

An American pope

The clash between the first American pope and his “own” president has, unsurprisingly, sparked a flood of commentary in the United States. “Only a mad politician would quarrel with the pontiff,” one American acquaintance of mine, a longtime donor to the Republican Party, remarked. “We have millions of Catholic voters. They love the pope simply because he’s from Chicago. Why spit in their faces on the eve of the November midterm elections to the U.S. Congress?”

The question is far from rhetorical. By various estimates, the number of Catholics in America ranges from 57 million to 73 million. This is not only the largest Christian denomination in the country, but the largest religious group in the country.

Since the late 19th century, Catholics have typically voted for the Democratic Party. In recent decades, however, they are increasingly casting their ballots for Republicans. The main reason is that Democrats — especially in the eyes of the more traditional segment of believers — increasingly come off as a party of aggressive secularism, if not atheism, hostile to any religion, and especially to Christianity.

According to polls, this view is particularly common among white Catholics. Among Latino (or “Hispanic”) Catholics, there are more supporters of the Democrats, but even among them Republican influence is growing. In the 2024 election, Catholic voters played a significant role in Donald Trump’s victory. That is precisely why his remarks have alarmed many within the party — including Vice President J. D. Vance, who converted to Catholicism in 2019.

At first, Vance urged the pontiff to focus on moral issues and leave politics to the professionals. However, he soon softened his remarks. Many saw this not only as a form of apology, but even as a public distancing from Donald Trump.

Vance himself, along with many American analysts, considers himself the leading candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 2028. For him, as a Catholic (and moreover, a convert), the support of his own community is almost an essential condition for a successful presidential campaign — especially since another potential candidate, current Secretary of State Marco Rubio, is also a traditional Catholic.

Interestingly, Pope Leo XIV likewise sought to smooth over the impression left by the spat with Trump, saying that his speech about tyrants had been written two weeks before Trump’s attacks and had no direct connection to them. The explanation is not especially convincing, but the attempt to avoid escalating the conflict is evident.

The sparring between the pontiff and the president is a clear illustration of the long-standing ideological confrontation between the Holy See and the United States. Today, the Roman Catholic Church is, above all, a church of the Global South, rather than the Global West, which has to a significant extent lost the Christian faith.

Church of the Global South

There are now 1.4 billion Catholics worldwide, meaning they make up nearly 18% of the global population. The majority live in South and Central America, but Africa is rapidly catching up: it is now home to one-fifth of all Catholics. Asia, especially India and South Korea, is also a region of growth for the Roman Catholic Church.

Hundreds of thousands of priests and bishops come from these regions, often from poor families. For many of them, the seminary was virtually their only opportunity to receive an education. Those who continue their studies at non-church universities — in departments of sociology, anthropology, and history — often fall under the influence of professors who are adherents of the Frankfurt School, or simply Marxists. For these professors, the world is divided into the oppressed (Muslims, along with the indigenous peoples of the Americas, Asia, and Africa) and the oppressors (the United States and Europe). Christianity, in their view, is the religion of colonizers and slave traders, imposed on Africans or the Maya. In their interpretation, the Catholic Church must now repent and seek to compensate the Global South for past sins.

Liberation theology, which emerged in Latin America in the second half of the 20th century, offered a radical example of a synthesis between Marxism and Christianity, calling for a kind of evangelical mission of social assistance to the poor. Despite repeated criticism — and even bans from the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church — liberation theology remains a widespread phenomenon, especially in Spanish-speaking countries.

For a significant portion of the rank-and-file Catholic clergy, along with the Church’s upper hierarchy, the United States is an imperial power that dispenses justice and punishment at will against the “undesirable” states of the Global South. Americans and their allies, according to this view, must be constantly checked and restrained through an abstractly understood framework of international law. In this picture of the world, Washington is almost always wrong, while America’s opponents deserve, if not support, then at least an attempt to understand their position.

Pope Leo XIV has undoubtedly been influenced by such ideas. He is a U.S. citizen, yet he spent twenty years serving in the Peruvian province of Lambayeque, where 30% of the population lives below the poverty line. He even obtained a Peruvian passport.

Judging by some of the pontiff’s statements, in his worldview a U.S. strike on Iran is unequivocally wrong, “selfish” Europeans are unwilling to admit migrants, and Islam is something that should either be spoken of positively or not discussed at all.

Pacifism or support for authoritarian regimes?

Here a paradox is evident. Most of America’s conflicts over the past fifty years have been with dictatorial regimes — communist ones (such as North Vietnam or Cuba), Islamist ones (the Taliban and Iran today), and outright dictatorships (Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro). Each time, calls from the Holy See for peace and adherence to international law have, in practice, worked in favor of authoritarian regimes, prolonging their existence.

Today, aggression is increasingly not about crossing a state border with armored and infantry units, but about conducting drone warfare, carrying out acts of terrorism, waging cyberattacks, and making use of proxy organizations.

The example of Iran is particularly illustrative. On the one hand, the recent attack by the United States and Israel did indeed formally violate international law. On the other, the effective transformation of Lebanon into an Iranian semi-colony through the Tehran-backed Hezbollah is itself a form of aggression, as is the creation in Yemen of an international base for Islamist terrorism via cooperation with the Houthis.

For some reason, Pope Leo XIV chose Lebanon as an example of a state where Muslims and Christians coexist peacefully. Yet a few short decades ago the country was devastated by the Lebanese Civil War. By various estimates, it claimed between 120,000 and 170,000 lives and led to the emigration of many thousands of Maronite Catholics, who in the 1940s had helped establish Lebanon as an independent state. The Iranian regime played an active role in that war, supporting the Shiite group Hezbollah, just as it backs the Sunni Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip. The Holy See condemns Iran for the public executions of regime opponents (as Pope Francis had done), yet Leo XIV is calling for peace precisely at a moment when the Islamist dictatorship in Tehran is facing the most difficult period in its nearly half-century of existence.

The idea that the pope is, in a sense, a “pacifist by office” is broadly correct. But there are exceptions. In Catholic philosophy, there is a concept of the “just war.” At the same time, the final judgment on whether a given war is just depends on specific circumstances. Unlike Pope Francis, who was unable or unwilling to speak unequivocally about Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the current pontiff, to his credit, has clearly described the Kremlin’s actions as imperialist.

The idea that the pope is, in a sense, a “pacifist by office” is, on the whole, correct.

However, it seems that when it comes to the situation surrounding Iran, he could have adopted a more nuanced approach, proceeding from the assumption that the Iranian regime cannot be influenced by any means other than military force.

The pontificate of Pope Leo XIV has only just begun. Will the Catholic Church’s approach to the Global West soften under the “Chicago pope”? That cannot be ruled out — he is vigorous, intellectual, and energetic. In 2029, Donald Trump will leave the White House, while Europe and the United States, with all their shortcomings and problems, will remain the planet’s principal defenders of democracy, and thus of peace.

Court statistics show that Yakovlev’s problems go beyond certification and postponed serial production. According to the SPARK database, 363 lawsuits totaling more than 21.2 billion rubles were filed against the company as a defendant between 2024 and 2026. Most of the disputes are tied to contractual obligations within the production chain, including supplies, contracting work, services and energy. Aviation experts who spoke to The Insider on condition of anonymity said these disputes point to payment problems within the aviation and defense production networks.

The largest plaintiffs include suppliers of titanium, engines, metals, components and avionics, all key parts of the aircraft production chain. According to SPARK, TD VSMPO-AVISMA Corp. filed claims worth 5.7 billion rubles, UEC-UMPO 1.8 billion rubles, Gidromash 1.1 billion rubles, KUMZ 825 million rubles, AMR 395 million rubles and UKBP 278 million rubles. The companies that most often sued Yakovlev were Gidromash, with 30 cases; KUMZ, with 15; Izhstal, with 11; AMR, with 10; Strela Production Association, with eight; and UKBP and ELARA, with six each.

An industry source told The Insider that the wave of supplier lawsuits is linked to the company’s shortage of funds.

“PJSC Yakovlev does not have the money to pay suppliers for services provided and components delivered. Money is allocated from the budget for the most urgent needs, but the situation with contractors arose because no new aircraft are being produced, meaning there is no revenue. Debts have accumulated over previous years and apparently will now be covered from the state budget,” the source said.

An aviation expert who spoke to The Insider on condition of anonymity said the lawsuits against Yakovlev cannot be clearly linked only to the civilian MC-21 and SJ-100 programs. A significant share of the claims, the expert said, may be connected to military production.

“Yakovlev’s main real product, not its project-stage product, is Sukhoi Design Bureau fighter jets. They are literally produced at the same plants in Irkutsk and Komsomolsk-on-Amur where the MC-21 and SJ-100 are assembled, in neighboring workshops and, broadly speaking, by the same people. Fighter jets break down and crash. They need parts, repairs and new aircraft, which means money is needed from the Defense Ministry. But the Defense Ministry is not allocating enough money. It has even stopped giving money to shipbuilders. I am sure a significant share of the lawsuits is connected to this, not to civilian aircraft.

At the same time, the list of plaintiffs shows the lawsuits are mixed. The UEC-UMPO lawsuit is definitely about civilian aviation: it is the developer of the PD-14, the engine for the MC-21. But that claim is within a single structure: both Yakovlev and UEC are part of Rostec. The Gidromash lawsuit is military: at least one ruling concerned spare parts for Indian fighter jets. KUMZ, Izhstal, AMR and VSMPO-AVISMA deal in metals, alloys and titanium, which are used everywhere. With suppliers like that, it is impossible to say whether the cooperation is civilian or military.

These are definitely mixed claims, but the proportion cannot be determined from open data. Aircraft contracts in Russia are a gray area, and that was true even before the war. Even in the civilian sector, the Defense Ministry often appeared around the financial side. For the past two years of the Russian economy, this has been the normal backdrop for enterprises involved in the state defense order: payment problems are widespread there, and contractors are actively complaining about them. Of course, this is not normal, and it is not normal for the aviation industry in particular.

If you set aside the separate Aeroflot story, I would explain this group of lawsuits as payment delays under contracts: there is no money because customers for military aircraft are not making payments, because loans are expensive and because the civilian aviation program has failed. Aircraft deliveries were supposed to have begun already, but they have not. There is no money for them, and the gaps are being covered with loans. Chemezov has already complained about this, without singling out United Aircraft Corp., but UAC looks like the weakest link in this arrangement.”

The court data therefore do not make it possible to clearly attribute all the lawsuits either to the civilian MC-21 and SJ-100 programs or to military production. Some claims are tied to clearly civilian cooperation, some to military contracts, and a significant share concerns suppliers of materials and components that serve both sectors.

PJSC Yakovlev is part of Rostec’s United Aircraft Corp. The company produces the SJ-100 and MC-21 passenger aircraft, as well as military aircraft including the Su-30SM fighter jet and Yak-130 advanced jet trainer. After Western suppliers left Russia, Yakovlev became one of the key contractors in the civilian aviation import-substitution program.

Despite the latest delay in serial manufacturing, Rostec is maintaining ambitious plans for  producing civilian aircraft. At the meeting with Putin, Chemezov said the corporation plans to produce 36 MC-21 aircraft, 20 SJ-100s and 12 Il-114s a year by 2030.

The next tranche for Ukraine is estimated at €1.4 billion and is due to be transferred in July 2026. In the first quarter of this year, Euroclear set aside €744 million for payment as a “windfall contribution,” a sum drawn from the net profit the depository earns by investing cash balances from blocked accounts belonging to Russia’s central bank.

Euroclear’s interest income from sanctioned Russian assets totaled €1.1 billion in the first quarter of 2026, down 23% from the same period a year earlier. The company attributed the decline to lower interest rates and warned that the income would continue to depend on monetary policy. The depository estimated its direct expenses related to sanctions and Russian countermeasures at €38 million, with lost revenue totaling another €9 million.

As of the end of March 2026, Euroclear Bank’s balance sheet stood at €237 billion, of which €200 billion related to sanctioned Russian assets. The depository continues to be involved in court proceedings in Russia, including cases initiated by Russia’s central bank, and says the risk of unfavorable rulings is high as Moscow does not recognize international sanctions. Proceeds from sanctioned assets remain the main source of funds the EU has directed to support Ukraine since 2024.

In December 2025, EU countries agreed to indefinitely freeze €210 billion in Russian state assets. Previously, the freeze had to be extended every six months and could have been blocked at any time by Hungary or Slovakia. The decision was also aimed at persuading Belgium to support an EU plan to issue Ukraine a loan of up to 165 billion euros backed by the frozen assets.. Kyiv would repay the loan only if Russia pays reparations for war damage. Russia’s central bank at the time called the EU plans “illegal” and filed a lawsuit against Euroclear in a Moscow arbitration court.

The ceremony came to light after a memorial museum opened in Pyongyang on April 27 with photographs from the event on display. The images show Putin personally presenting Russian state awards to North Korean military personnel.

A caption under the photographs reads: “Ceremony for presenting state awards of the Russian Federation to the chief commanders and soldiers of the Korean People’s Army’s overseas operational unit who took part in the operation to liberate the Kursk Region, Dec. 3, 2025.” The medals themselves are also on display at the museum.

According to NK News, at least five senior North Korean military officers received awards. Their identities have not been officially disclosed, but the outlet suggests they may be the generals Putin greeted at the Victory Day military parade in Moscow on May 9, 2025.

The ceremony had not previously been reported publicly and did not appear on the Kremlin’s official schedule. Chris Monday, a Russia expert at Dongseo University, said the Kremlin likely concealed the event deliberately. In his view, Moscow wants to highlight its alliance with North Korea while avoiding the appearance of being too dependent on Pyongyang.

Monday also suggested the awards may have been an attempt to ease tensions between Russian and North Korean military personnel. He said North Korean officials were dissatisfied with how their units were used in the Kursk region and had criticized Russia’s command.

The museum exhibit also shows footage from visits by State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, who were guided through the museum by Kim Jong Un.

Independent Russian outlets Politzek-Info and SotaVision reported that Yarotsky committed suicide during the night of May 6 to 7 at the IK-7 penal colony in Khadyzhensk, a city in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai. His death was disclosed in a letter from Alexander Nozdrinov, another political prisoner held at the same colony.

According to Nozdrinov, Yarotsky repeatedly complained of pressure from the prison administration, with SotaVision adding that he was forced to work at night despite having health issues.

Yarotsky was first tried in December 2023, when a court sentenced him to 1.5 years in a general-security penal colony for “desecrating a symbol of military glory.” The charge stemmed from a political cartoon he posted on social media depicting Putin, a penis, and a St. George ribbon, which has become a symbol of Victory Day commemorations in modern Russia. The sentence was later overturned, and the case was sent back for retrial.

In the spring of 2025, the artist was sentenced again, this time to 5.5 years in a penal colony. He was convicted of spreading “false information” about the Russian army and “desecrating a symbol of military glory” over a post about Russian battlefield losses in Ukraine.

SotaVision noted that Yarotsky was at least the seventh Russian political prisoner to die behind bars this year. 

The drones in question are those of the Geran (“Geranium”) series — localized Russian versions of the Iranian Shahed. These represent the most widely employed deep-strike loitering munitions used by the Russian military to target Ukrainian infrastructure.

Geran drones are primarily divided into autonomous and manually controlled variants, but the majority fall into the autonomous category, functioning as slow-moving cruise missiles and navigate toward pre-programmed coordinates without human control. However, newer variants featuring direct manual control have emerged, utilizing mesh modems and cameras to maintain a link with ground operators. These variants have been adapted for specialized roles, with some even observed carrying air-to-air missiles or man-portable air-defense systems for engaging Ukrainian aircraft.

To counter the sustained Russian drone campaign, Ukraine has employed a range of measures, from kinetic air defenses to electronic warfare (EW), which targets the satellite navigation systems of Russian drones by jamming and spoofing legitimate satellite signals, causing the navigation of the drone to deviate.

To survive these efforts, Russian drones rely on Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs) for navigation. Unlike standard antennas, CRPAs contain an array of elements, each of which functions as an individual antenna patch. In this manner, a CRPA can identify the direction of incoming jamming and create a blind spot to block the interference while sharpening actual satellite signals, ensuring the drone maintains its course even when targeted by EW systems.

The effectiveness of a CRPA is directly tied to its element count. For instance, a 16 element CRPA can resist jamming from 15 different sources. In Geran UAVs, CRPAs work in tandem with inertial navigation units, which serve as backup systems if the antenna is completely jammed. However, drones cannot rely on inertial measurement alone, as these systems are prone to cumulative drift over hours of flight, requiring correction from the CRPA’s satellite navigation to maintain accuracy. Without these antennas, the Geran is essentially unable to strike targets precisely.

How Chinese companies supply Alabuga with antennas

Harxon Corporation is a large Chinese business specializing in the sale of navigation antennas. By its own count, the company has “over 400 employees and more than 200 partners worldwide.” The firm presents itself as a subsidiary of the U.S. sanctioned BDStar.

Harxon’s online product catalog, aimed at the civilian market, indicates that the product codes for the company’s antennas all begin with HX. Nordsint has documented antennas with the same prefix in the debris of Shahed drones. In particular, these models were labeled for use in "grain combine harvesters.” This tactic is likely used to bypass Chinese export customs, as Chinese law prohibits the export of dual use goods to military users. A model of this name does not appear in Harxon’s public catalog, possibly indicating a hidden model for military clients.

Posing as a supplier for Russian military drone production, Nordsint contacted Harxon asking to purchase CRPAs. Nordsint reached out to Harxon’s official sales email, but received a reply from the personal email of a representative named Masha Wu. Wu expressed a willingness to sell antennas but emphasized that the transaction would be handled under a different company name. “We will use other company for communication and contract signature (not Harxon) because it's sensitive,” wrote Wu. She is identified on LinkedIn as an overseas sales manager at Harxon. 

When asked about the availability of the HXTX9050A, Wu said that the company did not stock the model, but said similar ones were available. Wu subsequently transferred the sale to a representative named Anthony, later identified on an invoice to Nordsint as Anthony Zheng, from a company called NavX Technology Co., Ltd. Due to the restricted nature of anti-jamming solutions, Zheng asked to move the conversation from WeChat to Telegram. Little information exists about NavX as a company. It does not have an online presence, and no official mentions of the company name can be found online apart from business registries, which indicate the company was incorporated in July 2025.

Zheng offered antennas with seven, eight, and 16 channels, designated as models GI004, GI005, and GI006, and provided technical documents for each antenna. A discrepancy appeared in the documentation for the GI006 16-channel antenna, which was internally labeled as the GI015 within the technical specifications. Despite this labeling, the filename of the document remained GI006, and the GI006 designation appears on a final invoice of these antennas.

None of these models exist in online records, and they appear to be manufactured exclusively for military clients. “We will have the normal civilian antennas in the near future. I will share more information when we build up the cooperation” said Zheng. When asked if NavX stocked the HXTX9050A, Zheng said that the “GI005 is smaller and better than HXTX9050A,” indirectly acknowledging the existence of the latter model. According to Zheng, Harxon/NavX CRPAs use almost entirely Chinese made components, with the only foreign components in the system being a cheap Samsung capacitor. Additionally, he mentioned the company was in the process of developing a 32-channel antenna. 

Nordsint placed a bulk order for 200 units, consisting of 100 7-channel antennas, 50 8-channel antennas, and 50 16-channel antennas. The invoice for the antennas identified the seller as Shenzhen NavX Technology Co., Ltd., and the company requested that payment be directed to a VTB Bank account.

Previously, The Insider revealed that this bank serves as a key processing hub for Chinese firms supplying the Russian defence industry. The total cost for this hardware amounted to 5,443,200¥ ($797,188). The cost of each individual antenna was 49,030¥ ($7176) for the 7-channel variant, 55,200¥ ($8,079) for the 8-channel model, and 108,864¥ ($15,934) for the 16-channel version.

The company’s name indicated on the seal appears to be authentic, while the registration number provided does not.

Nordsint cross-referenced the images provided by NavX with photos from Ukrainian auctions featuring captured drone components. In several instances, antennas captured in Ukraine still retained product stickers in Chinese specifically designating the antennas as GI004 and GI006 respectively, the same models sold by Navx. In the case of the 7-channel GI004 antenna, the sticker found in the field is identical to the sticker featured in photos sent by NavX. These stickers indicate in Chinese that the units are “agricultural machinery navigation antenna,” a false label presumably used to bypass Chinese export restrictions, as it is unlikely Russian customs services would understand the associated Chinese text. 

Zheng confirmed the company’s direct involvement with the Russian military. “We are working with Alabuga, so we have to make it confidential,” he said when questioned on the lack of public information regarding NavX.

The Alabuga plant, located inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, is the primary production facility for Russian drones of the Geran and Gerbera varieties. The Gerbera is a simplified version of the Geran and uses a similar radar signature to overwhelm air defenses during attacks, though certain variants are also used in strike and reconnaissance roles. Additionally, markings on antennas contain the prefix ALB, which possibly corresponds to the Alabuga plant. At the time of writing, the GI-006 is the most common 16-channel CRPA found in Russian drones, judging from the relative amount of online listings.

The GI-006 is the most common 16-channel CRPA found in Russian drones

Beyond specifically labeled antennas, numerous other instances of antennas manufactured by the company are found in online listings. The identification of these antennas can be done by comparing internal layouts, case materials, and design elements to known examples.

Harxon’s shell company

Nordsint’s buyer persona questioned Zheng on the relationship between Harxon and NavX. Zheng claimed the two operate as “separate, independent companies.” However, when pressed on whether NavX serves as a rebrand to protect Harxon from sanctions, Zheng wrote that “this angle is correct,” while adding, “but I don’t belong to Harxon anymore.” 

He explained that Harxon was not allowed to sell to military clients, explaining that Harxon would refer to NavX for these cases. “If Harxon has some military project they can't make, [they] will recommend to us.”

When pressed on whether NavX serves as a rebrand to protect Harxon from sanctions, Zheng wrote that “this angle is correct”

Despite Zheng’s claims that NavX and Harxon work as independent companies, online evidence points to NavX acting as a shell company for Harxon’s military sales. Zheng, who signed NavX’s invoice, is identified as the overseas sales manager for Harxon on the e-commerce marketplace made-in-china.com.

Additionally, a facial recognition search of Zheng’s profile pictures on WeChat show that he appears several times on Harxon’s website, as well as at the Intergeo 2023 exhibition with a nametag identifying himself as Anthony Zheng. Furthermore, a Linkedin post made by a Turkish civilian surveying company specifically identifies Anthony Zheng and Masha Wu as representatives of Harxon who visited the company. In 2022, Zheng visited Russia and took part in the Agrosalon exhibition. His Linkedin profile indicates that he has worked for Harxon since 2019.

There are no official mentions of NavX antennas in Russian trade data, nor are there any official instances of the company NavX trading with Russian counterparts. Previously, The Insider reported that between August and September 2024, an Alabuga-based company, Morgan LLC, imported more than $1 million worth of Harxon antennas. The trade data indicate that Chinese and Turkish shell companies as well as Harxon itself acted as exporters. Trade data shows that antennas shipped directly by Harxon had dimensions of 33.4mm x 33.4mm x 7.7mm, which are significantly smaller than CRPA models and close to the size of individual antenna patches. Other shipments from Harxon were specified as “not for military use.” 

Nonetheless, trade data is not a perfect indication of supply, as shipments of sensitive goods are often obfuscated from Russian customs databases or concealed as other components. Additionally, Harxon does sell to legitimate civilian markets in Russia. However, when comparing the indicated value and weight of shipments from Harxon to Alabuga to the value and known weight of invoiced antennas, the figures are more consistent with CRPAs than civilian antennas manufactured by the company.

Harxon continues to participate in the global market. The company took part in the XPONENTIAL Europe 2026 trade fair held in Dusseldorf, Germany in March 2026. The company’s website shows it has authorized distributors in 27 countries, including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Brazil, and Japan. Harxon’s parent company BDStar has been under American sanctions since 2024, albeit for reasons unrelated to support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, the firm was added to the list “for their support to the [Chinese] High Altitude Balloon that overflew the United States in February 2023.” 

At the time of writing no countries apart from the United States have sanctioned BDStar, and Harxon is not subject to the restrictive measures of any country, allowing it to continue doing business as usual. Sanctions on the company, of course, would impact the markets in which it can sell its products.

The Insider sent comment requests to Harxon Corporation, VTB Bank, and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Chinese Embassy in Latvia. The Insider did not receive an immediate reply from Harxon. However, Zheng cleared all Telegram chats with Nordsint’s buyer account after comment requests to Harxon were sent.

The Chinese Embassy stated that it “would like to highlight that China’s position on the Ukraine issue remains consistent and clear. We have worked actively for a ceasefire and to promote peace talks. We never provide lethal weapons to any party to the conflict, and strictly control the exports of dual-use items.”

VTB Bank requested information of the full company name on the invoice, which The Insider provided by email. VTB did not respond further.

With the participation of Andrey Zayakin.